Abstract
The Zeuthen bargaining model occupies a prominent place among those theories of the bargaining process that have been formulated and expounded by economists. Its solution to the bargaining problem is essentially economic, since invariant utility functions based on economic factors alone determine the outcome. However, this paper shows that a necessary condition for reaching the Zeuthen solution (shown by Harsanyi to be mathematically equivalent to the game-theoretic solution of Nash's theory) is that bargainers initially take up positions on opposite sides of the outcome that maximizes their utility product. Whether utility functions are mutually known or unknown, inherent in the bargaining situation itself is the requirement that bargainers be at least initially uncertain as to each other's subsequent concession behaviour. With uncertainty, von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality implies that each bargainer would make an initial demand that maximizes the expected gain from holding fast. Therefore, even if Zeuthen's concession criterion should subsequently dictate concession behaviour, expected utility maximization within the context of subjective uncertainty may well yield initial demands that are inconsistent with reaching the Nash-Zeuthen solution. Finally, a general methodological conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that, since the bargaining process necessarily proceeds from a context of subjective uncertainty, greater emphasis needs to be placed on its role as a device for affecting expectations.
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Saraydar, E. Uncertainty, the bargaining problem, and the Nash-Zeuthen solution. Theor Decis 1, 309–319 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139573
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139573