The article shows that in her book Frontiers of Justice, Martha C. Nussbaum interprets the concept of the social contract developed by John Rawls in a one-sided manner. Against this background, I propose a theory of justice other than that offered by Nussbaum. The author is in favour of the Hobbesian interpretation of counter-actualism and reads Rawls in this spirit. She claims that he accuses individuals of insensitivity to others and self-interest. He claims that people co‑operate and associate with each other only in the hope of mutual benefits. However, Rawls’ arguments can be reconstructed differently. When we consider what he writes about reciprocity, moral education and well-organised society, mutual benefit ceases to be the reason for socialisation and the premise of indifference. It is a tool to protect the weak from exploitation. Respect for others and social bonds based on reciprocity are the prevailing attitudes. Doubts will arise about Nussbaum’s interpretation of Rawls’s tendency to marginalise the weak, the poor and the disabled. I also suggest relieving the tension suggested by Nussbaum between the requirements of the social contract and the Kantian ideal of personal dignity. The element of the contract that refers to the ideas of reciprocity and honesty also acquires a moral character in contrast to the pragmatic character suggested by Nussbaum.
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