Abstract
A case from 1996 in Oregon in which citizens' legally publicmotor vehicle information was disseminated on a World Wide Website is considered. The case evoked widespread moral outrageamong Oregonians and led to changes in the Oregon records laws.The application of either consequentialist ornon-consequentialist moral theories to this and otherinformational privacy cases is found to be inadequate.Adjudication of conflicting desires is offered as the appropriateanalytical model for moral disputes. The notion of adjudicationoffered here diverges from traditional moral theories in itsindeterminate nature.
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Scanlan, M. Informational privacy and moral values. Ethics and Information Technology 3, 3–12 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011471604734
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011471604734