Abstract
In this essay, I exploit an ambiguity in the concept of self-determination. Self-de Green termination can mean to determine oneself in choices and actions or to determine one’s self. The second kind of self-determination leads to our capacity to imagine alternative selves of ourselves, which are to be actualized. This creates the basis for a normative conception of self-determination, i.e. a conception that incorporates the aspect of a right or good way to determine oneself. I defend a normative interpretation of self-determination, which is illustrated by reference to three theorists: Harry Frankfurt, Thomas Hill Green and John Stuart Mill.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Fabian Wendt, Andrea Esser and participants at the “Thick (Concepts of) Autonomy” conference in Münster (2012) and at the University of Arizona (2014) for helpful comments. This paper is a revised version of an article published in German in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie in 2011.
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Schramme, T. (2022). Determining Oneself and Determining One’s Self. In: Childress, J.F., Quante, M. (eds) Thick (Concepts of) Autonomy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 146. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80991-1_3
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