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The pragmatist more than any one else sees himself to be, between the whole body of founded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him. Who so well as he ]eels the immense pressure of obfec~ive control under which our minds perform their operations ? (p. 233).
On pragmalistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of word, it is true (p. 299).
If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmalism, in the sense of being good for so much (p. 73).
W. James,The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy 1896. New Impression. London 1912. — Deutsch von Th. Lorenz unter dem Titel: Der Wille zum Glauben und andere popularphilosophische Essays. Stutgtart 1899.
As a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use (p. 10).
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds (p. 11).
A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, wotdd be an irrational rule (p. 28).
Studies p. 111. Mit Benutzung der ausgezeichneten Obersetzung von Eisler.
A. a. O. p. 7ff.
The use-criterion (Humanism p. 59).
Humanism, p. 8.
Nur diejenigen Urteile, die diese Probe bestanden haben, dürfen nach Schiller als Wahrheiten charakterisiert werden. Die Folge ist alles, der Ursprung nichts. Auch niche dec Ursprung aus sogenannter reiner Vernunft. Die reine Vernunft ist überhaupt nut ein Mythus, der lediglich in dew blutleeren Kopf abstrakter Rationalisten existiert. Schiller ist bier ganz unerbittlich und geht in seinem Kampf gegen die Vernunftmythologie sogar noch über James hinaus. „Instead of saying like James: ‘so all-important is it to secure the right action that (in cases of real intellectual alternatives) it is lawful for us to adopt the belief most congenial with our spiritual needs and to try whether our faith will not make it come true’, I should rather say: “the traditional notion of beliefs determined by pure reason alone is wholly incredible. For is not ‘Pure’reason a myth? How can there be such a thing? How, that is, can toe so separate our intellectual function from the whole complex of our activities, that it can operate in real independence of practical considerations ? I cannot but conceive the reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation, It must follow that the use, which has developed it , must have stamped itself upon its inmost sttructure, even if it has not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has no practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or fallure of adaptation, whisk natural selection must sooner or later wipe away.” (Humanism, p. 7f.)
Studies, p. 361.
It is difficult to see why a phenomenon, which is common in the sciences and normal in philosophy, without exalting indignation, should be regarded as inadmissible in the religious sphere (Studies p. 360).
Vgl. hierzuStudies p. 363. — Hier der charakteristische, das im Text Entwickelte zusammenfassende Satz: „The controversy about the logical value of religious experience will have henceforth to be conducted with considerably expanded notions of what evidence is relevant.” — Die geforderte Erweiterung besteht in der grundsätzlichen Einbeziehung derjenigen Annahmen,which are not capable of direct verification by sense-perception.
It allows the usidest liberty to experiment: But it inexorably judges such experiments by the value of their actual achievements, and sternly withholds its sanction from insincere phrasemongering, from ineffecetual aspiration, from unworkable conceptions, from verbal quibblings and dead formulas. Studies p. 358f.
Vgl. hierzu die Theorie der religiösen Urteile in meiner Religionsphilosophie 1921, S. 188ff.
Vgl. James,The Meaning of Truth (London 1909) p. VIf.:Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intelleactally, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn’t entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality’s whole setting, . . . will be true of that reality.
Über Macchlavelli als Schriftsteller 1807. W.W., XI., 449.
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Soholz, H., Stück, Z. Die Religionsphilosophie des Als-ob. Annalen der Philosophie 3, 1–73 (1921). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02901663
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02901663