Abstract
In this paper I distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘global’ forms of ‘envatment’. I show that recent envatment arguments (the ‘local’ variety) work similarly to arguments from perceptual illusion and that neither of them are able, by themselves, to get us ‘global’ scepticism. Consequently, motivating the radical sceptical idea that all of our perceptual beliefs might be false is harder than it looks.
Included in N. Venturinha (ed.), Special Section on Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology.
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