Abstract
In a triad of practice manuals collectively titled The Process of Meditation (Bhāvanākrama I, II, III), the eight century Indian Buddhist philosopher Kamalaśīla singles out vipaśyanā (insight meditation) to be of particular importance on the early stages of the Buddhist path. This paper provides a reconstruction of vipaśyanā based on how it is depicted in that work. I make two primary claims. First, vipaśyanā is a technique for facilitating the direct perceptual ascertainment of a select set of properties, and second, it accomplishes this by reconditioning the practitioner’s conceptual habitation. I further enrich this reconstruction by suggesting a series of stages that a practitioner progresses through, based on a list of intrinsically and extrinsically epistemic cognitions that Kamalaśīla gives in his Commentary on the Compendium on Reality (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā). I end the paper with a potential method to use during meditation for altering one’s conceptual habitation. Kamalaśīla does not explicitly state these claims, but they can be inferred based on the theories on cognition found in both Kamalaśīla’s other works as well as the works of the Pramāṇavāda philosophers who influenced him. This reconstruction of vipaśyanā thus remains consistent with Kamalaśīla’s own philosophical commitments, and is, I argue, the best way to explain the cognitive function of vipaśyanā given those commitments.
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Notes
Direct perceptual ascertainment and its role in cognition are described in the work of the philosophers whose theory of mind Kamalaśīla adopted, namely, Dharmakīrti and his commentors. For more on their discussion of direct perceptual ascertainment, see Dunne (2004, pp. 287-309) and Arnold (2005, pp. 38–42).
These four are śamatha, vipaśyanā, the limit of entities (vastuparyantatā), and the perfection of the goal (kāryapariniṣpatti) (Tucci 1971, p. 1).
“…it called conceptual content because of the presence there of the defining characteristic of vipaśyanā, [namely,] a concept that corresponds to what is real.”
...savikalpapratibimbakam ucyate. tattvanirūpaṇavikalpasya vipaṣyanālakṣaṇasya tatra samudbhāvāt. Tucci (1971, p. 2).
With regard to that, the Buddha briefly taught in the Cloud of Jewels sutra, the definitions of śamatha and vipaśyanā:
Śamatha is having a mind of singular focus. Vipaśyanā is correct examination.
tatra śamathaś cittaikāgrata. vipaśyanā bhūtapratyavekṣeti saṃkṣepād āryaratnameghādau bhagavatā śamathavipaśyanāyor lakṣanam uktam. Tucci (1971, p. 3).
And vipaśyanā is called correct examination.
bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate. Tucci (1971, p. 5).
See Adam (2008) for more on this identification.
That said, the etymology of pratyavekṣā suggests a perceptual process, as the term is built off of the verbal root ‘īkṣ,’ “to see” (Adam 2008, p. 197).
darpaṇāntargatasvamukhapratibimbapratyavekṣeṇa svamukhagatavairūpyāṇām viniścayavat. Tucci (1971, p. 2). Kamalaśīla here is using the literal meaning of pratibimba as “reflection.” Elsewhere, the related term “pratibimbaka” is used in a more technical sense, meaning “content.”
“But when the yogi does not determine reality more clearly, like someone born blind, a person who has entered darkness, or someone whose eyes are closed, then he should know that his mind is stuck, and devoid of vipaśyanā.”
yadā tu jātyandhavad andhakārapraviṣṭipuruṣavad vinimīlitākṣavat sphuṭataraṃ tattvaṃ nāvadhārayed yogi tadā tasya cittaṃ līnaṃ veditavyaṃ vipaśyanārahitaṃ ca. Tucci (1971, p. 9).
Similarly, Paul Griffiths argues that Vasubandhu also depicts vipaśyanā as a form of “seeing-as” (1983, p. 83).
For more on the pedagogical relationship of being mind-only and emptiness in The Process of Meditation, see Arnold (2017).
“And vipaśyanā is called correct examination. Moreover, what is correct is the selflessness of persons and phenomena.
bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate. bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyaṃ Tucci (1971, p. 5).
Adam (2008) argues that while bhūta in this case could be translated as an adjective such as ‘correct,’ as I have done and David Ruegg does (1992, p. 110), he prefers the nominal translation of bhūta as ‘reality’ to “emphasis the actuality of the object cognized” (195-196). Given that pratyavekṣā here means a perceptual process, the object being examined will itself be real, regardless of whether that examination comes to a correct judgement about the object. What is important for Kamalaśīla when he uses this phrase is the truth of the judgment from that examination, not the ontological status of the examined object. For this reason, I have chosen the adjectival translation of ‘correct.’.
Vincent Eltschinger explains, “In other words, a single instance of perception grasps its object in all its aspects (sarvākāreṇa, sarvātmanā), leaving nothing of it unapprehended” (2013, p. 252).
tasmād bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitāsya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam. bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānāt mādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat. tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva cittam […] TSP ad TS 3337.
In Buddhist philosophy, there are exceptions to this, where no concepts are formed following sensory cognition. This occurs in the case of advanced meditative states, such as yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) and the attainment of extinction (nirodhasamāpatti), that are achieved by practitioners that are farther along the Buddhist path than the vipaśyanā practitioner. For more on yogic perception see Dunne (2006), and for more on the attainment of extinction, see Griffiths (1986).
Note that some readers will find it more natural to refer to this as concept deployment. I use the term “formation” because in Buddhist epistemology, these are token conceptual constructions, rather than persisting types of concepts. This theory—that we habitually form token concepts identical to the concepts formed in previous similar perceptual encounters—is similar to the theory in contemporary philosophy of mind that we deploy the same type of concept in response to similar sets of stimuli. Buddhist philosophy of mind holds that all cognitive events are momentary, so in this case, it is more accurate to speak of momentary token concepts rather than persisting types.
This is due to our conceptual habitation, which will be described in more detail in “Habituation and Cognitive Imprints” section. What I am describing in this paragraph is the point at which the observer has already learned from their linguistic community how to use a particular type of concept, which Pramāṇavāda philosophers refer to as “the time of using the linguistic convention” (vyavahārakāla). The initial act of forming a new type of concept in response to a perceptual encounter is more complex on this nominalist account, and is referred to as “the time of [establishing] the linguistic convention” (saṃketakāla) (Arnold 2006 n. 70, 71).
Tom Tillemans argues that the kind of correspondence in this case is correlation without isomorphism (1999, pp. 9–10). The Pramāṇavāda philosophers were nominalists. On their account, when we make judgments, we mistakenly believe that the properties expressed by the concepts in the judgments distribute over what are in fact unique particulars. Since, on this nominalist account, no property is actually shared across particulars, all judgments involve some amount of error (bhrānta). This error indicates a lack of any isomorphism between judgments and facts about the particulars. Nevertheless, Tillemans argues that, on Dharmakīrti’s account, these judgments can still be said to correspond to facts in a minimal correlational sense (1999, pp. 9–10). For a judgment to be true, there must be some fact regarding the object that the judgment corresponds to.
The conditions that cause us to make this kind of error will be discussed in detail in the “Habituation and Cognitive Imprints” section.
This includes cognitions such as correct examination (bhūtapratyavekṣā). Given that Kamalaśīla identifies vipaśyanā as a form of correct examination, as stated above, the argument that follows in the next section could be construed as answering the question of what kind of ascertainment is involved in vipaśyanā.
tasmāt samādhihastena manaḥ saṃdhāya sūkṣmataraprajñāśastreṇa tatra cetasi rūpādimithyāvikalpabījam uddharet. evaṃ saty utkhātamūlā iva taravo bhūmer nirmūlatayā mithyāvikalpāḥ punaś cetasi na virohanti. ata evāvaraṇaprahāṇāya śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo bhagavatā nirdiṣṭaḥ. Tucci (1958, p. 213).
cittamātramevaitat sarvaṃ na punarbāhyo ‘rtho vidyate. Tucci (1958, p. 210).
Note that one can hold an inferential judgment that is contradictory with one of their perceptual judgments. These kinds of contradictory judgments are evidenced in examples such as perceptual illusions where the observer is aware that what they are observing is an illusion. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that an individual would be able hold two simultaneous contradictory perceptual judgments. While there might be rare cases of individuals for whom this kind of contradiction is possible, it is important to keep in mind the kind of person Kamalaśīla has in mind when he considers the standard vipaśyanā practitioner. As McClintock (2010) explains, Kamalaśīla’s audience is, ideally, an audience of judicious persons (prekṣāvant), and is, in fact, both fellow Buddhists and worthy opponents (49-62). McClintock is referring to the audience of Kamalaśīla’s Commentary on the Compendium on Reality, but it is reasonable to assume that Kamalaśīla is speaking to a similar audience in other texts such as The Process of Meditation. It is difficult to imagine how such a thinker could hold two contradictory perceptual judgments simultaneously.
This conditioning process is described in detail in the next section.
bhāvanāḥ abhyāsāḥ. TSP ad TS 37 Thanks to Sara McClintock for pointing this out to me.
“Since the differentiation in this case is differentiation through exclusion, the determination is [a form of] ascertainment. The causes of this are habituation, close proximity, degree of acuity of comprehension, and so on. For it is not the case that the mere appearance is the cause of ascertainment, but [its causes] are instead habituation and so on. For this reason, the meaning [of the previous verse] is that ascertainment is brought about when all these [causes] are present.”
yasmādbhedo vyāvṛttiryadbhedastatra vyasāyo niścayastasya kāraṇamabhyāsaḥ pratyāsattistāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ cetyādi. nahyanubhavamātrameva niścayakāraṇaṃ kiṃtvabhyāsādyo ‘pi. tena yatra te santi tatra niścayaḥ prasūyata ityarthaḥ. TSP ad TS 587.
anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati. PVSV 32.5.
tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo ‘nubhavād bhedaniścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ. PVSV 32.5-12. This translation is based on the translation and analysis found in Kellner (2004, pp. 19–32).
See Kellner (2004, pp. 27–28).
Kellner (2004, pp. 19–32).
yathā janakādhyāpakāviśeṣe ‘pi pitaramāthāntaṃ dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti niścinoti. TSP ad TS 1305.
Adam (2016, pp. 369–370).
“If someone objects, “How is there the ascertainment of evidence?””
liṅganiścaya eva kathamiti cet. TSP ad TS 1474–1476.
abhyāsāt. yathā maṇirūpādiṣu tadvidām. TSP ad TS 1474–1476 Thanks again to Sara McClintock for pointing out this passage.
The 14th century Vedānta philosopher Vedānta Deśika makes a similar claim, stating that the expert jeweler can perceive sensory properties, such as subtle distinctions between colors, that the novice does not apprehend (Freschi 2011). Elisa Freschi provides a translation of Deśika’s work, Theistic Mīmāṃsā, in which Deśika states that, “[In the case of the expert jeweler,] the difference among colours [of a precious stone], which was first concealed by their similarity, is eventually made apparent as something sensual through accurate investigation” (2011, pp. 12–13).
dang po’i me dang chur snang ba’i shes pa yang goms pa med pa na rang rgyud kyi tshad ma nyid kyis gzung du zin kyang ‘khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan yod pa’i phyir nges pa bskyed pa’i nus pa med pa de bas na / de la phyis kyi tshad ma ‘jug pas tshad ma nyid du rnam par gzhag pa / de ltar na gzhan las tshad ma yin no / de yang goms pa yod cing gsal ba can thob pa na rang nyid las yin te / See Dunne (2004) for the Tibetan and a further discussion of this passage (294).
See Krasser (2003) for the various lists of intrinsically and extrinsically epistemic cognitions given by a number of different authors in the Pramāṇavāda movement.
My presentation of this list is based upon the list given by Ernst Steinkellner (1992, p. 259). Kamalaśīla’s own presentation of this list is as follows:.
“These [Buddhists] accept that there are some [cognitions] that are intrinsically epistemic, namely, perception from reflexive awareness, yogic cognition, cognition that fulfills a goal, inference, and habituated perception. The latter is ascertained as intrinsic because of having removed the cause of error through the strength of habituation. [In addition,] there are some that are extrinsically [epistemic,] namely, that which is being disputed on this occasion, i.e. cognition produced from directive, and perception that is not devoid of the causes for error, because neither habituation nor a cognition that fulfills a goal has been obtained.”
taiḥ kimñcitsvataḥ pramāṇamiṣṭam yathā svasaṃvedanapratyakṣaṃ yogijñānam arthkriyājñānam anumānābhyāsavacca pratyakṣam taddhi svata eva niścīyate. abhyāsavalenāpahastitabhrāntikāraṇatvāt. kiñcidanyataḥ yathā vivādāspadībhūtaṃ codanājanitaṃ jñāna pratyakṣaṃ cānapagatabhrāntinimittam. abhyāsārthakriyājñānoranavāptatvāt. TSP ad TS 2944.
This claim that the practitioner first learns to infer that the phenomenon is empty is based on Kamalaśīla’s use of the pedagogical framework known as the three knowledges (prajñā). For more on this, see Schmid (2019).
abhyāsāderniścayakāraṇasyābhāvāt kacidādye pratyakṣe bhrāntirutpadyata iti na tasya siddhyetsvata eva pramāṇatā. TSP ad TS 3093.
tasmād abhyāsabalāt protsāritabhrāntinimittam upajāyate yat tat svata eva pramāṇam iti sthitam. TSP ad TS 2968.
See Kellner (2020) for more on the manner in which the habituated perception of emptiness, gained through the conceptual meditation of vipaśyanā, triggers the nonconceptual meditation of yogic cognition.
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PVSV (Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti) =
Gnoli, R. ed. (1960). The Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Auto-commentary. Text and Critical Notes. Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
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Schmid, K. Insight and Ascertainment: The Meditation of Vipaśyanā in Kamalaśīla’s Philosophy of Mind. J Indian Philos 51, 431–452 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09541-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09541-9