Abstract
How is metaphysics related to the empirical sciences? Should metaphysics in general be guided by the sources, methods and results of the sciences? And what about the special case of the metaphysics of the social world: should it likewise be guided by the sources, methods and results of the social sciences? In her paper “Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?”, K. Hawley raises the question: If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach the metaphysics of the social world? She proceeds by discussing three approaches to social metaphysics: (SM-1) inference to the best explanation (IBE) from current social science, (SM-2) descriptive conceptual analysis, and (SM-3) normative, especially ‘ameliorative’ projects. At the end of her discussion, she reaches a rather pessimistic conclusion, especially as regards the IBE approach: “a number of phenomena indicate that the prospects for securely basing social metaphysics via inference to the best explanation from social science are currently faint. […] We need to look elsewhere if we are to develop a metaphysics of the social world.” In my comments on her paper, I try to re-animate the program of an inductive metaphysics by defending the idea that the method of inference to the best explanation (IBE method) should be the central method of justification for metaphysics in general and for social metaphysics in particular.
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Notes
Ladyman, Ross et al. argue that standard analytic (or ‘neo-scholastic’) metaphysics is based on inadequate sources and methods such as (i) philosophers’ armchair intuitions, (ii) uncritical common sense or (iii) out of date and simplified accounts of scientific results. For these and other reasons, analytic metaphysics “should be discontinued” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, vii). Instead Ladyman and Ross favor “a radically naturalistic metaphysics” in the sense of a self-conscious defence of scientism in metaphysics, i.e., “a metaphysics that is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary science” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1, my emphasis). As they emphasize time and again, according to them “no alternative kind of metaphysics can be regarded as a legitimate part of our collective attempt to model the structure of objective reality” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1, my emphasis). I think these challenges are to be taken very seriously by anyone concerned with metaphysics and its methodology.
For an application of the IBE method to the tasks of interpretation in the ‘interpreting disciplines’ (including most social sciences and humanities) see Scholz (2015).
In the Anglo-Saxon world, it is hardly mentioned at all, with the exception of a few remarks by Father Copleston in Volume VII, Chapter XX of his monumental A History of Philosophy (Copleston 1963, 374ff.). The basic idea of Inductive Metaphysics, that metaphysicians should make use of a posteriori sources of justification and inductive methods, goes back to Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) and Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906). Later on, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), Gerardus Heymans (1857–1930), Oswald Külpe (1862–1915), Erich Becher (1882–1929) and Aloys Wenzl (1887–1967) sought to employ a posteriori sources of justification and inductive methods more consistently and more rigorously than their predecessors. Concise statements of the basic ideas and the methodological program can be found in Becher (1921), 318–328 and especially in Becher (1926).
Philosophy and science, in their beginnings, were hardly distinguishable as they were united in their revolution against myth, epic and other forms of non-committal storytelling.
Indeed, many, if not all, philosophical problems can be formulated in this way. Consider, e.g., the problem of free will (how is it possible for us to have free will at time t, supposing all actions are determined by the state of the universe before t and the natural laws?), the problem of skepticism (how is it possible that we know anything, given the skeptical hypotheses the skeptic makes salient?) or the problem of theodicy (how is grave evil possible, supposing the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect God?).
(Q-Phil) presupposes that p is possible. To be sure, discussion may reveal that this presupposition is controversial or even false. In this case, the question should be withdrawn (Nozick 1981, 9).
It should be clear, though, that philosophers are also asking what-questions and why-questions (Scholz 1999) such as “What is justice?”, “What is knowledge?” etc. and “Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief?” or “Why is there something rather than nothing?”.
In view of this critical attitude, the Kantian program has also been called Critical Metaphysics.
In the history of metaphysics, (CF-M) has received, at least, two rather different interpretations: (a) one that emphasizes modesty and metaphysical agnosticism, (b) another that emphasizes radical anti-realist (or ‘idealist’) consequences. This point might be relevant for our topic, social metaphysics and its relation to the social sciences. My guess is that many social scientists and philosophers of social science see themselves in the broadly Kantian traditions, or even in the radical constructivist camp. In Germany, sociology emerged in a broadly neo-Kantian climate. Many social scientists simply assumed that their object of knowledge is not just there to be investigated, but has to be somehow constructed. Other traditions (e.g., the French and German tradition of so-called moral statistics) may have been importantly different in this respect.
A note on terminology: In the context of this paper, I prefer “science-driven” or “science-guided” to “naturalistic”, since the latter might suggest “guided solely by the natural sciences”.
Accordingly, metaphysical beliefs need not be wholly justified a priori though it may eventually turn out that some a priori presumptions cannot be avoided. In any case, the radical apriorism of much of traditional metaphysics is to be given up.
Whereas Peirce used the terms “retroduction” and “abduction” (cf. Peirce 1931–1958, 5.180–5.212, Buchler 1940, 150–156), Gilbert Harman introduced the term “inference to the best explanation” (Harman 1965). For current discussions see Thagard (1978), Lipton (2004), Schurz (2008), Bartelborth (1996, 2012) and Scholz (2015).
Indeed, the greatest mistake in the epistemology and methodology of metaphysics has been to expect a higher degree of certainty from metaphysical theories than from empirical science. There are many historical causes of and reasons for this mistake that deserve close inspection and scrutiny, but I cannot go into these matters here.
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Acknowledgements
I gratefully acknowledge support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Project Grant No. Scho 401/6-1: How Is Metaphysics of Science Possible?). For helpful comments I want to thank the members of the research group Causation, Laws, Dispositions and Explanation at the Intersection of Science and Metaphysics (CLDE) as well as Katherine Hawley and two anonymous reviewers.
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Scholz, O.R. Inductive Social Metaphysics—A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Metaphysics of Social Reality: Comments on Katherine Hawley. J Gen Philos Sci 49, 199–210 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9399-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9399-y