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Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology?

From the book Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology

  • Alexander Schnell

Abstract

This chapter raises the question - based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle (in particular) - of if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath:” beneath the subject and the object where a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being can take place. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism, on the one hand, and an “idealism” - which leaves in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective - on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pregiven objectivity - because it would imply a petitio principia - but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity.”

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston
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