Journal of the History of Philosophy

466 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the fourteenth century. I will agree that the term "natural supposition" does survive in the fourteenth century, but I believe we should be cautious in regard to its meaning and note the caveat of the author of the Logica contra Ockham, who tells us that to speak of natural supposition is to speak improperly. It survives as a term, but the phrase has lost the Platonic punch of the previous century. Despite these qualifications, I think Pinborg's book is verY worthwhile, for in painting his general picture he not only stays close to the latest contributions in these fields but also cites the texts of the medieval authors themselves. One of the great advantages of the work is the bibliographical listing, which notes the contributions of the two fields and their interrelationship made during the two decades before 1972. The author also frequently puts us in touch with a number of medieval texts (Latin with a German translation) that have not been too readily available. It is a handy sketch of recent advances in our knowledge of the medieval developments in these two areas of the trivium. STEPHEN F. BROWN Boston College Charles Partee. Calvin and ClassicalPhilosophy. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, vol. 14. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976. Pp. x + 163. Gld. 44. John Patrick Donnelly, S.J. Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli's Doctrine of Man and Grace. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, vol. 18. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976. Pp. x + 235. These two works are evidence of the expanding interest in early modern Protestant philosophy , especially Scholasticism. Many publications in the various series appearing under the auspices of E. J. BriU have contributed to our understanding of this subject. It is now becoming increasingly apparent that traditional philosophy (i.e., Aristotelian Scholasticism) played a more positive role in the development of Protestantism than previously realised. The two works considered here are uneven in quality, perhaps surprisingly so considering that they come from different series by the same publisher, both under the general editorship of Heiko Oberman. Partee's book takes up a fascinating, if difficult, topic, namely, Calvin's use of classical philosophy. It is, of course, a theme that has been dealt with by many earlier writers, but it has not yet been treated exhaustively. The author succeeds in showing that Calvin's acquaintance with ancient philosophy was more thorough than has usually been admitted. Though Calvin did not quote the ancient philosophers very frequently (Aristotle is cited only ten times in the Institutio), he obviously was well aware of their teachings and had quite a broad knowledge of philosophical sources. Partee's book brings much valuable material to our attention, and the author is well acquainted with much of the vast secondary interpretative literature on Calvin. On the other hand, the book is not very clearly written, is marred by various methodological problems, and is too dependent upon secondary accounts, many of which are quoted at far too great a length in the body of the text. An example of the author's lack of clarity occurs in what would seem to be a rather crucial context, his formulation of a key definition: "'The Christian humanists . . . are defined as those scholars with theological training, however, acquired, who discuss philosophical insights in their writings, with a strong sense of appreciation" (p. 9). This statement, which is said to derive from Kristeller's definition, is neai'ly unintelligible. The notion of "philosophical insights" occurs frequently in Partee's book (e.g., pp. 91, 95, 146) but adds little to clarifying his major theme. In my reading of sixteenth-century writers I have found much discussion of philosophy, but little of "philosophical insights." What, indeed, could a discussion of philo- BOOK REVIEWS 467 sophical insights involve? Also puzzling is a statement such as the following: "In general until the modern period philosophy was primarily concerned with ontology and therefore with epistemology as the way in which being or reality was perceived" (p. 42). I find such a sentence difficult to understand in either a philosophical or a historical sense. Since the book is so much based upon secondary literature...