O₂ can do? Kierkegaard and the Debate on Divine Omnipotence

Abstract

The present article aims at giving a survey of Kierkegaard’s view(s) on divine omnipotence. In addition, an attempt is made to contextualize his view by trying to incorporate it into an overall typological scheme of (mostly) current approaches to the problem. Finally, the scope, significance and viability of Kierkegaard’s account will be assessed. The article arrives at three major conclusions: (1) Kierkegaard’s view of divine omnipotence is best understood in light of (a particular reading of) the notorious claim that “all things are possible for God”; moreover, in Kierkegaard the latter gives rise to a distinction between two essential forms of omnipotence, O₁ and O₂-O₂ being a self-coercive (on God’s part) and in fact paradoxical manifestation of O₁. (2) Kierkegaard’s standpoint does not easily lend itself to being incorporated into the overall typological scheme. (3) The radical and strikingly novel implications of his view regarding a number of classical problems in philosophy of religion (divine omnipotence versus divine love; divine omnipotence versus human freedom; the problem of theodicy) can only be subscribed to by accepting the price of systematically “ambiguizing,” as it were, perhaps even “equivocalizing” all key terms concerned