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Personhood and the practical

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Abstract

Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to our animality. A more inclusive alternative is proposed.

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Notes

  1. Other philosophers have offered somewhat more complicated pictures, but most accept in one way or another the misfit between metaphysical identity questions and practical questions involving personal identity. DeGrazia [4], Shoemaker [5], and my own earlier work [6] each arguably offer a different kind of example of this approach.

  2. One nice survey of some of the more prevalent instances of this practice can be found in DeGrazia [4].

  3. Some philosophers acknowledge this point but take it in a different direction than I do; see, e.g., McMahan [7, pp. 69–86].

  4. For a nice review of some of this evidence see Donald [8].

References

  1. Locke, John. [1690] 1975. An essay concerning human understanding. Ed. Nidditch, P. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  2. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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  3. Olson, Eric. 1997. The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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  4. DeGrazia, David. 2005. Human identity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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  5. Shoemaker, David. 2007. Personal identity and practical concerns. Mind 116: 317–357.

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  6. Schechtman, Marya. 1996. The constitution of selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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  7. McMahan, Jeff. 2002. The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  8. Donald, Merlin. 2001. A mind so rare. New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company.

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  9. Nelson, Hilde Lindemann. 2002. What child is this? Hastings Center Report 32(6): 29–38.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1423 University Hall MC267, 601 S. Morgan St., Chicago, IL, 60607-7114, USA

    Marya Schechtman

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  1. Marya Schechtman
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Correspondence to Marya Schechtman.

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Schechtman, M. Personhood and the practical. Theor Med Bioeth 31, 271–283 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9149-6

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