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The Tragedy of Biomedical Moral Enhancement

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Abstract

In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu present a challenging argument in favour of biomedical moral enhancement. In light of the existential threats of climate change, insufficient moral capacities of the human species seem to require a cautiously shaped programme of biomedical moral enhancement. The story of the tragedy of the commons creates the impression that climate catastrophe is unavoidable and consequently gives strength to the argument. The present paper analyses to what extent a policy in favour of biomedical moral enhancement can thereby be justified and puts special emphasis on the political context. By reconstructing the theoretical assumptions of the argument and by taking them seriously, it is revealed that the argument is self-defeating. The tragedy of the commons may make moral enhancement appear necessary, but when it comes to its implementation, a second-order collective action-problem emerges and impedes the execution of the idea. The paper examines several modifications of the argument and shows how it can be based on easier enforceability of BME. While this implies enforcement, it is not an obstacle for the justification of BME. Rather, enforceability might be the decisive advantage of BME over other means. To take account of the global character of climate change, the paper closes with an inquiry of possible justifications of enforced BME on a global level. The upshot of the entire line of argumentation is that Unfit for the Future cannot justify BME because it ignores the nature of the problem of climate protection and political prerequisites of any solution.

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Notes

  1. In this problem-oriented Spirit, Liao et al. [2] argue for considering various types of human engineering in the debate about solutions for climate change just as economic measures or geoengineering. They include an idea of BME very similar to Persson and Savulescu’s proposal. In this paper, I focus on Persson and Savulescu’s version of the argument since it is more elaborate and far-reaching in its conclusion. I refer to Liao et al. and criticising comments where appropriate.

  2. Thus, the conclusion discussed here goes beyond the claims of other advocates of BME as e. g. Douglas [8], Liao et al. [2], or Persson and Savulescu themselves in an earlier contribution [5].

  3. Apart from purposeful development, basic research in human morality or medical research might result in rudimentary means for BME rather accidentally without any intention to implement them.

  4. Some passages of Unfit for the Future suggest that Persson and Savulescu have other problems like global poverty in mind as well [1, p. 102, 105; 21: 2]. However, in search of effective solutions, problems have to be distinguished carefully. This paper concentrates on climate change.

  5. To simplify the issue, this paper ignores the question of mitigation versus adaption as well as the question for the urgency of possible measures. This is due to the assumption that direct climate protection is an essential part of any policy mix to solve the environmental problems caused by climate change.

  6. The problem of cooperation and the problem of just distribution have to be distinguished carefully. In the following, priority is on the problem of cooperation because it is the more fundamental problem.

  7. G. Hardin borrowed the example from William Forster Lloyd. While Lloyd only uses it to illustrate his remarks on labour markets, Hardin tries to justify a limitation of reproductive freedom with the inevitable tragedy of the commons. His argumentative strategy is very close to that of Persson and Savulescu.

  8. Elsewhere, the authors emphasise a “will to act morally” [1, p. 104], “motivational internalization of moral doctrines” [1, p. 107], “moral motivation” [1, p. 113], and “moral weakness of will” [1, p. 123].

  9. There is no clear distinction between a “feeling of justice and fairness” [1, p. 70] and a “Sense of justice” [1, p. 108] in Unfit for the Future. I take this to be a minor inaccuracy owed to the simultaneous discussion of several distinct problems. Duties towards future generations and non-human animals are an important subject but they are not directly relevant for the basic idea of the tragedy of the commons.

  10. It should be pointed out that there are serious doubts about the assumption that governments act reliably in the interest of their voters [cf. 11, p. 313].

  11. Game theory appears as an appropriate tool to reconstruct the argument inasmuch as Persson and Savulescu explicitly refer to rational actors and game theory provides an established explanation for collective action problems.

  12. Columns in many illustrations of n-person prisoner’s dilemmas show the degree of cooperation in the collective. Table 1 is reduced to the extreme cases of full cooperation and full defection.

  13. For analytical purposes, I disregard side-effects and risks for personal health completely. Nevertheless, they are very likely and hence a serious argument against moral enhancement.

  14. This issue is closely related to the higher-order problem selective incentives face as solutions to problems of collective action. The costly provision of rewards or punishments to overcome free-riding is a problem of collective action itself [cf. 19, 20].

  15. Outside of the theoretical framework I proposed to reconstruct Persson and Savulescu’s argument, a different line of argumentation identifies the problems of climate protection not as problems of collective action but attributes them to a lack of individual willpower or motivation. Concerning BME, it is then criticised that the application of BME by individuals requires exactly the same sort of willpower or motivation BME is meant to bring about in the first place [21–23]. This theoretically distinct approach equally leads to the conclusion that BME in itself can’t solve the problem of climate protection.

  16. At least, this is true for its original form introduced by Lloyd.

  17. G. Hardin acknowledges that the problem he insinuates with the tragedy of the commons occurs only on unmanaged commons and limited his argumentation accordingly [24].

  18. The acceptance of compulsory BME as a solution to the problem of climate change corresponds to the argument for a less liberal attitude of democracies in response to the threats of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction [cf. 1, p. 99].

  19. In contrast, broadly conceived education [cf. 1, p. 2] does not require comparably high incentives because it increases individuals’ chances of success in life which act as integrated selective incentives [cf. 12].

  20. Considering attempts to prevent free-riding, it might be easier to monitor BME than to monitor reduction of emissions. Anyhow, monitoring of emissions is possible even now, e.g. in the context of emissions trading. Apart from that, it is conceivable that unilateral BME of a society is connected to benefits in internal cooperation of this society which outweigh disadvantages in international cooperation. Such advantages could explain unilateral BME but have not been elucidated to date.

  21. For an account of normative consent cf. Estlund [28, p. 117ff]. In contrast to this normative account of hypothetical consent, the argument that it is unlikely that morally enhanced individuals would regret their enhancement because they otherwise “might have been criminals who would have been punished and condemned by society” [1, p. 113] misses the point of the problem of social cooperation. For one, defection in social cooperation is not a criminal act. Moreover, punishment is a transparent social mechanism to influence behaviour under the rule of law.

  22. The benevolent enhancer is a close relative of the benevolent dictator or “benign despot” [29, p. xviii] which economists used to assume before public choice literature challenged the myth [30, p. 4].

  23. Persson and Savulescu [18] optimistically discuss a resembling problem concerning the context specificity of empathy.

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Acknowledgments

The idea for this paper was developed during a research stay at the research group Éticas Aplicadas y Democracia at the University of Valencia, Spain. I highly appreciate the inspiring academic atmosphere and the accommodation the University of Valencia kindly provided. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the MANCEPT Workshops for Political Philosophy, September 10, 2014 in Manchester, United Kingdom and at the DKPhil, October 2, 2014 in Münster, Germany. I’m thankful to all discussants in Valencia, Manchester and Münster as well as to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Norbert Paulo, Christoph Bublitz and Barbara E. Müller for detailed feedback and productive discussions.

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    Stefan Schlag

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Schlag, S. The Tragedy of Biomedical Moral Enhancement. Neuroethics 12, 5–17 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9284-5

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