Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine Francis Glisson’s theory of perception insofar as it concerns the lowest class of living beings: plants. Plants have a special status, they are located between inanimate objects and animals in the hierarchy of being. Unlike the former, they are organic, but unlike the latter they are unconscious. Peculiar to Glisson is the claim that vegetative organization requires self-referential perception. In light of traditional epistemology, this claim may sound puzzling, because we tend to associate self-representation with conscious thought. In order to make sense of Glisson’s self-referential, but unconscious perceptions, the first part of the paper investigates the role of perception in the vegetative process of organization. The second part is a comparative study on two ways of drawing the distinction between unconscious perceptions and conscious sensations. The first one is the Cartesian approach as outlined by Antoine Arnauld in the early 1680s, the second one is Glisson’s theory. In light of the comparison it is argued that Glisson’s is a higher order theory of sensation in which the phenomenon of consciousness requires the delimitation of the all-inclusive, self-referential nature of perception.
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Notes
- 1.
On Glisson’s philosophical and medical views, just to mention a few seminal studies, see Duchesneau 1989, 183–196; Giglioni 2002a, b; Hartbecke 2012; Henry 1987; Hutton 2015; Pagel 1953; Pagel 1967; Rey 2014; Thomson 2008, ch. 3. On the impact Glisson made on the history of vitalism and vital reactivity see Giglioni 2008 and Wolfe 2013. For further items see the bibliographies in Henry 1987, 17. fn. 6; Giglioni 2002b, 175. sqq. and Hartbecke 2012, 273. sqq.
- 2.
On the Helmontian roots of Glisson’s vitalism see Giglioni 2002b.
- 3.
In a personal conversation, Guido Giglioni emphasized that his verdict reflected Albrecht von Haller’s perspective.
- 4.
Although Glisson uses the traditional language of hylomorphism, in his conception individual substances (such as plants or animals) are only particular modifications of the energetic nature of matter. See Ad lectorem 12. Glisson 1672, b3r–v.
- 5.
Glisson seems to be fond of military images. See Giglioni 2002a, 253.
- 6.
X. 29.: Motus hostilis est hostis invadentis exercitus, hic in regno alieno arces et propugnacula sibi exstruit [...]. Porro, motus et affectiones praeternaturales conjunctim, loco vexilli, ideam causae invadentis erigunt. Нас idea non minus inimica est praesenti formae, quam sunt ejus causae: materiam enim ad suos amplexus, et ad dimittendam formam praesentem sollicitat ideoque illius cum hac unionem quodammodo laxat et debilitat. Hae causae, si praevaleant, tractu temporis formam praesentem expugnant, sin contra haec triumphet, illas foras deturbat. Praeviae dispositiones praevalentes sensim intenduntur, donec ad momentum quo forma prasens expellitur deventum fit. Eo enim instanti determinatio materiae praeparatoria completa fit. Cum enim in proximo momento forma vetus expellatur, et nova educatur, clare constat materiam fuisse in antecessum ad eam formam satis determinatam: aliter enim effectus non immediate consecutus fuerat.
- 7.
Guido Giglioni warns the reader not to misconceive Glisson’s notion of perception. In order to avoid anthropomorphic connotations he suggests that perception is “not a cognitive function, but, more fundamentally, a vital act”. My take on this issue is that cognition, existence and power go parallel in Glisson (much in the same ways as in Spinoza). In light of this parallelism, I agree with Guido Giglioni that animism and anthropomorphism are to be avoided, but I suggest one should resist antropomorphism not by denying cognitive functions to the simple forms of material life but by degrading the nature of cognition in them. Elementary vital acts involve elementary cognition (Giglioni 2002a, 254.)
- 8.
See Glisson’s emphatic claim in chapter XV.: illius objectum enim est entitas propria quae repraesentat se, suas causas et effectus, item omnes influentias aliarum rerum, confoederationes, cooperationes, consensus et dissensus, etc. (XV.10, Glisson 1672, 215.)
- 9.
On the history of the speculations about the Glisson-Leibniz connection see Hartbecke 2012, 22.
- 10.
Glisson and Sinoza were associated as having common tendencies by Henry More already in the late seventeenth century, see Henry 1987, 28–29.
- 11.
- 12.
Arnauld expressed his view that all modes of the res cogitans contain a reflexive element as early as his 1648 correspondence with Descartes. Here he speaks of “simple reflexion which is intrinsic to all thoughts” (simplici reflexione omni cogitationi intrinseca, July 1648, in Descartes 1897–1913. V, 213.)
- 13.
- 14.
[N]otre pensée ou perception est essentiellement réfléchissante sur elle-même: ou, ce qui se dit plus heueresement en latin, est sui conscia. Car je ne pense point que je ne sache que je pense. Je ne connais point un carré que je ne sache que je le connais […] La seconde est qu’outre cette réflexion qu’on peut appeler virtuelle, qui se rencontre dans toutes nos perceptions, il y en a une autre plus expresse, par laquelle nous examinons notre perception par une autre perception (Arnauld 2011, 73.) I have slightly modified Stephen Gaukroger’s translation.
- 15.
Schmal 2020.
- 16.
Disputationes metaphysicae, 25. s. 1. n. 39.: Addendum tamen existimo non toto tempore quo durat operatio exterior procedens ab arte necessariam esse illam reflexionem formalem; quod mihi quidem satis probare videtur experientia et ratio, quia ipsa directa repraesentatio, et quasi intuitus mentis circa rem vel operationem faciendam, sufficit ad dirigendam operationem. Tunc ergo non est necesse ut exemplar cognoscatur tanquam obiectum quod, sed satis est ut implicite et per modum tendentiae ad obiectum aliquo modo cognoscatur, ea tantum implicita et virtuali reflexione, quam quilibet actus mentis in se includit, ratione cuius dicitur cognosci seipso ut quo, quamvis non cognoscatur ut quod.
- 17.
XV. 7.: Natura igitur substantialis sua naturali perceptione 1. percipit se, 2. facultates suas, 3. operationes harum, 4. et ultimo, influxus, alterationes rerum aliarum extra se, necnon connexus, confoederationes, etc. cum iisdem. Percipiendo autem se, alia haec omnia una percipit, nempe ut se aliquo modo afficientia.
- 18.
Fateor itaque perceptionem naturalem suos actus aliquo modo cognoscere, sed non per alium percipiendi actum, atqui per eundem quo percipit objectum. (Ibid.)
- 19.
Je me connais donc moi-même en connaissant toutes les autres choses. In Des vraies et des fausses idées, ch. II.
- 20.
- 21.
XV. 8.: [S]ensus includit quasi implicitum quoddam judicium de re percepta. Est enim quasi tacita assertio de percepto objecto, se sibi conscium esse hoc vel illud se percipere, hunc equum se videre, hunc hominem loquentem se audire.
- 22.
This is not surprising since the term consciousness, as is known, was not commonly used in its modern philosophical sense during the seventeenth-century. According to Thiel 1991, 79., Cudworth was the first in the English-speaking world to make extensive use of the word in its distinctively philosophical (as opposed to moral) sense, at the time of Glisson.
- 23.
As far as the scope of the natural perception is concerned, Glisson makes it clear that this kind of self-knowledge is free from any ignorance and error. It seems to cover everything contained in the act itself: Primo, perceptio naturalis integrum objectum suum, et quicquid in eo continetur, et quo ordine singula se respiciunt, perfecte, hoc est, absque ignorantia aut errore, noscit (Ad lectorem 14., Glisson 1672, c1r).
- 24.
Secundo, causas se afficientes in effectis, quamdiu hi sibi inhaerent, intuetur. (Ibid.)
- 25.
Tertio, omnes suas dispositiones seu aptitudines ad formam, ad quam a generante aut alias ordinata est, accurate percipit; ipsiusque ideae formae futurae, methodique qua materia ad operationes ejus accurate accommodetur, exactam notitiam habet. [...] Extenditur enim, directe, tantum ad subjectum percipiens. At oblique suam objectivam rationem ampliat: et non tantum ad alterationes in se factas earumque causas, sed et ad effectus a se oriundos, qui in eorum causis, nempe in seipso, relucent, quibusque referas ideam foetus formandi, extenditur (Ibid., Glisson 1672, c1r–v.)
- 26.
XV. 7.: Percipiendo autem se, alia haec omnia una percipit, nempe ut se aliquo modo afficientia.
- 27.
By narrow content, as we will see soon, I mean the content of an act of natural perception, because sense-perception as a whole gains a lot by limiting the information conveyed about itself. This process allows the animal to transgress the narrow limits of its own existence and to become familiar with the world and its inexhaustible richness.
- 28.
In contrast, natural perception does not require organization: Dico, naturalem perceptionem ad rationem suam non requirere materiae organizationem, sed consistere posse vel cum, vel sine, eadem (XV. 6., Glisson 1672, 211.)
- 29.
XI. 6.: Нaес causa est cur animalia percipiunt sola objecta, at motum in organo factum non discernunt. See also chapter XV. 10., Glisson 1672, 215–216.: Sensus enim entitatem propriam organi percipientis, hoc est ipsius partis, qua percipit, non percipit, sed objectum perceptum ut quid extra se contemplatur.
- 30.
XI. 6.: movens motu suam ideam in materia mota absque alia actione satis efficaciter imprimat...
- 31.
Ibid.: quam facultas perceptiva materiae passae, propter intimam sibi praesentiam, necessario percipit.
- 32.
Ad lectorem 14.: Quare naturalis perceptio objective a ratione sensuum plurimum deficit.
- 33.
In Giglioni’s version What is gained in the “public” knowledge of the senses is lost in the “private” knowledge of nature. Giglioni 2008, 470.
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Acknowledgments
The work on this papaer was supported by National Research, Development and Innovation Office (Hungary): [Grant Number K 116234, K 120375, K 123839, K 125012]. I am particularly indebted to Guido Giglioni for his comments on an earlier version of my chapter.
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Schmal, D. (2021). “Vegetative Epistemology”: Francis Glisson on the Self-Referential Nature of Life. In: Baldassarri, F., Blank, A. (eds) Vegetative Powers. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 234. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69709-9_20
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