Abstract
Kathrin Koslicki is one of the leading authors of mereological hylomorphism, a non-reductive theory that construes material objects as mereological fusions of matter and form. Accordingly, Michelangelo’s David has both a portion of marble and David’s individual form as proper parts. I individuate two kinds of dependence that play an important role in characterising Koslicki’s brand of hylomorphism. First, forms depend for their existence on the compounds of which they are parts. Second, hylomorphic compounds depend for their identity on their forms. The existential dependence of forms on their compounds ensures forms cannot float free of material objects, whereas the identity dependence of material objects on their forms grants forms play a non-trivial role in determining the nature of their compounds. The main goal of the present paper is to argue that these two claims of dependence lead to a contradiction when conjoined with some further weak principles concerning parthood and grounding. I then briefly illustrate which are the theoretical commitments that Koslicki may arguably relax to avoid the impasse. In the end, though, her brand of hylomorphism will be in a worse dialectical position.
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Notes
Koslicki has previously defended, and later abandoned, a universalistic conception of form. See her (2008).
In the quote, “Socrates’ soul” is clearly a colourful expression to refer to Socrates’ hylomorphic form.
In addition to (RDmodal), Koslicki also endorses more fine-grained, non-modal definitions of dependence (see her 2018: ch, 5). However, since those further definitions do not play a role in the present argument, I prefer to ignore them.
Such drawbacks have been the main drivers of the raise of the post-modal metaphysics. See Wildman (2020) for a nice introduction.
Moreover, see Correia (2008, 1026–1027) for a more general argument according to which the Aristotelianism vs Platonism debate on universals cannot be successfully construed as a debate on whether universals necessitate their instance, as for (RDmodal).
Actually, Koslicki (2018, p. 188) already warns about a threat of circularity arising from the dependence relations between hylomorphic forms and their bearers. She suggests avoiding construing hylomorphic forms as essentially and constitutively dependent upon their bearers. Notice, though, that the present argument just assumes that hylomorphic forms rigidly depend upon the compounds of which they are parts; and we have argued above that Koslicki is better off regarding the assumption as sound.
Moreover, (3*) is arguably the best way to pursue another theoretical strategy on the behalf of Koslicki’shylomorphism, that is, revising (RDforms) into a weaker dependence claim. Differently from (3), the grounding relatum in (3)* is just the fact that the appropriate hylomorphic compound exists, not the fact that such hylomorphic compound and its form (which is the subject of the grounded fact) stand in the suitable creating relation. The weakening of (3) into (3*) basically mirrors a proposal due to Giordani and Tremolanti (2022) with respect to the dependence of Aristotelian universals upon their instances. As we are going to see, though, (3*) is sufficient to get Koslicki’s theory in trouble when paired up with a further weak principle concerning identity-dependence.
Costa (2017) suggests that the participation relation should be taken as primitive. Others, like Kim (1976), construe participation as some sort of constitution. And of course, for a perdurantist like Goodman (1951), according to which events are just ‘unstable objects’, the participation relation reduces to parthood.
It is still worth noting that Matthew Tugby has advanced strong arguments for exactly the kind of Platonism I have described here. For instance, Tugby claims Platonism would offer a neat solution to the modal issue of alien properties (2015) and provide the theory of properties that best suits dispositionalism (2013). In other words, Platonism knows how to put those ontological danglers to work.
Relatedly, Fine claims that he would be «[…] decidedly uncomfortable with a conception of form whose presence could float free of the underlying facts» (2020, p. 432).
According to Tahko and Lowe (2020), the asymmetry of identity-dependence seems to follow from the non-circularity of identity criteria. If x is what it is partly in virtue of the fact that x has a certain relation with y, then y cannot be what it is partly in virtue of its being suitably related with x. Otherwise, x and y would be deprived by well-defined identity-conditions.
Fine expresses the claim, within his theory of embodiments, in the guise of the Existence Postulate.
Or at least features hylomorphists plausibly wish to maintain as essential.
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Acknowledgements
There are two people I wish to thank. The first one is my supervisor Andrea Maria Clemente Bottani, who provided invaluable support throughout my PhD years. The second one is Damiano Costa, who helped and encourages me to keep working on this paper. Lastly, although I have presented the topic of this work has been in various occasions, it greatly benefitted from being discussed by the participants to the 6th Italian Conference on Analytic Metaphysics and Ontology.
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Sciacca, G. Forms and Compounds in Koslicki’s Mereological Hylomorphism. Philosophia 51, 1849–1863 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00645-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00645-w