Abstract
The Upaniṣads do deal with moral problems, and one could find a systematic ethical stance in them, though the Upaniṣads are, for the most part, concerned with metaphysics where the Ultimate Reality is explored and mediated upon. For an Upaniṣadic seeker, metaphysics and ethics are inseparable. The present study makes an attempt to examine the ethical stance of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad and see whether it falls in the framework of any ethical theory. This study examines the Taittirīya Upaniṣad’s ethical ideas focussing on the eleventh chapter of the Śikṣā-vallī (first section). The first part of the paper is an unearthing the moral precepts found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, whereas the second part explores whether the ethic of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad is deontological. The study concludes with a submission. In this paper, the attempt is to position the moral precepts enunciated in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad in an ethical theory framework in the light of comparative philosophy. I argue that the moral precepts enunciated in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, though seemingly deontological, are for the maintenance of the social order, unlike in Kant’s ends in themselves; and the ethics of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad has overwhelming elements of consequentialism and virtue ethics.
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Notes
Let me make it clear at the outset itself that by deontology I mean the duty-centred ethics. It means that deontology induces (gives a good reason for) internalism, that is, epistemic justification is a matter of duty fulfilment. For a detailed discussion on and against internalism in deontology one could refer to Bergmann 2000: 87–102. See also footnote no. 4.
Explaining this subjective phase, a learned scholar had opined (though he wrote it some five decades ago, it seems to be a verity): ‘… the Rigveda is a great hymnology to the personified forces of nature, and thus represents the earliest phase in the evolution of religious consciousness, namely, the objective phase of religion. The Upanishads, on the other hand, make the subjective phase of religion. … as we go from the Vedic period to the Upanishadic period, there is visible at every stage the process of transference of interest from God to Self. When the individual Self has become the universal Self, when in short, the Ātman has been realized’ (Ranade 1968: 2). R. Balasubramanian opines in this connection: ‘The Upaniṣads speak of the absolutely real as pāramārthika, and one who has realized it is said to remain in his own native or natural condition (svarūpa-sthiti), which is also called the state of liberation (mokṣa/nirvāṇa). There is a detailed description of Brahman/Ātman and the means to its realization in the Bṛhadāraṉyaka Upaniṣad. When Kahola asked Yājñavalkya to explain to him Brahman that is immediate and direct, the latter first of all identified Brahman with the Self that is within all, and then described Brahman/Ātman as ‘that which transcends hunger and thirst, grief, delusion decay and death’. He goes on to say: ‘knowing this Self, the Brāhmaṇas renounce the desire of sons,…(BU 3, 5,1)’ (Balasubramanian 2009: 301).
There is an opinion among some scholars that there is less emphasis on ethics in Indian philosophy in general and the Upaniṣads in particular. Many a scholar opines that the Upaniṣads give primacy to metaphysical speculations. In this connection let me quote what an author in one of the recent study writes: ‘The Upanishads are mainly metaphysical treatises. … The emphasis is on intuitive knowledge’. (Sahoo 2017: 36). N. K. Devaraja wrote about the dismal state of ethical thought and socio-political philosophy in Indian tradition in this way: ‘… it must be admitted that the contributions of Indian thinkers in the fields of ethics and socio-political philosophy seem to be very poor indeed when viewed against those of European philosophers…’ (Devaraja 1962: v–vi). Again, this was what B. K. Matilal wrote about the neglect of ethics in Indian philosophy some three decades ago: ‘Certainly, there exists a lacuna in the tradition of Indian philosophy. Professional philosophers of India over the last two thousand years… except some cursory comments and some insightful observations, the professional philosophers of India have very seldom discussed what we call ‘moral philosophy’ today’ (Matilal 1989: 5).
Deontological ethics deals with moral theories according to which certain acts ought to be or ought not to be done, regardless of the consequences of their performance or non-performance. Deontology is seen in opposition to consequentialism. Immanuel Kant ethics is deontological. We take into account the contemporary deontological works of Nagel (1978), Scanlon (2000), and Kamm (2001). See also footnote 1.
Śikṣā-vallī would imply ‘the chapter of instructions’. According to S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade, ‘the first Valli is called the Śikshā-vallī or Chapter on Enunciation inasmuch as it begins with a succinct enumeration of six gramatico-philological elements: letter, accent, quantity, effort, modulation, and combination; but from the fact that the chapter as a whole contains some very curious teachings on other cosmological, physiological, and ethical matters, it can in a wider sense be designated the Śikshā-vallī or Chapter of Instructions generally’ (Belvalkar and Ranade 1997: 97).
In this present study, we have taken references and passages from ‘Taittirīya Upaniṣad’ in Eight Upaniṣads, 1998: 237–417. We have also consulted the text in The Early Upanisads: Annotated Text and Translation (Patrick Olivelle, trans. and ed. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998: 288–313). The Taittirīya Upaniṣad is of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda. It belongs to the Taittirīya śākhā (or branch) tradition/school of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda. The Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda has four śākhās (branches), and the Taittirīya is the most important among them. The main concern of this Upaniṣad is an enquiry into the reality of Brahman.
The Yajurveda period is a settled period, and one can see the Upanishads of the Yajurveda making an axiological distinction. For instance, take the axiological dissection the Kaṫhopanisad making between preyas and śreyas, the pleasant (or pleasurable) and the good (or preferable), respectively [Anyacchreyo’nyadutaiva preyaste ubhe nānārye puruṣam sinītaḥ; tayo śreya ādadānasya sādhu bhavati hīyate’rthādya u preyo vṛṇīte.—Kaṫhopaniṣad Vol. 1, 1998:2: 1] [‘the preferable is different indeed; and so indeed, is the pleasurable different. These two, serving divergent purposes (as they do), bind men. Good befalls him who accepts the preferable between these two. He who selects the pleasurable, falls from the true end’ (Eight Upaniṣads, Vol. 1, 1998: 131)]. The pursuit of values is matter of choice here, as there is no compulsion, and ‘everyone has to choose; and the choice is personal’ (Balasubramanian 2005: 6). Thus, as the choice is personal, accountability also becomes personal whereby an ascription of moral responsibility gets delineated.
See footnote 1 for explanation.
Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is notable for the categorical imperative, which is central to Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant argues for an a priori basis for morality by saying ‘… this categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition a priori…’ (Kant 2007: 58, 4: 454).
This has reference to the story related by Kṛṣṇa to illustrate the point of telling lie to save life in the 69th section of the eighth book of Mahābhārata, titled Karṇa parva, where satyavādin Kauśika’s vow to speak truth throughout his life is narrated. One day he faced the dilemma of telling the truth or telling a lie as some bandits were chasing a group of travellers to kill them. Though the travellers requested Kauśika not to tell the bandits of their movements when they come, he told the truth and they were killed. Kṛṣṇa stated that Kauśika had to go to hell after his death ‘in consequence of that great sin consisting in the words spoken’.
Trayo dharmaskandhāḥ. yajñaḥ, adhyayanam dānamiti prathamaḥ. Tapa eva dvitīya. Brahmacaryācāryakulavāsī tritīya (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 2: 23: 1).
Emphasizing the importance of the institution of marriage and all that implied in it, an author writes: ‘Given the importance of marriage, one might begin by not letting oneself disrespect marriage: one ought not to mock it, enter into it lightly, or hold divorce to be an easy and readily available escape—especially when children are involved. Moreover, one ought not to let others get away with flippant disparagement of marriage, one should counsel them not to enter lightly or consider divorce a ready escape, and impress upon them the exponentially increased gravity these matters assume when children are involved’ (Otteson 2006: 288).
Ṛtam ca svādhyāyapravacane ca. Satyam ca svādhyāyapravacane ca. Tapaśca svādhyāyapravacane ca. Damaśca svādhyāyapravacane ca. Śamaśca svādhyāyapravacane ca (TU 1:9:1).
One could get a detailed exposition on Indian ethics in the edited volume Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges (Bilimoria et al. 2008).
One can posit a question here: in connection with Kantian deontology it could be said ‘an action is right if it conforms to an a priori moral principle’. Why is not possible to understand ‘attainment of Brahman (or Brahma-jñāna)’ as this a priori moral principle? If this can be allowed, then, since all the precepts of TU are aimed towards knowledge of Brahman, they are in conformity with the a priori moral principle and hence deontological. I have this reply: I would not consider Brahma-jñāna as a priori moral principle, though I would subscribe to a priorism in moral epistemology. A moral reason is always a stronger reason for doing something than any other reasons. Furthermore, it is not tenable for me to argue that Brahma-jñāna as moral principle. I am not going in line with Kant’s deontology in the article, though I make a reference to him. I would like to clarify: Kant's a priori postulate of God is conceived as the supreme guarantee of happiness as the motivation for moral action. God for Kant is a practical necessity for the realization of the highest moral good. Neither can Brahma-jñāna be conceived as such a guarantee nor moral action be conceived as seeking such a goal from the perspective of TU. Moreover, Kant himself does not prove the postulates. They are the blind spot of the whole edifice of his grand moral theory.
No itarāṇi. Ye ke cāsmacchreyāmso brāhmaṇāḥ (TU 1: 11: 3). The text also says that the Brāhmaṇas behave in the right and correct way, and not others, and they should be imitated: Ye tatra brāhmaṇāḥ saṁmarśinaḥ. Yuktā āyuktāḥ. Alūkṣā dharmakāmāḥ syūḥ. Tathā te tatra varteran. Tathā tatra vartethāḥ. Athābhyākhyāteṣu. Ye tatra brāhmaṇāḥ saṁmarśinaḥ. Yuktā āyuktāḥ. Ālūkṣā dharmakāmāḥ syūḥ. Tathā te teṣu varteran. Tathā teṣu vartethāḥ (TU 1: 11: 4).
The Commentary of Śaṅkara clearly underlines the Brāhmaṇa supremacy. It says: ‘Brāhmaṇas—not Kṣatriyas and others’ (Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śankarācārya, 1998: 287).
Yato vāco nivartante. Aprāpya manasā saha. Ānandam Brahmaṇo vidvān. Na bibheti kutaścaneti. Etam ha vāva n tapati. Kimaham sādhu nākaravam. Kimaham pāpakaramiti. Sa ya evam vidvānete Ātmānam spṛṇute. Ubhe hmevaiṣe ete Ātmānam spṛṇute. Ya evam veda. Ityupaniṣat (TU 2: 9:1).
Satyānna pramaditavyam. Dharmānna pramaditavyam. Kuśalānna pramaditavyam. Bhūtyai na pramaditavyam. (TU 1:2:1).
Saiṣā’’nandasya mīmāmsā bhavati. Yuvā syātsādhuyuvādhyāyakaḥ. Āśiṣṫho draḍhiṣṫho baliṣṫhaḥ. Tasyeyam pṛthivī sarvā vittasya pūrṇā syāt. Sa eko manuṣa ānandaḥ. Te ye śatam mānuṣā ānandāḥ. Sa eko manuṣyagandharvāṇāmānandaḥ. śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya… (TU 2: 8:1–2).
Kant writes: ‘The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as giving universal law through all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept of dependent upon it, namely that of a kingdom of ends. By kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws. … For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves. But from this there arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which can be called a kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means. A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other’ (Kant 2007: 41 [4: 433]).
P. Bilimoria argues in his ‘Ethics and Virtue in Classical Indian Thinking’, that virtuous emotions are key to Indian thinking on ethics (Bilimoria 2014: 294–305).
Braithwaite and Pettit speak of two kinds of criteria in ethics, namely consequentialist and deontological. Both these criteria have different definitions to assess the value. The consequentialist assessment looks at ‘targets’, while deontological one takes into consideration ‘constraints’ (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 27). In the consequentialist paradigm, a ‘target’ is central and that must be ‘promoted’ (Pettit 1997: 126), whereas in deontological paradigm ‘constraint’ is a value that is ‘exemplified’ and ‘honoured’ (Pettit 1997: 126) by the agent’s actions (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 27).
Author of this article is greatly indebted to the unknown referee who has given this insight in her/his review report. I take the comment as it is and keep it under quote.
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The author would like to thank the two unknown reviewers for their comments and suggestions on the first draft of the paper. The present version is the revised and modified one in the light of their critical comments and observations.
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Sebastian, C.D. Is the Ethics of Taittirīya Upaniṣad Deontological?. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 35, 483–495 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0152-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0152-z