Skip to content
BY 4.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter Mouton March 17, 2022

Anti-Chinese sentiment in the Czech public service media during the COVID-19 pandemic

  • Renáta Sedláková

    Renáta Sedláková, Ph.D., graduated from the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno. She works as an assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies, Palacky University Olomouc. She specialises in mass media research methods and the analysis of news discourse. Her field of interest covers media representation of reality, in particular ethnic minorities. She is interested in the process of reception of contemporary popular culture.

    ORCID logo
From the journal Lodz Papers in Pragmatics

Abstract

This paper focuses on Sinophobia which is usually not expressed openly in the public service media. The Sinophobia discourse intensified in 2020 in connection with the coverage of the pandemic. How are anti-Chinese attitudes expressed in the news discourse of the Czech Radio and Czech Television? Examples from a broader analysis of the representation of the SARS-COV-2 pandemic in news and journalism programmes are given. Inductive qualitative research methods (discourse and semiotic analysis) were used to detect subtle nuances of meaning and reveal implicit presuppositions. This study focuses on the manifestations of bias, e.g., the ideologically grounded attitudes of the speakers. The anti-Chinese statements (about poor hygiene habits and eating wild animals) were most often mentioned in connection with the origin of the coronavirus, vaccination, and China expansive policy. Sinophobic messages were built on the opposition of Us and Them, which is, according to van Dijk (2000), the core of new racism. In spite of the fact that the open hate speech and systematic bias (intentional implications, obvious evaluation or signposting) were not found in the researched sample, the analysis identified the presence of Sinophobic statements in both public service media.

1 Introduction

Ex-President Trump’s calling the pandemic the “Chinese virus,” or “kung flu,” awakened Americans and blamed the Chinese or Asians (Moynihan and Porumbescu 2020). Anti-Chinese sentiment has been documented in various Asian countries throughout history (Billé, 2014). It has been present in American society, as well as in Mongolia, Vietnam, and Japan in the 20th century (Billé and Urbansky 2019). According to the United Nations (2020a), the coronavirus pandemic started a new wave of hate speech and discrimination across the world. The discourse around the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the persistence of the “yellow peril” trope. The Chinese are blamed in the media as the source of the virus (either by creating it or being infected by animals), not preventing its spread to other parts of the world, and not providing any accurate data about the infected or dead. In everyday life, random attacks on Asian-looking people occurred, which made them scapegoats for the frustration of virus-vulnerable individuals (Wong 2020). According to Zhang (2008) Sinophobia has been a dominant way for the West to perceive China since the eighteenth century. And the covid pandemic revealed that orientalism is still alive, producing knowledge on the Orient and politically influencing the public’s view on it (Zhang and Xu 2020).

The Pew Research Center’s findings (Silver 2021) confirm the growth of anti-Chinese attitudes worldwide. Unfavorable opinions of China have grown in recent years across many advanced economies and have been accompanied by the widespread criticism over how China handled the coronavirus pandemic (Silver 2020). In Central Europe, the xenophobic or racist opinions aimed at different target groups have been present for a long time. [1] Mainly the Roma population (Gypsies), Jews, or Muslim immigrants are targeted. Empirical data on Czech attitudes towards different minorities show that at least one third of the Czech population express openly xenophobic or negative feelings towards others. According to the findings from the Public Opinion Research Center (Spurný 2020), 53% of the Czech population consider foreigners living in the Czech Republic to be a problem. Respondents with low levels of education express stronger negative feelings. When it comes to other nations, Czechs think favorably about Slovaks and Poles but they express very negative attitudes towards Roma people (71%) and Arabs (69%) (Tuček 2020). On the contrary, despite plenty of jokes and stereotypes about the Vietnamese population, 40% of the Czech population express positive feelings towards them (Tuček 2020).

After the fall of communism in 1989, Czech foreign policy was critical towards China, and at the end of the millennium it stood out within Europe for its negative ideological attitudes. “The China related discourse of Czech political leaders changed significantly from very negative to exceedingly positive during 2013,” when contemporary president M. Zeman was elected, known for his friendly rhetoric towards China (Bajerová and Turcsányi 2019: 96). The Czech population, with its own communist history, found several reasons for developing anti-Chinese sentiment, e.g., human rights violation or the political influence in Tibet. In public opinion research 39% of Czech respondents declared negative attitudes towards China in 2020 (Tuček 2020). In the international comparative online research Sinophone Borderlands Europe Survey (Turcsányi et al. 2020) the Czechs and five other countries [2] where more than a half (57.4%) of the respondents expressing negative feelings towards China. Almost half (41.1%) of respondents declared their opinion concerning China worsened during the last three years. [3] When Czech respondents expressed opinion on Chinese people on the scale form 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely), they evaluated them as: productive, competent, competitive, and confident; they see them as friendly and honest, sincere and trustworthy significantly less (see Figure 1). However, only 33 Czech respondents visited China and 92% rated their knowledge of China as low or average. Most of them said their key sources of information about China were the news (60.2%) or social media (41.9%). From that we can assume that Czechs’ knowledge of China is largely based on media representations. [4] That is why the key question is: How do Czech media represent China? This paper focuses on anti-Chinese sentiment in the Czech public service broadcasting, i.e. Czech Radio (CRo) and Czech television (CT).

Figure 1 
          
            Feelings of the Czech respondents towards Chinese people. Based on the Sinophone Borderlands European Survey dataset (Turcsányi and Sedláková 2020).
Figure 1

Feelings of the Czech respondents towards Chinese people. Based on the Sinophone Borderlands European Survey dataset (Turcsányi and Sedláková 2020).

2 Literature review

From the media constructivist approach (Schulz 1989; Luhmann 2000) it can be assumed that the public image of nationalities or countries is mainly formed on stereotypes shared in Czech culture which are reproduced and enforced by the media. A number of authors (e.g., Bennett 1996; Lewis 2001; Silverstone 2007) have suggested that television news services have become a key source of information that many people rely on. Schulz (1989) stated that the media representation of the world has genuine consequences in the non-media reality, as the public lacks direct personal experience with events. It corresponds with a rapid increase of the amount of media content and texts in the last decade and news from various credible and non-credible sources which is easily accessible nowadays. However, media do not only represent reality; they also structure and label it, and they do so through language. The ideological factors (not only news routines [5]) are projected into the process of making the news through the use of particular wordings (Shoemaker and Reese 1991; Hall, 1997: 1–3, Kopytowska 2015).

There are several analyses of the Czech media coverage of China conducted by the think-tank MapinfluenCE (2017). They quantitatively analysed [6] 1257 texts selected via key words published by 42 media dailies, weekly magazines, radio and television stations, and news servers from 2010 to June 2017 in connection to economic or political topics. [7] According to their findings the Czech media debate on China is politicized. The image of China the media created was mostly negative (41%) or neutral (45%); the rest of the texts (14%) were positive towards China. The negative perception of China in the Czech Republic stands out in comparison with the analysis of media from other countries. Slovak media created a largely neutral image of China (68% of texts). Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak media focused mainly on trade, investment (or lack thereof), and bilateral economic relations with China, with a mainly neutral discourse, while the Czech media focused more on criticism of human rights violations in China, followed by references to censorship, communism, or Tibet (MapinfluenCE 2018). The authors suggest that the media show a tendency to perceive China as the essence of what the Czechs are not and do not want to be.

The second paper studied the media coverage of two specific topics: i) the debate on 5G networks, and ii) Chinese investments in the Czech Republic (Blablová and Karásková 2021). Both topics were presented in a highly professional and technical way connected to political debates and decisions. Published texts were mainly neutral with a low positive (2–3%) or negative (6–17%) sentiment. The lack of investments and the failure of CEFC in the Czech Republic was stressed with the demand that Chinese investments should not pose a security risk to the Czech Republic. The media debate on investments in 5G, while connected to international development, was highly influenced by the domestic political scene, the statements of the president, and connected with the security risks and Huawei (Blablová and Karásková 2021: 23).

This paper complements other findings in the analysis of the Czech media, precisely CRo and CT, and their representation of China. People who share xenophobic or racist opinions and try to spread them publicly typically use anti-system media, disinformation websites, social media, or anonymous discussions. Because the CRo and CT strive to adhere to the law (Act no. 483/1991 Coll. on Czech Television, Act no. 484/1991 Coll. on Czech Radio) and meet the high standards of public service journalism declared in their codes, it is difficult to prove the presence of anti-China statements in their broadcasts. This is further complicated by the strategy of not expressing such statements openly as the authors are aware that they could face legal sanctions. [8]

As explained by Hall (1997: 263) in the representation only half of the truth is always shown. Its second part—the hidden meaning—lies in what has not been said or depicted, and refers to an idea that is implied but cannot be verbalized openly. Accordingly, van Dijk (2000) showed how new racism is usually detected at the latent level of communication. Racist content is not communicated directly and openly, but rather between the lines. Authors of different kinds of hate speech assume that audiences will complete the messages on the basis of shared cultural knowledge and thus uncover the latent intended meaning (Sedláková 2017). Any discrimination, either spoken or behavioural can lead to other human rights violations (Baider and Kopytowska 2018; Kopytowska and Baider 2017). As noted by Cohen (2013: 8) the worst thing we can do about it is to deny the seriousness of any xenophobic or racist statement.

It is difficult to clearly delineate where free speech ends and where hate speech begins. As there is diverse legislation in the EU member states, there is no consensus on what content is prosecutable. The EU Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 2008 defines hate speech as “the public incitement to violence or hatred on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic origin”. The Council of Europe defines hate speech as covering “all forms of expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance” (Council of Europe, updated). The United Nations (2020b: 10) definition of hate speech is:

any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor. This is often rooted in, and generates, intolerance and hatred, and in certain contexts can be demeaning and divisive.

Any prejudiced views and opinions against certain person, minority, or society in general could be understood as hate speech. More precisely, hate speech is the way in which racist and xenophobe attitudes, prejudice, and intolerance are expressed. The internet, primarily social media and alternative media, is usually used for expressing such opinions. According to the United Nations (2020), hate speech spreading divisive and discriminatory messages and ideologies online became one of the most frequent methods. Xenophobic or racist attitudes are not usually expressed openly, as those who hold such views are aware they could be investigated. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2021) considers hate crimes to be under-reported. Additionally, Kopytowska and Baider (2017) pointed to the interface of verbal and physical violence.

Hate speech is understood as a threat to human rights and the social system. Racist beliefs are based on division; it identifies, defines, categorizes, and distinguishes “Us” and “Them” – the different Others. This is the dichotomy that van Dijk (2000) puts at the core of the new racism, the latent ideology of the dominant white majority society. The process of othering is based in the power hierarchy within the culture/society. In this process the Others are defined as different; not only physically, but above all culturally, in their origin and mentality (Pickering 2001, Kopytowska and Baider 2017). However, the understanding of Others is usually based on stereotypes and fallacious assumptions. The image we create about Others is driven from the concept of our self. The “Us” and “Them” duality can only be understood as a whole, in opposition to each other. “A foreign group is exactly the imaginary opposite that its own group needs for its identity, cohesion, inner solidarity, and emotional security” (Baumann 1996: 44). “Our” group can differentiate itself from numerous Others different on various levels. The same features can be present in images of various Others. These are based on culturally shared mental representations, which we have internalized in the process of socialization, and which reflect the perceptions of our own group. According to Lévi-Strauss (1996), this bipolar vision is the basis of our orientation in the world. These dualities reflect the universal structure of the human mind. By perceiving the world through dualities and categorizing the living world according to them, man structures the world in which he lives, creates order in it and gives meaning to it. The classification of categories into the “Ours” and “Theirs”, one of which reflects the values associated with “Us” and the other with “Them”, is generally shared and presented in the dominant social group as natural, given, and unquestioned (Fiske 1990). [9] Based on this, the meaning created and communicated reflects the structure and distribution of power in society. Reading the messages according to these opposites is not self-evident, the knowledge and experience with other texts, their social context, and our cultural background contribute to it (Fiske 1990: 166–177). Because xenophobic meanings can be expressed between the lines, it is difficult to prove their presence in the public service media content.

There is a dual broadcasting system in the Czech Republic. The public service media is represented by the Czech Radio (CRo) and the Czech Television (CT). They are regulated by Act 484/1991 Coll. for Czech Radio and to Act 483/1991 Coll. for Czech Television. [10] Compliance with these laws is controlled by the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting (RRTV) of the Czech Republic which is elected by the Parliament. Both institutions have a code of ethics which refers to the BBC broadcasting standards (Czech Television 2003, Czech Radio Council, no date). It is expected for public service media to provide high quality content and embody the highest professional standards. CT and CRo are supposed to meet the requirements of Act No. 231/2001 Coll. for the Operation of Radio and Television Broadcasting, which imposes objective, balanced, and nonbiased broadcasting. As it is not possible to measure the objectivity of the news, Birch (1989: 15–16) suggests researching the discourse structures that constitute news discourse. This means focusing on how the news about an event or topic is constructed, whose meaning is represented, who is allowed to take part, and who is excluded.

3 Methods and data

The paper draws on the semiotic approach (Hartley 2001; Fiske 1990; Hall 1997) which understands news reporting as a specific kind of socially shared discourse and analyses news as a text constructed from signs (Hartley and Fiske 2003; Chandler 2002; Barthes 1982). The semiotic approach perceives ideology as a process of production and reproduction of meanings, ideas and social values (Barthes 1982). These are the foundational stones of culture within which discourses are created, circulated, and reproduced via language (Hall 1997). Discourse represents a semantic representation of the world negotiated in social interactions (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). According to van Dijk (1993) discourse is not only written text but a scope of social practices and contexts. Discourse is “socially constitutive, as well as socially conditioned”, as argued by Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258). Discourse establishes regimes of truth which determine the acceptable formulations

of texts (Foucault 1994). [11] People perceive and understand the world through texts of various kinds. The language they use, especially the wording, both reflects and shapes external reality. Hall (1997) showed that the wording used and the final narrative created reveals the author’s ideological position and the preferred meaning they wish the reader to decode. When creating texts, the author makes choices as to how to represent the topic, how to signify its actors, and (often implicitly) decides what not to say. These language choices are often unconscious as authors draw on conventional or dominant representations which are taken for granted (van Dijk 2000). That is why biased media messages issued by Czech public service media are consequences of the highlighting or the ignoring of certain aspects of reality rather than the result of a journalist’s intention to manipulate.

This paper draws on the findings of two research projects: i) an analysis of the pandemic SARS-COV-2 representation in the Czech Radio broadcasts in 2020, and ii) monitoring China’s representation in the news and journalism programmes of the Czech television. The research sample of the first study included different types of programmes broadcast by ČRo: Hlavní zprávy ve 12 (‘the Main News at 12’), Hlavní zprávy – rozhovory, komentáře (‘Main News – Interviews, Comments’) and the programmes Dvacet Minut Radiožurnálu (‘Twenty Minutes of RadioJournal’) and Interview Plus (‘Interview Plus’) based on an interview between a presenter (usually) with one guest, approximately 22 to 26-minute long. Over 40 hours of broadcast recordings from two periods: i) March 9th to 29th 2020, and ii) September 21st to October 11th 2020 were analysed. The selected samples cover the development of the COVID-19 pandemic in the CRL: the 1st period covered the beginning of the pandemic along with the declaration of a state of emergency on March 12th, while the 2nd one covered the onset of the second wave of the pandemic in the autumn and the re-declaration of a state of emergency on October 5th. The second study is the longitudinal monitoring of China representation based on CT programmes’ archive. The main evening news Události (‘Events’), late evening journalism programme Události, Komentáře (‘Events and Commentaries’), Horizont (‘Horizon’) and debate Otázky Václava Moravce (‘Václav Moravec Questions’) were monitored. The examples used in this paper are from material broadcast from November 2020 to June 2021 and searched with the keyword vaccination.

A qualitative approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990) was applied in the two studies to examine the procedures used in the construction of the news, use of specific wording, and rhetoric. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) represents an approach suitable for analytical examination of the interconnection between data and ideology (Fairclough 1995: 55). On a basic level, CDA is focused on the text and its language, it sticks to measuring the processes in the specific creation of discourse (ibid. 98). CDA understands language as an agentive process; it helps reveal how language could be used by different speakers for specific purposes and how discourse is framed within preferred ideological optics reflected in the wording. CDA and semiotic analysis (Barthes 1982; Chandler 2002) were used to detect subtle nuances of meaning, to reveal implicit presuppositions or bias of published news. and the naturalization [12] of the communicated meanings. We tried to uncover meanings hidden in the news and to identify the use of specific representations implying the ideological grounding of the speakers, either guests or journalists. We focused on the specific language used and showed how the stereotyped, xenophobic, or racist opinions could be expressed without using inappropriate words.

The goal of this paper is to provide evidence that Sinophobic discourse was present in the Czech public service media last year in connection with the representation of the SARS-COV2 pandemic. The main research question of this paper is: How are anti-Chinese attitudes expressed in the news discourse of the Czech public service media? What signs of an ideological bias are present in the representation of China in the news discourse? The aim of the analysis was not to assess the factual correctness of the communicated information, but to analyse the dominant framing and the methods of narrativization of the news about China in the Czech public service media.

4 Results

The main attributes ascribed to China can be found in the news and journalism programmes of CRo and CT. While China is usually represented as an authoritarian and totalitarian state which controls its citizens and media using censorship in the name of the communist ideology, it is done without references to official documents confirming that. Within the One-China policy it uses police practices to restrict personal freedom and violates human rights which is covered in the propaganda of the overall prosperity of the great Chinese nation. Under nationalistic rhetoric framed by the slogan “One-China – one nation” it is trying to politically rule the sub-territories and people living within its borders. Through the Belt and Road Initiative it seeks to strengthen its political influence in Western countries and via the vaccination policy China makes third world countries feel dependent on it (Karásková and Blablová 2021). Statements supporting this framing of China were broadcast in radio interviews with guests as well as in television news and journalism programmes. Such images of China are framed by ethnocentrism. The western ideology of liberal democracy lies in the background of these reports. CT and CRo in the long run hold slightly right-wing liberal policies (Křeček 2017), which were implemented in the Czech Republic in the years after the fall of communism (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Volek and Urbaniková (2017) found in a survey that the majority of Czech journalists are also liberal-right oriented. Despite reflecting official Czech policy such representation of China is biased. Illustrative examples are listed below.

4.1 The representation of China on the Czech Radio

The following examples reflect the belief that censorship and hiding important information from the world occurred in China.

  1. GUEST: If there was freedom of speech in China, we would not end up with such a huge pandemic, because party officials kept it a secret, the crisis broke out all the more… (CRo, Interview Plus, April 1st 2020).

  2. GUEST: … let’s repeat the facts. The virus comes from poor hygiene in China, the local crisis has become a global pandemic. China, meanwhile, swept the tracks and smashed the whole thing, so it didn’t inform us in time. Today, we have to admit that we don’t even know what’s going on in China, because the journalists who covered it were expelled, foreign journalists, so we only have news from official sources (CRo, Interview Plus, March 26th, 2020).

  3. GUEST: Even the rise of the disease, its spread, would probably never have occurred if China had not been a despotic authoritarian regime accustomed to silencing its critics, if it had not been a system based on lies and had taken the necessary measures in time… (CRo, Interview Plus, March 25th, 2020).

    Although these were the guest’s statements, the presenter did legitimize them by not contradicting them. On the contrary, a journalist took the guest’s statement and used it in his next question.

  4. JOURNALIST: And that’s what I’m asking, not whether China or Russia will have regimes that have problems with democracy, as you yourself said, that are trying to gain influence outside their territories in various ways, because they will continue to do so. It is probably clear that yes, ...” (CRo, Interview Plus, March 25th, 2020).

    In the following example, the presenter even agreed so much with the guest that they literally exchanged their roles. It could be seen as unprofessional and contradicting journalism standards in the public service media.

  5. GUEST: ... Today there is no talk of the European Union helping the Chinese, today there is only talk of China graciously selling us medical supplies. You know, it seems to me as if someone came to you to set fire to your house, but then, as an arsonist, he sold you a fire extinguisher around the corner.

    JOURNALIST: And we would thank them. GUEST: And even more overpriced. And we would thank them. Watch it. This disease comes from China, let’s read [...]. What has China done since then?

    JOURNALIST: Basically nothing.

    GUEST: [China] started checking people on the internet, but [China] did not ensure hygiene in public places. This is [...]

    JOURNALIST: Mr. Fischer, I repeat a question that has fallen on a bit, I feel when I asked who might intend to subject Czechia to Chinese influence here, for example, depending on the supply of medical aids or medicines and medicines.

    HOST: Large financial groups. Mr. President, who has a delegation with unclear content and an unclear composition broadcast there. Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who receives Communists in his office [...] And we can continue. We have to be kind of…

    JOURNALIST: Alert, as he said.

    GUEST: Beware, because the Czech Social Democracy signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party 4 years ago. How is the memorandum being implemented? How has this undermined the ability of the actors who today are constitutional actors for social democracy and responsible for our republic? [...] Let’s read the regular reports of the Security Information Service and we can actually quote right there, China is trying to get public space in the Czech Republic under control and is trying to get parliamentary decision-making under control, that is not itself. [...] Let’s not forget that universities have become a hub of Chinese interests, where even academic freedom is actually restricted, not only in our country, but all over the world. (CRo, Interview Plus, March 26th, 2020).

Other examples are the presenter’s questions suggesting that he is asking about China’s expansive foreign policy. The extracts from an interview with the Chancellor of the President of the Czech Republic in the programme Twenty Minutes of Radiožurnál broadcast on March 25, 2020 reflect the presenter’s assumption that China’s assistance to countries during the COVID pandemic will have political implications.

  1. JOURNALIST: Chancellor, I wonder if there is such a role in, say, some political protection, good political relations, and so on. What will China want for that? [...]

    JOURNALIST: So, for some reason, China will probably put one country ahead of another, as you yourself said, maybe we were given priority over someone else, so I wonder what we paid for it? [...]

    JOURNALIST: Chancellor, doesn’t this situation show how terribly risky it is to be dependent on a country like China for such an important thing as medical aid? Because basically, if I understand your words well, it was up to the Chinese will, if they would prefer the Czech Republic, or keep us waiting in line. (CRo, Twenty Minutes of Radiožurnál, March 25th, 2020).

While these were examples of the biased approach of the public service media journalists, the next example from the Czech Radio broadcast not only reflects a markedly ethnocentric Western view, but is very close to hate speech. The guest of the programme Twenty Minutes of Radiožurnál broadcast on March 17th, 2021, cardiac surgeon J. Pirk is a well-known figure in the Czech Republic, as he repeatedly operated on former President V. Havel, and is an authority for at least part of the Czech society. In an interview about coronavirus and the new disease COVID-19, this doctor’s objective was to legitimize the expert knowledge he was sharing. However, his claims about the origin of the virus and its spread are unsubstantiated and therefore only speculative. In this case the presenter should have asked about their source; otherwise, it could be seen as his lack of professionalism because openly xenophobic statement was presented in the public service media broadcast, which is in contradiction with Act no. 484/1991 Coll. on Czech Radio.

  1. JOURNALIST: I’ve already mentioned your interview for Space X for Reflex’s website. The conversation attracted a lot of attention, spread on social networks, quoted by other media. Among other things, and in addition to what I said a moment ago, you said in this interview that the madness surrounding the spread of coronavirus is completely unfounded, that it is actually a new type of flu, and that the number of victims in China, respectively you commented on the number of victims in China, that when any animal species multiplies, nature begins to correct it. Do you think all this even now, two weeks after the recording of the conversation?

    GUEST: Jan PIRK: So, if I take it from behind, I’m absolutely convinced with that, China that from where the problem is, all those big epidemics came from China, whether it was SARS, whether it was another flu epidemic. This is due to the fact that they simply do not follow the basic rules of hygiene. They have dead animals next to the living, they eat raw animals. As a guest, you will receive a beating heart from a living snake, and this is terribly unhygienic, terribly dangerous, it is already written in the Old Testament that this is not to be done.

    JOURNALIST: Okay, but does it have to do with how many Chinese there are, so how did you relate it in the interview? (CRo, Twenty Minutes of Radiožurnál, March 17th, 2021)

We can argue that the guest openly expressed what is usually self-censored as politically incorrect and therefore not formulated directly, only in hints. The words he uses, however, show a high degree of intolerance and xenophobia, which is evident from the use of several evaluative attributes. According to Lévi-Strauss (2006), each culture is structured according to binary oppositions. The individual elements of culture do not make sense in themselves, but acquire it in opposition to other elements of the system. These oppositions function as codes through which it is possible to reveal the meanings of the structures behind individual cultures. The basic binary oppositions structuring cultures are edible versus non-edible, or raw versus cooked. These distinctions are culturally based. Cooking is the key process of transformation crossing the categorical boundary between nature and culture. Culture cannot exist on its own, but it is connected with nature and becomes its opposite. [13] While culture represents the civilized, nature is seen as uncivilized. This opposition implicitly refers to the dividing categories, such as civilized versus barbaric. The uncivilized is ascribed to Chinese in this process of othering. However, it is highly exceptional to hear from the public service broadcast that some nation is uncivilized because of its eating habits. By eating raw animals or live animals, they are fundamentally different from “Us” because “We” eat what is cooked. In the process of othering “Their” actions are understood as unhygienic, uncultivated, and dangerous. It means, “They” (Chinese) are dangerous. What “They” do is forbidden to “Us”, the Judeo-Christian culture. The reference to the Old Testament as the basic text of Western civilization, [14] setting out the basic rules of social order, here amplifies the perception of Chinese culture as fundamentally different. The fact that “They” behave unhygienically proves that “They” are not as advanced as “We” are (“Our” culture is). And because “Our” culture is perceived as right, “They” are automatically wrong, and also bad. The reference to the authority of sacred text (Old Testament) should validate the above statements, which are to be taken for granted, universally valid and unquestioned. Because breaking a long-established rule has its consequences; “when any animal species multiplies, nature begins to correct it” as Pirk says. Thus, it is implicit that the epidemics that break out in China are a punishment for violating fundamental cultural rules. Moreover, Chinese are linked to animals explicitly by the guest in this sentence. The guest ignored the fact that China is part of a different cultural context [15] and has its own sacred texts, norms, and traditions. Even though his statement was ethnocentric and xenophobic, the presenter did not question it. The broadcast thus was biased and communicated negative meanings about China openly.

4.2 The representation of China on the Czech Television

This part of the paper draws on the analysis of CT transmissions. Especially in the context with COVID-19 information and vaccination, China’s representation in the news and journalism was unbalanced. Bias and negative sentiment were present in individual reports. Even if the data on the epidemiological situation in China were favourable, journalists stressed that this is due to the use of totalitarian coercive practices of the state.

  1. After concealing the coronavirus at the beginning of the year, the state managed the pandemic thanks to unlimited powers. It can order tough measures at any time without public debate (CT1, Events, October 30th, 2020).

  2. In the south, they warn that without the vaccine, people can lose their jobs, housing allowances, and entitlement to school for children (CT1, Events, April 11th 2021)

Despite the use of threats, according to B. Šámalová, the reporter, vaccinations in China did not go smoothly and some people and health professionals were concerned about the safety of vaccinations because the development of vaccine was not sufficiently transparent and mistakes in vaccination had occurred in the past.

  1. Vaccinating high-ranking people before it was proved safe boosted confidence in the system that had been shaken by the scandal in 2018. Hundreds of thousands of children had received defective diphtheria and tetanus vaccines, and more affluent parents had preferred to have their children vaccinated in Hong Kong or abroad (CT1, Events, November 15th, 2020).

According to the journalist, “the country where the disease broke out is trying to catch up with the delay in vaccination,” but wants to improve the effectiveness of vaccines, as tests in Brazil had shown their reduced effectiveness against some symptoms. Although reports also indicate high numbers of vaccinations given, their overall message was rather negative, highlighting shortcomings, risks, and nonstandard procedures. The next example shows the presenter’s explicitly negative assessment of China’s progress with reference to unnamed experts.

  1. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese have already received experimental coronavirus vaccines before they underwent the third phase of clinical trials. Foreign experts consider such an approach to be unethical and harmful (CT1, Events, November 15th, 2020).

Since the autumn of 2020, vaccinations have been represented in CT as a “light at the end of the tunnel” or a “weapon in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic”. Compared to vaccines from other manufacturers, vaccines from the Chinese companies Sinovac and Sinopharm were mentioned less frequently by CT, mainly in connection with the information that they had not yet been approved by EMA (June 2021). In this context, the vaccine was associated with the Russian Sputnik vaccine. The Czech President, who, despite official Czech foreign policy, had long held a supportive attitude towards China and Russia, spoke in favour of using these vaccines. However, Czech politicians spoke out against the use of Chinese vaccines because they were not officially approved by EU countries, and those who would have them administered would not subsequently be recognized in the EU as having had a covid vaccine.

The reports publicized the distrust of the public and experts towards the vaccine from China. “Only 25% trust Sputnik and 18% trust Sinopharm. As for Sinopharm, it was also due to the fact that a third of people do not know this vaccine at all”, according to the results of public opinion poll by analyst Kantar CZ in the programme Václav Moravec Questions on May 9th, 2021. Based on historical experience there is a lack of confidence in the quality of the production process, or doubts as to whether the vaccines produced in China are sufficiently pure, without additives which may cause undesirable side effects, and to what extent the vaccines had been sufficiently tested. “I certainly wouldn’t get Sputnik or a Chinese vaccine, not because I didn’t trust scientists in China or Russia, because I don’t trust their authorities to do everything they can to get the vaccines tested correctly”, Tomáš Cikrt, editor in chief of the Medical Diary in the Events section, commented on December 7, 2020.

Another attribute associated with vaccinations in China and Russia was the dissemination of misinformation about the origin of the virus, the effects of vaccination on health, and the government’s intentions. “We know that we are fighting misinformation, that vaccines are undergoing an accelerated form of research, and that they are imperfect, they are dangerous. And I think that if we agreed to talk to China and Russia, we would spread this misinformation even more, and we certainly would not want that”, said J. Bžoch, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on January 8th, 2021 in the programme Events and Commentaries.

The information that China provides its vaccines to third world countries was framed politically. Both journalists and respondents spoke of a hybrid war in which China and Russia pursued their own strategic goals of strengthening their influence through vaccine diplomacy. “After all, we know that vaccines for Russians and the Chinese are a key part of their propaganda at the moment,” said the presenter of the 90´CT 24 programme on March 10, 2021. In the spring of 2021, Chinese vaccines were used only in Hungary among European countries. In the news broadcast on June 15, 2021 vaccination using Chinese vaccine was connected with the plans for construction of the Shanghai Fu-tan University in Budapest. [16] This plan was represented as a controversial subject of a political storm. In the news only the statements of opposition politicians were mentioned, as were public concerns about the construction of the university and the amount the Hungarian government will borrow from China for the construction. The article was supplemented by visual footage of demonstrators with anti-Chinese banners: “China Stop the state terror against Uyghurs! China stop the genocide!” The bias of this news was obvious and its negative sentiment clear.

Other news reported on the situation at Shanghai Airport also with negative sentiment:

  1. Official footage of the testing of Shanghai Airport employees. Organized queues gave the impression of a calm process. But that’s how the testers themselves caught him. Videos about chaos and panic were being broadcast on Chinese social networks. Airport staff in protective clothing pushing the crowd into a confined space in the underground car park. They blocked the entrance. Some people shouted to let them leave, because they do not want to die and fled through fire exits. Video censors are erasing posts fast. The state media did not report on the chaos, but boasted that the airport tested over 17,000 people overnight (CT1 Events, November 24th, 2020).

The totalitarian practices of China, particularly the censorship of social media and police surveillance, were implicated in this news. [17]

All the above examples illustrate the long-term negative bias of the Czech Television reporting on China. This bias is also significant in the news on the situation of the Uighurs, which we will not address here, because it is completely different thematically. In the material analysed, it is very difficult to find news that would be neutral or would have a positive sentiment (compare with MapinfluenCE 2017). Although the broadcasts also include information about China’s successes, information is provided on Chinese citizens’ costs and restrictions imposed on them at the same time. This is a clear example of van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square. In this case positive aspects about “Them” are de-emphasised and at the same time “They” are blamed for totalitarian practices which would not be acceptable by the majority of contemporary Czech society. [18] In this way the Czech Television could express the distance from the state represented as authoritarian (see below).

5 Discussion and conclusion

Although there were no explicit negative statements or hate speech against China in any of the monitored news and the journalistic programmes on CRo and CT, these examples show bias in the public service media reporting about China. Statements supporting the negative framing of China were broadcast in radio interviews with guests as well as in television news. Various studies (Křeček 2017; Sedláková, Lapčík and Burešová 2019) indicate that mainstream media in the CR take the right-liberal political position and reproduce the official Czech foreign policy discourse. The quoted examples showed that journalists of both Czech public service media were biased with respect to China. Western ethnocentrism with an ideology of democratic liberal society forms the background against which they represent China. Any ideological discourse is characterized by the use of a dividing dichotomy of “Us” and “Them”. [19] In Czech public service broadcasts, China represents the category of “Them”. As western democracies are represented as normal, natural, understandable, right, and positive, the opposite is true about China being represented as strange, unnatural, obscure, wrong, and negative. These dichotomies are the constitutive elements of the new racism, as shown by van Dijk (2001). Both CRo and CT news were built on opposition, in which China represents a different Other. However, this structuring of news reports according to the opposition “Us” versus “Them” evokes stereotypical negative representations of Chinese people present in the Czech culture and reproduces Sinophobia and xenophobia.

According to Billé (2014), Sinophobia in Mongolia is the legacy of 70 years of experience of cooperation with the socialist Soviet Union. As a result of Russian propaganda during this period, the Mongols adopted the Orientalist view of China as being backward, poor, and uncivilized in contrast to Russia, representing the modern West. Although China and the USSR were countries developing a Marxist-Leninist ideology and their relations were friendly in the 1950s, after the rejection of Stalin’s cult in the USSR in the late 1950s, there was a significant political split between them (the Sino-Soviet split). The Czech Republic has forty years of experience with socialism. During this period, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was the recipient of Soviet propaganda which presented China as uncivilized. It is possible that we can look for the germ of the negative perceptions of China right there. This corresponds to the bipolar structuring of the world mentioned above. At the same time, the experience with the restrictive practices of real socialism contributed to a higher sensitivity as to what is happening in the People’s Republic of China. In the analysed news China was represented as the Other, the negative meaning was ascribed to China and Sinophobic ideology was reproduced in this way.

In spite of the fact that the systematic bias, was not confirmed in the researched sample, the analysis identified the presence of Sinophobic statements. It is difficult to prove intentional bias in public service broadcasting as the xenophobic meanings are rarely communicated explicitly. These can only be detected in a long-term systematic study of the content broadcast with the knowledge of cultural, social, and political background. The denial of significance of such subtle statements contributes to the reproduction and persistence of an ideology of hate. Dealing with xenophobia or Sinophobia we cannot ignore the media reception. However, no conclusions can be drawn in this respect on the basis of the analysis conducted. Further research on audience understanding of broadcasts should follow, as well as the research on the journalistic values and the news routines applied.


Department of Asia Studies, Palacký University Olomouc Tř. Svobody 26 Olomouc, 771 80, Czech Republic


About the author

Renáta Sedláková

Renáta Sedláková, Ph.D., graduated from the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno. She works as an assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies, Palacky University Olomouc. She specialises in mass media research methods and the analysis of news discourse. Her field of interest covers media representation of reality, in particular ethnic minorities. She is interested in the process of reception of contemporary popular culture.

Acknowledgements

The work reported in this article was supported by Sinophone Borderlands: Interaction at the Edges, reg. no. (CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791).

References

Act no. 483/1991 Coll. on Czech Television. Available at: https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1991-483 (accessed 28/10/2020).10.3233/BIR-1991-28511Search in Google Scholar

Act no. 484/1991 Coll. on Czech Radio. Available at: https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1991-484(accessed 28/10/2020).10.1111/j.1469-8986.1991.tb00736.xSearch in Google Scholar

Bajerová, Alžběta & Richard Turcsányi. 2019. Between Defender of Values and Faithful Ally: Czech Approaches to China in the Prism of Role Theory Approach. Studia Orientalia Slovaca 18(2). 93–120.Search in Google Scholar

Baider, Fabienne & Monika Kopytowska. 2018. Narrating hostility, challenging hostile narratives. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1. 1–24.10.1515/lpp-2018-0001Search in Google Scholar

Barthes, Roland. 1982. Mythologies. New York: The Noonday Press.Search in Google Scholar

Bennett, Lance. W. 1996. News: The Politics of Illusion. White Plains, New York: Longman.Search in Google Scholar

Birch, David. 1989. Language, Literature and Critical Practice. Ways of Analysing Text. London, New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Billé, Franck. 2014. Sinophobia: Anxiety, Violence, and the Making of Mongolian Identity. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.10.21313/hawaii/9780824839826.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Blablová, Veronika & Ivana Karásková. 2021. Soumrak východních příslibů: česká mediální debata o čínských investicích a 5G sítích [Twilight of Eastern Promises: Czech Media Debate on Chinese Investments and 5G Networks]. MapinfluenCE. Available at: https://mapinfluence.eu/cs/soumrak-vychodnich-prislibu-ceska-medialni-debata-o-cinskych-investicich-a-5g-sitich/ (accessed 20/05/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Czech Radio Council. No date. Kodex Českého rozhlasu [Czech Radio Code]. Available at: https://rada.rozhlas.cz/kodex-ceskeho-rozhlasu-7722382 (accessed 08/01/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Czech Television. 2003. Czech Television Code of Ethics: Principles of public service provision in the area of television broadcasting. Available at: https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/english/ct-code/ (accessed 08/01/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Chandler, David. 2002. Semiotics. The Basics. London: Routledge.10.4324/9780203166277Search in Google Scholar

Chouliaraki, Lillie & Norman Fairclough. 1999. Discourse in Late Modernity Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Cohen, Stanley. 2013. States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.Search in Google Scholar

Entman, Robert M. 1993. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication 43(4). 51–58.10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.xSearch in Google Scholar

EU Council. 2008. Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33178 (accessed 25/06/2021).Search in Google Scholar

EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2021. Encouraging Hate Crime Reporting – The role of law enforcement and other authorities. Available at: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2021/hate-crime-reporting (accessed 25/06/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Fairclough, Norman. 1995. Critical Discourse Analysis. London, New York: Longman.Search in Google Scholar

Fairclough, Norman & Ruth Wodak. 1997. Critical Discourse Analysis. In Teun van Dijk (ed.), Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, 258–284. London: Sage.Search in Google Scholar

Fiske, John. 1990. Introduction to Communication Studies. 2nd edn. London, New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Foucault, Michael. 1994 [1966]. Řád Diskursu. In Michael Foucault (ed.), Diskurs, autor, genealogie [The Order of Discourse in Discourse, Author, Genealogy], 7–39. Praha: Svoboda.Search in Google Scholar

Hall, Stuart. (ed.) 1997. Culture, media and identities. Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices. London: Sage.Search in Google Scholar

Hartley, John. 2001. Understanding News. London, New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Hartley, John & John Fiske. 2003. Reading Television. London, New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Huntington, P. Samuel1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72(3). 22–49. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621.10.2307/20045621Search in Google Scholar

Karásková, Ivana & Veronika Blablová. 2021. Záchrana z východu. Debata o čínských vakcínách v České republice [Rescue from the East. Debate on Chinese vaccines in the Czech Republic]. Mapinfluence.Search in Google Scholar

Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldová, Radoslaw Markowski & Gábor Tóka. 1999. Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139175173Search in Google Scholar

Kopytowska, Monika. 2010. Unveiling the Other – the pragmatics of infosuasion. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 6(2). 249–282.10.2478/v10016-010-0013-ySearch in Google Scholar

Kopytowska, Monika. 2015. Mediating identity, ideology and values in the public sphere: towards a new model of (constructed) social reality. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 11(2). 133–156.10.1515/lpp-2015-0008Search in Google Scholar

Kopytowska, Monika. 2018. Culture, Mediated Experience and the Semiotics of Distance. In Artur Gałkowski & Monika Kopytowska (eds.), Current perspectives in SemioticsSigns, Signification and Communication, 221–234. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.Search in Google Scholar

Kopytowska, Monika & Fabienne Baider. 2017. From stereotypes and prejudice to verbal and physical violence: Hate speech in context. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 13(2). 133–152.10.1515/lpp-2017-0008Search in Google Scholar

Kopytowska, Monika, Łukasz Grabowski & Julia Woźniak. 2017. Mobilising against the Other. Cyberhate, refugee crisis and proximization. In Monika Kopytowska (ed.), Contemporary Discourses of Hate and Radicalism across Space and Genres, 57–97. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.10.1075/bct.93.11kopSearch in Google Scholar

Křeček, Jan. 2017. Analýza předvolebního vysílání České televize a Českého rozhlasu [Analysis of Pre-Election Broadcasting of Czech Television and Czech Radio]. Praha: CEMES FSV UK. Available at: https://www.mediar.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/analyza-ct-cemes-2017.pdf (accessed 10/06/2020).Search in Google Scholar

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1996 [1966]. Myšlení přírodních národů. [The Savage Mind]. Praha: Dauphin.Search in Google Scholar

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 2006 [1964]. Mythologica. [Mythologiques]. Praha: Argo.Search in Google Scholar

Luhmann, Niklas. 2000. The Reality of the Mass Media. Cambridge: Polity Press.10.1515/9781503619227Search in Google Scholar

MapinfluenCE. 2018. Slovak Media Analysis. Available at: https://mapinfluence.eu/en/slovak-media-analysis/ (accessed 20/07/2021).Search in Google Scholar

MapinfluenCE. 2017. Czech Media Analysis. Available at: https://mapinfluence.eu/en/media-analysis/ (accessed 20/07/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Moynihan Donald & Gregory Porumbescu.2020, September 16. Trump’s ‘Chinese virus’ slur makes some people blame Chinese Americans. But others blame Trump. The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/trumps-Chinese-virus-slur-makes-some-people-blame-Chinese-americans-others-blame-trump/(accessed 20/10/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Neuendorf, A. Kimberly. 2002. The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks: Sage.Search in Google Scholar

Pew Research Center. 2020. Most Americans Have ‘Cold’ Views of China. Here’s What They Think About China, In Their Own Words. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/30/most-americans-have-cold-views-of-china-heres-what-they-think-about-china-in-their-own-words/ (accessed 20/05/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Pickering, Michel. 2001. Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation. Basingstoke: Palgrave.10.1007/978-1-137-08051-6Search in Google Scholar

Roche, Gerald. 2020, February 17. The Epidemiology of Sinophobia. Available at: https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/02/17/the-epidemiology-of-sinophobia/ (accessed 20/05/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Schulz, Winfried. 1989. Massenmedien und Realität. Die ‘ptolemäische’ und die ‘kopernikanische’ Auffassung. In Max Kaase & Winfred Schultz (eds.), Massenkommunikation. Theorien, Methoden, Befunde, 135–149. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.10.1007/978-3-322-83571-0_9Search in Google Scholar

Sedláková, Renáta. 2017. Socially Insensitive Messages, Stereotypes and the Disadvantaged Others in the Czech Advertising. Communication Today 8(1). 114–129.Search in Google Scholar

Sedláková, Renáta & Monika Kopytowska. 2018. Different faces of the unknown: the media and the semiotics of fear. In Artur Gałkowski & Monika Kopytowska (eds.), Current Perspectives in Semiotics: Texts, Genres and Representations, 261–291. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.Search in Google Scholar

Sedláková, Renáta, Marek Lapčík & Zdenka Burešová. 2019. Media representation of the US 2016 presidential elections in Czech Radio broadcast. The Journal of International Communication 25. 301–323. DOI: 10.1080/13216597.2019.1649169.10.1080/13216597.2019.1649169Search in Google Scholar

Shoemaker, Pamela J. & Stephen D. Reese. 1996. Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media content. New York: Longman.Search in Google Scholar

Silver, Laura. 2021, June 30. China’s international image remains broadly negative as views of the U.S. rebound. Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/30/chinas-international-image-remains-broadly-negative-as-views-of-the-u-s-rebound/ (accessed 26/06/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin & Christina Huang. 2020, October 6. Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries. Majorities say China has handled COVID-19 outbreak poorly. Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/ (accessed 26/06/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Spurný, Matěj. 2020. Postoje české veřejnosti k cizincům – březen 2020 [Attitudes of the Czech public towards foreigners - March 2020]. Sociologický ústav AV ČR. Ústav. Available at: https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5203/f9/ov200430b.pdf (accessed 06/02/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Strauss, Anselm & Juliet M. Corbin. 1990. Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Newbury Park: Sage.Search in Google Scholar

Šámal, Pavel et al. 2012. Trestní zákoník. Komentář. [Criminal Code. Comment. ] 2nd edn. Prague: C. H. Beck.Search in Google Scholar

Tuček, Milan. 2020. Vztah české veřejnosti k národnostním skupinám žijícím v ČR – březen 2020 [The relation of the Czech public to ethnic groups living in the Czech Republic - March 2020]. Sociologický ústav AV ČR. Available at: https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5199/f9/ov200429.pdf (accessed 06/02/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Turcsányi, Richard & Renáta Sedlaková. 2020. Sinophone Borderlands 2020 Europe SurveyDataset. Palacky University in Olomouc.Search in Google Scholar

Turcsányi Richard, Matej Šimalčík, Kristína Kironská & Renáta Sedláková. 2020. European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19 Differences and common ground across the continent. Available at: https://sinofon.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/COMP-poll-final.pdf (accessed 21/05/2021).Search in Google Scholar

United Nations. 2020a. United Nations Guidance Note on Addressing and Countering COVID-19 related Hate Speech. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Guidance%20on%20COVID-19%20related%20Hate%20Speech.pdf (accessed 28/07/2021).Search in Google Scholar

United Nations. 2020b. United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/UN%20Strategy%20and%20PoA%20on%20Hate%20Speech_Guidance%20on%20Addressing%20in%20field.pdf (accessed 28/07/2021).Search in Google Scholar

van Dijk, Teun A. 1993. Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society 4. 249–283.10.1177/0957926593004002006Search in Google Scholar

van Dijk, Teun A. 2000. New(s) Racism: a Discourse Analytical Approach. In Simon Cottle (ed.), Ethnic Minotities and the Medi, 33–49. Open University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Volek, Jaromír & Marína Urbaniková. 2017. Čeští novináři v komparativní perspektivě [Czech Journalist from the comparative perspective]. Praha: Academia.Search in Google Scholar

Wong, Tessa. 2020, February 20. Sinophobia: How a virus reveals the many ways China is feared. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51456056 (accessed 26/06/2021).Search in Google Scholar

Zhang, Yunpeng & Fang Xu. 2020. Ignorance, Orientalism and Sinophobia in Knowledge Production on COVID‐19. Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 111(3). 211–223.10.1111/tesg.12441Search in Google Scholar

Zhang, Chunjie. 2008. From Sinophilia to Sinophobia: China, History, and Recognition. Colloquia Germanica 41(2). 97–110.Search in Google Scholar

Programmes analysed

Dvacet Minut Radiožurnálu [Twenty Minutes of RadioJournal] 2020, 2021. radio program, Czech Radio. [Online] Available at: https://radiozurnal.rozhlas.cz/dvacet-minut-radiozurnalu-5997743/o-poradu (accessed 25/04/2021).

Hlavní zprávy [Main News]. 2020, 2021. Radio programme, Czech Radio.

Main News – Interviews, Comments [Hlavní zprávy – rozhovory, komentáře] (2020, 2021). Radio programme, Czech Radio. [Online] Available at: https://radiozurnal.rozhlas.cz/hlavni-zpravy---rozhovory-a-komentare-5997846/o-poradu (accessed 25/04/2021).

Horizont ČT24 [Horizon CT24]. 2020, 2021. TV programme, Czech Television. [Online] Available at: https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ivysilani/10316155327-horizont-ct24 (accessed 18/04/2021).

Interview Plus [Interview Plus]. Radio programme, Czech Radio. [Online] Available at: https://plus.rozhlas.cz/interview-plus-6504167/o-poradu (accessed 25/04/2021).

Otázky Václava Moravce [Václav Moravec´ Questions]. 2020, 2021. TV programme, Czech Television. [Online] Available at: https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/porady/1126672097-otazky-vaclava-moravce/ (accessed 18/07/2021).

Události [Events]. (2020, 2021). TV programme, Czech Television, Czech Television. [Online] Available at: https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ivysilani/1097181328-udalosti/(accessed 25/06/2021).

Události, komentáře [Events and Commentaries] 2020, 2021. TV programme, Czech Television. [Online] Available at: https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ivysilani/1096898594-udalosti-komentare (accessed 30/06/2021).

Published Online: 2022-03-17
Published in Print: 2021-07-27

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Downloaded on 6.6.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/lpp-2021-0004/html
Scroll to top button