Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 91 the true rationality of law inheres not simply in the reason of the sovereign doctrinairely insisted upon but in the endurability of the laws as that is signified or imparted to them through the assent of the people in Parliament. As I hope will appear, Hobbes maintains the king's prerogative, the need for the assent of Parliament, and the indispensability of subordinating the common law (thus the legal profession) to statute and Chancery or equity. This is the paradigm of Bacon's practical politics. (p. 14) In this same vein, perhaps, the inner leaf of the cover to this edition of Hobbes's Dialogue "advertises" that he expresses a more "liberal" view of the relations between reason and law (one might add from the above, between monarch and parliament) than those found in Leviathan and other of his works. It is not that it is a more liberal view (without quibbling about the term "liberal"), but that in a relatively brief and condensed work Hobbes has drawn together several of the more pertinent issues of his political and legal philosophy. It seems to me that Leviathan, if it is read carefully, contains several of the aspects of Hobbes's philosophy reflected upon in the Dialogue. Hobbes's discussion in Chapter 15 of "Other Laws Of Nature" and especially Laws six through nineteen, and his contention that they are summarized by the Golden Rule, which to him is the heart of equity, are surprisingly humane and democratic in sentiment. They become the fount (constitution?) of civil law in any appropriate sovereignty. Chapter 26 "Of The Civil Laws" contains material similar to that discussed by Professor Cropsey, while Chapter 30 "Of The Office Of The Sovereign Representative" lays obligations upon the sovereign to act with equity and entrusts to his care the making of good laws which are sharply distinguished from just laws. A just law is made with and by authority, but is not thereby wise or good. It is in this distinction that is to be found much of the confusion and grounds, based upon that confusion, for much of the vituperation leveled against Hobbes. Cropsey contributes to our knowledge of Hobbes by his sharp analysis of several related themes. Some are: Whether it is wisdom or authority that makes a law, the relation of reason to law, the distinction between who pens the law (who devises it) and who executes (makes it)--within which the Philosopher is quoted by Cropsey as declaring, "God made Kings for the People, and not People for Kings" (p. 21)--and several others. In conclusion permit me to say that the student of Hobbes in particular and political philosophy in general will do well to attend to this new edition of Hobbes's Dialogue so well introduced by Joseph Cropsey. THEODORE WALDMAN Harvey Mudd College Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation. By E. M. Curley. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. XV+ 174. n.p.) In the philosophy of Spinoza two main strands seem to come together. On the one hand, there is his avowed goal to achieve a union of the mind with the whole of nature or God, which heralds man's freedom, and finds its consummate expression in the intellectual love of God which is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself. On the other hand we are presented with a rigorous deductive system which supplies the structural framework for a unified science of nature. We may term the former the mystical, and the latter the naturalistic side of Spinozism. But the unique 92 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY fusion of these seemingly incompatible opposites in the work of one man defies our categorial repertoire. Hence interpreters may tend to make light of either the one or the other of the two strands or try to evade them altogether by assimilating Spinoza's philosophy to other types of doctrine. Mr. Curley will probably not quarrel with us when we class his interpretation as naturalistic. Let it be said at once that this is an ingenious and scholarly work of a very high order. It is also exceedingly well and persuasively written; and it is...