Esteem and self-esteem as an interweaving polarity. Max Weber´s analysis from the Protestant ethic to the ideal-type of politician

Introduction

As a preliminary remark, it has to be noted that there is no specific approach to esteem in Max Weber’s sociology and no continuity or systematic reflections on this subject. The terminology used varies and does not present a significant consistency. Weber rarely employs the term “esteem” (Achtung). Sometimes he talks about honorable or dishonorable conduct and, additionally, touches on the question of reputability in relation to belonging to a church or sect. There has been no orderly systematic investigation of the concept of esteem that could be easily summarized and referred to. Therefore, Weber cannot be considered to have thouroughly described esteem or formulated a conceptual framework for it and nor can he be seen as a forerunner of later theorists who elaborate the subject.

However, his analysis of the rational organization of life implemented through the Protestant ethics (the plural is justified here, because Weber examines the Lutheran, Calvinist, Pietistic and Methodist principles by using a comparative method) includes a number of relevant remarks about esteem contained within his analysis of a religious ethic which guided professional and entrepreneurial activity as well as the personal and social conduct of life (Lebensführung). These remarks are important not only because they highlight the relevance of esteem in the Protestant ethic and in Protestant behavior, but also because they reveal a relationship and dynamic between esteem and self-esteem which cannot evolve consistently without reference to one another. Although this issue has not been specifically dealt by Weber’s interpreters, ^[1] some related aspects have been stressed: the social influence and control exerted by the community (Etzrodt, 2008) on the one hand, and the emphasis on the role of the Protestant ethic in strengthening individual autonomy and the formation of personality (Farris, 2013) on the other hand. These aspects appear to complement esteem; they are both necessary, but at least partially autonomous and irreducible to a single concept.

The task then is to extrapolate the aspects that seem relevant to the concept of esteem in Weber’s analysis and to elucidate the main traits of the Protestant ethic. Then it is necessary to show the extent to which they can be employed in formulating first the modality for understanding esteem and self-esteem as single issues, and secondly in outlining the relationship (including tension and correspondence) between them. This approach to investigating esteem and self-esteem is complicated by the fact that there is no independent, systematically organized theory to rely upon, since the applying remarks are extrapolated from treatises which primarily focus on the relation between the Protestant ethic and the development of the modern economy. Nevertheless, it does enable us to supply the evidence indicating in which form Weber’s concept of esteem is value-related and value-dependent in relation to the main ethical ideals of the time. This can be used to bridge the theoretical issues and the historical context, since the latter can provide varying degrees of support for esteem, and can affect the way esteem is achieved.

Yet the issue concerning the relationship between esteem and self-esteem does not only address the connection between them in a historical period and context which stressed their relevance, but it also highlights a pattern of conduct which could be applied to other contexts and spheres of life. ^[2] Therefore, the thesis here is that the kind of relationship which Weber ascertains in the organization of life conceived of by the Protestant ethic also represents a pattern of behavior applicable to the professional politician. Certainly, Weber focuses his conception of the political ethic on the principle of responsibility and criticizes the contrasting ethic of conviction. Nevertheless, the polarity between esteem and self-esteem plays a non-negligible role in the behavior of the professional politician and in conferring dignity and value on his or her activity.

A favorable context for esteem

In Weber’s view, the fundamentals of the Protestant ethic create a favorable background for the social evaluation of esteem and for the parameters used to measure esteem. Weber argues that in the Middle Ages, on the contrary, the search for profit was banned. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, criticized the pursuit of profit as turpitude. The notion of work was not systematically foregrounded, since it was recognized as a means of earning living, but not considered as an aim in itself. Contemplation and prayer were judged to be superior intellectual activities and as a rule considered worthier. Good works also played a relevant role, but they were viewed as single activities and valued more in terms of intention than for their products and results. Thus, esteem existed and referred to people’s virtues, but there was no systematic evaluation; rather, it was related to honorable or dishonorable behavior.

In the modern epoch this changed, especially with the input of Protestant ethics, which conferred evident value and meaning on the notion of profession (Beruf). The etymology of Beruf can be traced back to religion. It is connected with Berufung, which means a calling. In this sense, undertaking a profession entails taking on a personal task and performing it regularly and constantly throughout life. Consequently, professional duty is to be understood as the task of pursuing one’s calling. The word calling, on its part, no longer denotes an exceptional condition or state of mind, but a regular activity to be performed in ordinary everyday life. Indeed, the word Beruf appears in Luther’s German translation of the Bible in a passage which originally, as Weber remarks, does not contain the word (Weber, 2011, p. 99). In Luther, however, the notion of profession continues to have a traditional meaning, since it designates something which befits a person and which has to be acted upon accordingly; in other words, it is a destiny. On the contrary, as Weber explains, for Calvin the notion of profession is prominent, and is related to the central notion of grace.

For Calvin as well as for Luther, salvation is closely tied in with the election by grace. Unlike Luther, though, it was possible for Calvin to ascertain the state of grace not only through wealth and prosperity, but also through the intensive, regular, and steady exercise of a professional activity. The pursuit of profit is no longer condemned, providing it is not ultimately aimed at pleasure and luxury, but invested and used for amelioration purposes. Linking profession with religion enhances willingness to work and improves mental concentration, as it simultaneously involves developing an ethical responsible attitude, which Weber defined using the Italian word coscienziosità (conscientiousness) (Weber, 2011, p. 83). This results in a striking “connection […] between a religious regimentation of life and the most intensive development of a sense of business” (Weber, 2011, p. 74). It therefore entails the fulfillment of duty in a secular profession, which is viewed as “the highest expression that moral activity could assume” (Weber, 2011, p. 100). Consistently, evidence of intensive and constant work is considered the most reliable proof of the state of grace, and the kind of devotion and inner commitment required implies a form of asceticism which nevertheless takes place amid everyday life.

The accomplishment of good valuable work, which is down to personal discipline and a constant commitment, accompanied by soberness, parsimony, and the rejection of luxury, becomes fundamental to a good reputation and esteem. Thus, esteem is anchored in the new values associated with the systematic and effective performance of the profession, in which wealth and success are perceived as accompanying factors that testify to grace, but not as ends in themselves. On the other hand, esteem gains in importance, since individuals are endowed with the chance and opportunity to obtain it through their own conduct and performance in work.

The meaning of social esteem

In his essays on the Protestant churches and sects, Weber shows how esteem is linked to membership of a church or sect and how that has a positive impact not only on social consideration, but also on economic reliability: “Membership of a church community ‘of good repute’ […] guarantees the good standing of the individual, not only socially, but also, and especially, in terms of business” (Weber, 2002, p. 205). This means that the person acquires social status and social recognition through the fact of belonging to one of the churches, and it is on that basis that his creditworthiness is guaranteed. However, belonging to one of the churches is a necessary preliminary condition, but it has to be accompanied by evidence of a flawless conduct of life. In this case, creditworthiness is extended and financial help is provided, should non self-inflicted difficulties arise. By contrast, engaging in disrespectable moral and business conduct leads to the individual’s esteem falling in the eyes of other members and even to explicit or tacit exclusion, which implies social disregard and isolation: “Anyone who is excluded from the church for dishonorable conduct—as used to happen—or—as now—is tacitly deleted from its membership list, falls victim to a kind of social ostracism” (Weber, 2002, p. 206). Weber acknowledges that this has been diminishing in modern times, yet he states that it is still present and can be seen in the emergence of associations and clubs, which are the result of a process of “disenchantment” and secularization, but contain features that are inspired by traditional religious patterns. He thus concludes that the Protestants and especially the Puritans ^[3] were most engaged in pursuing ascetic conduct in social as well as business life and in connecting to it good reputation and social esteem: “The Puritan sects are the most specific bearers of this-worldly form of asceticism. […] The Puritan sects put the most powerful individual interest of social esteem in the service of this breeding of traits” (Weber, 2011, p. 224). Then the question arises whether emphasizing social esteem could lead to a concern for appearances and for opportunism.

Weber had already addressed this question in his main work on the subject, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of the Capitalism. In effect, it was one of the first questions that guided his analysis and interrogation. He dedicates particular attention to it especially at the beginning of the second chapter, where his aim is to illustrate the specific contents of the capitalist “spirit” and he starts by quoting passages from Benjamin Franklin’s works. Weber discovers that economic interest is tied up with ethical values (Nielsen, 2005, pp. 66–67). Franklin for instance says:

This is sometimes of great use. After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to the raising of a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings; therefore never keep borrowed money an hour beyond the time you promised, lest a disappointment shut up your friend’s purse for ever (Weber, 2011, p. 78).

Franklin also advises people to save money, to keep an exact account of expenditure and income, and he attests that a scrupulous policy of parsimony and correctness confer a reputation for being “a man of known prudence and honesty” (Weber, 2011, p. 78), which ensures creditworthiness and facilitates success in business. Weber analyzes Franklin’s statements and notes two different tendencies. On the one hand, he ascertains that all Franklin’s suggestions can be traced back to a utilitarian attitude stressing the importance of appearances:

All of Franklin’s moral admonishments are applied in a utilitarian fashion: Honesty is useful because it leads to the availability of credit. Punctuality, industry, and frugality are also useful and are therefore virtues. It would follow from this that, for example, the appearance of honesty, wherever it accomplishes the same end, would suffice (Weber, 2011, p.79).

On the other hand, Weber signals that things are more complicated. First, Franklin exhibits truthfulness and innocence in his behavior, and second he rejects any type of spontaneous enjoyment of money, since profit “is the result and manifestation of competence and proficiency in a vocational calling” (Weber, 2011, pp. 80–81). This indicates that social esteem is not only considered as a necessary complement of self-interest, but is rooted in a more profound, and originally religious, mindset.

Self-esteem and its internal motives

According to Weber, the decisive factor preventing the pursuit of esteem from being reduced to a mere external and seeming attitude dictated by opportunism and the desire for success was the “earnest regimentation of the conduct of life [Lebensführung], which penetrated every sphere of domestic and public life” (Weber, 2002, p. 2). This imposed an ascetic attitude and a condition of “estrangement from the world (Weltfremdheit)” (Weber, 2011, p. 71), which prevented people from seeking only enjoyment and required the constant and methodic ethical conduct of life. Consequently, “the ethical practice of ordinary people was disinvested of its random and unsystematic nature and built up into a consistent method for the whole conduct of one’s life” (Weber, 2002, p. 80). This implied a continual effort to uphold virtues such as industry, efficiency, moderation, punctuality, and justice, which had lost their occasional character and had become systematical ethical aims to be pursued with regularity in the activities of everyday life, led by the inward objective of moral improvement and the transcendent ultimate object of bliss (Seligkeit). Thus, esteem had to be underpinned by a form of self-esteem that was not to be reduced to self-confidence based on intellectual and practical capacities or skills, but that required a deep-rooted religious sentiment which had to be cultivated day after day through a rationalized conduct of life. Furthermore, this methodic application to daily life would ultimately forge the individual’s psychology and character. It generated psychological drives which were internalized and became the constant attitude of the individual (Guttandin, 1998, p. 180). Besides, it guided ethical behavior which had to be consistent at all moments and in all spheres of life. In its Puritan version above all, this ethical attitude rejected influence by sensation: “It thus formed the basis for a fundamental rejection of every kind of culture of the senses” (Weber, 2002, p. 74). On the other hand, it created the condition of isolation which “engendered, for each individual, a feeling of tremendous inner loneliness” (Weber, 2002, p. 73), which induced them to reflect, to judge their own agency, and to evaluate the ethical soundness of every single action (Schluchter, 2009, p. 9).

Weber compares this personal attitude to the Cartesian saying Cogito, ergo sum which he nevertheless translated into morals and converted into a criterion for judging one’s ethical life. Subjecting agency to the reflective process of introspective analysis entailed a systematic moral self-education which progressively eliminated the effect of immediate and uncontrolled emotions:

Puritan asceticism—like any “rational” asceticism—worked to enable man to demonstrate and assert his “constant motives”—in particular, those which asceticism instilled into him— against the “emotions”—in other words, to train him to become a “personality” in this strictly psychological sense of the word. The goal of asceticism was, in contrast to many widely held notions, to be able to lead a watchful, aware, alert life (Weber, 2002, p. 81).

The individual thereby developed a mental attitude over time which transformed his or her ethical-religious principles into constant norms which had to be adhered to in all life situations, privately, socially, and in professional and business life. Weber’s depiction of this compliance with norms and adherence to the moral law resembles, in its philosophical systematization, Kant’s moral philosophy both in its internal compelling claim and its regulative and (potentially) transcendent extension: “The law was provided as an ideal norm, never quite attainable, but still binding” (Weber, 2002, p. 84). According to Weber, this led individuals to systematically self-monitor their agency, to check for improvements and possible deficiencies, and to pre-emptively avoid the light-mindedness of great consequence. In this sense, social esteem had an external reference connected with the judgment of the people and with good reputation, but it simultaneously required self-esteem, a self-enhancing component based on the internal conviction of a state of grace testified by the strict ethical conduct of life, self-tested and subjected to the highly demanding and inexorable criteria of moral valuation (Schluchter, 1996, p. 84).

Self-esteem and social life

Viewed from this perspective, it appears that self-esteem was indispensable in underpinning social esteem, preventing any degeneration into an opportunistic external attitude. Following this line of thought, it could be inferred that self-esteem was limited to supporting the social reputation of the person and to legitimating its attribution by anchoring it in a religiously inspired conduct of life. Nevertheless, its impact is more extensive than this, since Weber sees the inward development of the Protestant ethic as directed at inner reflection and self-monitoring control, which not only establish a strict ethical conduct in all fields of life, but also represent the origin of the conception of individualism in the modern sense. Ethical self-analysis, which was founded on religion and on compliance with its moral principles, also implied acquiring the habit of reflective solitude and the capacity to make independent judgments. Thus, the Protestant ethic also created the premises for a more detached attitude towards others and for recognizing an individual autonomy which cannot be overridden.

Certainly there were practices of mutual control in public life among members of churches or sects, ^[4] and there were forms of obedience and acceptance which people had to comply with. Determinate forms of conformity were expected and, furthermore, attestations made by other members of the sect were indispensable to guaranteeing good and profitable relationships (Weber, 2011, p. 212). In this sense, in order for esteem to be bestowed upon them and for them to enjoy solidarity and reciprocal help, many common rules and recommendations had to be accepted and adhered to (Poggi, 1983, p. 78). On the other hand, as Weber explains, admission to a sect was considered as a reciprocal voluntary act which concerned both the organization and the individual. With reference to this voluntary act, several sects decisions were taken by counsels organized in democratic representative bodies, and the members were often called on to play an active role in taking joint decisions.

In Weber’s view, the Protestant sects therefore developed a system which on the one hand enhanced the isolation and independence of individuals and on the other hand, on this basis, promoted the creation of a strong social network of associations and organizations.

This combination of the inner isolation of the individual, which leads to a maximum degree of energy being directed outward with the empowerment of the individual to form highly coherent social groups with the maximum thrust—this combination first emerged in its most highly developed form from within the sects (Weber, 2002, p. 214).

The individual therefore seeks esteem by gaining acceptance and social recognition as a member of these groups: “The individual seeks to make his mark himself by integrating himself into the social group” (Weber, 2002, p. 213). However, the individual remains an independent person, and his or her capacity for judgment continues to play a significant role as does the possibility of having a personal opinion or of being autonomous in other respects of life.

Esteem and self-esteem in a secularized context

Weber criticized the progressive severing of the connection between the modern economy and life style from the intrinsic values which had from the outset accompanied the development of an industrious and systematic organization of life (Weber, 2002, p. 121). He was particularly concerned at the dominance of interest and profit that had become detached from the internal discipline which had prevailed thanks to the Protestant ethic. The profession had become, in his opinion, an obligation dictated by the increasing complexity of the economic and social system and had therefore lost its original link with the notion of a calling which had made it a choice and an expression of personal election. Finally, Weber was critical of the abandonment of the original parsimony and moderation in favor of a hedonistic mentality in pursuit of pleasure or luxury, that had converted profit into an end in itself.

By contrast, the process whereby some religious attitudes or ways of life had become secularized throughout history was not negative per se (Ghosh, 2014, pp. 269–70). Weber for instance approved of the ideal of the gentleman, since he regarded it as the secularized conduct of life centered on self-control, moderation, and fairness (Weber, 2002, p. 81). Similarly, he had positive regard for the kind of sociality based on the existence of associations and organizations which he thought represented a secularized form of the sects and which focused their attention on a specific activity or topic (Guttandin, 1998, pp. 134–5). According to Weber, individuals seek the same kind of social self-confirmation which they had sought in former times through the sects.

The cool objectivity [Sachlichkeit] of sociation encourages the individual to find his precise place in the purposeful activity [Zwecktätigkeit] of the group—whether this be a football club or a political party—but it does not in any way diminish the necessity for the individual to be constantly looking for ways to assert himself. On the contrary, it is precisely within the group, in the circle of his companions, that the task of “proving” himself becomes most urgent (Weber, 2002, pp. 213–4).

In other words, membership in a group or association signals that the individual is searching for esteem just as he or she had done in a religious group. This indicates that there is a striving for esteem which continues to play a significant role in a secularized society and which drives the individual to improve his or her social reputation. The question is then whether some other aspects of the Protestant ethic and its conception of esteem and self-esteem cannot be reinstated and employed anew in the context of modern society.

Weber seemed to approve of the relationship which once existed between esteem and self-esteem, where self-esteem was not only the reflex of social esteem, but also the result of the constant and systematic conduct of life based on the virtues of industry, commitment, a sense of justice as well as introspective reflection and autonomy of judgment, which guaranteed self-consciousness and personal freedom. Weber’s depiction of the polarity between esteem and self-esteem seems to point to it being fundamental to maintaining an externally directed social attitude and to seeking a good reputation and social approval, whilst having an individual and reflective capacity for making judgments about different situations and taking independent decisions. Weber refers to modernity as an epoch in which a plurality of values are recognized and in which it is incumbent on the individual to decide which value(s) he or she wants to defend and support. Weber states in one of his political essays: ^[5]

Indeed anyone living in the ‘world’ (in the Christian sense of the world) can only feel himself subject to the struggle between multiple sets of values each of which, viewed separately, seems to impose an obligation on him. He has to choose which of these goods he will and should serve, or when he should serve the one and when the other (Weber, 1994, pp. 78–79).

Thus, it could be said that self-esteem also plays a fundamental role, insofar as it rests on the capacity to take independent and sometimes unpopular decisions, while maintaining an attitude of respect and attention toward the public and looking for approval and good reputation in society. This prevents the person from falling into opportunistic behavior, without renouncing his or her search for esteem. The polarity between esteem and self-esteem can then be pivotally applied by referring to the behavior of the politician and to the ethical issues that Weber ascribed to that profession.

The profession of the politician and the question of esteem

In investigating the competences and the role of the politician in The Profession and Vocation of Politics, Weber refers to the need for the person to consider his or her activity a profession (Beruf). In relation to the exigencies of modern society which require increasing specialization and regular as well as intensive activity, politicians have to dedicate most of their time and energies to their own work and to make politics into the main content of life. The reference to the politician’s profession includes the notion of calling (Berufung) (Müller, 2006, p. 138) which Weber had already highlighted in relation to the Protestant ethic (Breiner, 2006, p. 19). The idea of calling shines through the politician’s charisma, which confers a particular aura on the bearer and calls forth a form of faith in the people who believe that this is the “chosen” person to lead them, to whom they owe unconditional recognition. However, in modern times and with democratization, as Weber explains in Economy and Society, this conception of charisma has been reinterpreted and is now down to the judgment and the choice of the voters (Colliot-Thélène, 2014, p. 95). This implies that the politician cannot rely exclusively on fascination, but has to gain the electorate’s esteem. For Weber, this is related to the program and ideas that the politician proposes, to the decisions taken as well as to the consistency shown in implementing the program, but also to the politician’s behavior and mental attitude. In order to make the politician act more correctly and efficiently, the question of esteem therefore becomes highly relevant.

Reinforcing esteem could make politicians more accountable to the representative institutions and to the public, and on the other hand empower them to solve relevant political problems and to take momentous decisions: “The honor of the political leader, that is, of the leading statesman, consists precisely in taking exclusive, personal responsibility for what he does, responsibility which he cannot and may not refuse or unload onto others” (Weber, 1994, p. 331). This burdens politicians with great responsibility, but also confers a great deal of power on them and can induce them to become vane and self-confident, stressing the value of appearances and “the need to thrust one’s person as far as possible into the foreground” (Weber, 1994, p. 354). The risk of opportunism envisaged in the sphere of business reappears in relation to politicians in the guise of vanity. To prevent it, Weber relies once again on the politicians’ conduct of life (Lebensführung) and on the three virtues of behavior: passion, sense of responsibility, and sense of measure (Augenmaß). Passion, Weber explains, must not be confused with enthusiasm or uncontrolled excitement. ^[6] On the contrary, passion means “the sense of concern for the thing itself (Sachlichkeit) and the passionate commitment to a cause (Sache)” (Weber, 1994, p. 355). Having a sense of responsibility entails considering the consequences and the negative side-effects of decisions, especially in relation to the future, weighing the positive and the negative issues, and taking decisions which the politician is personally accountable for. The sense of measure, ultimately, means “the ability to maintain one’s inner composure and calm while being receptive to realities, in other words distance from things and people” (Weber, 1994, p. 353); that is, avoiding emotional as well as external influence by pronouncing a judgment. ^[7] These virtues are thought to by-pass “purely personal self-intoxication” (Weber, 1994, p. 354) and false illusions, without jeopardizing “service to a cause” (Weber, 1994, p. 355) which, when joined with a matter-of-fact approach and fairness, grants the politician dignity (Weber, 1994, p. 356). With respect to this, Weber also conceives of an ethic of responsibility relating to the conduct of politicians (de Villiers, 2018, p. 145), which he contrasts with an ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) resting on absolute principles and impaired by the attitude of being estranged from the world. The ethic of responsibility, by contrast, entails considering negative tendencies and flaws in human nature, weighing up the possible negative consequences and unwanted side-effects, maintaining nevertheless the capacity to take decisions by bearing the consequences and being accountable for them (de Villiers, 2018, pp. 150–151). Thus, social esteem has to be complemented, and this also applies to politicians, with a form of self-esteem which is not simply socially derived, but finds support in personal qualities, independent judgment, and an autonomous decision-making faculty. ^[8] This also means having the capacity to set limits when faced with weighty scruples: “The leading politician must publicly refuse to accept responsibility for political actions if they conflict with his own convictions” (Weber, 1994, p. 204). This preserves the politician’s dignity and guarantees a kind of self-esteem derived from the systematic conduct of life and from the acquisition of an independent capacity of evaluation. Indeed, it allows for an inward critical instance which valorizes esteem without being completely subjected to it. ^[9]

Conclusion

Although Weber does not elaborate a comprehensive theory of esteem, his analysis of the Protestant ethic has interesting implications and provides material for reflection. First of all, he shows that the contexts which are favorable to the valorization of esteem relate to the regular activities and the work of the individual and stress the systematic conduct of life characterized by the methodic and rationalized organization of agency. He explains that connecting esteem to favorable conditions guaranteeing social and professional recognition is undoubtedly helpful in improving ethical attitudes, but can also bear the risk of promoting a conduct of life mainly based on opportunism and appearances. In order to prevent this, Weber argues that social esteem must be supported by a form of self-esteem which does not depend only on social reputation, but also finds in its own values and consistency the reason for legitimization. In the case of the Protestant ethic, religion certainly played a paramount role and was decisive in ensuring the strict ethical conduct of life. Nevertheless, Weber is not averse to the possibility of conceiving of secularized forms of ethical conduct, as he demonstrates in his reflections on the politician’s profession and ethic. In this case, he conceives of a kind of polarity between esteem and self-esteem, through which they are considered complementary aspects, but self-esteem is at the same time endowed with the capacity for exerting a critical function. Provided that self-esteem is not reduced to vanity and external approval, but rests on inner qualities which have to be constantly cultivated, it can guide the individual toward social compliance, by simultaneously providing a form of intellectual independence.