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Moral intuitions and justification in ethics

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA

    Stefan Sencerz

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland

    Stefan Sencerz

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  1. Stefan Sencerz
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Sencerz, S. Moral intuitions and justification in ethics. Philosophical Studies 50, 77–95 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355162

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