Philosophy East and West

In 1984, Derek Parfit, in his book Reasons and Persons, argued in favor of the reductionist view about persons, which at that time aroused a great deal of controversy. Although Parfit’s views were not accepted by the majority of the exponents of Western analytic philosophy, in Personal Identity and Buddhist PhilosophyMark Siderits observes that Parfit did not abandon the view that “the existence of a person just consists in the existence of a brain and a body and the occurrence of a series of physical and psychological events” (pp. 19–20). While Parfit was aware of the fact that the Buddha also maintained a similar view, neither he nor his critics were aware of the fact that “in the Classical Indian controversy over the Buddha’s view of persons, philosophical tools were forged that might help us to adjudicate the dispute between Parfit and his many critics” (p. 1). [End Page 537]

In the first edition of Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy, published in 2003, an attempt was made to show how such philosophical tools can actually be employed for solving some problems related to this dispute, and it was justifiably praised by discerning scholars for successfully developing “fusion philosophy,” where one finds “a serious and sustained effort to use elements from one tradition in order to solve problems arising in another” (p. 1). Siderits, however, also contends that since “[t]he Indian Buddhist philosophical corpus has not (yet) been declared a UNESCO World Heritage site” (p. 4), such tools borrowed from the Buddhist tradition may be put to novel uses and also that, in some cases, one may also go “into the terrain of rational reconstruction” (p. 4) and construe what the Buddhists could have said, in conformity with their basic tenets, if confronted with a novel problem that is being discussed in contemporary philosophy.

In the second edition, important and relevant publications that have appeared in the intervening twelve years have been duly taken into account, and many portions of the first edition have been revised, or even rewritten in view of such new materials. The book has nine chapters: (1) Situating Reductionism; (2) Refuting the Self; (3) Getting Impersonal; (4) Wholes, Parts, and Emergence; (5) Ironic Engagement; (6) Establishing Emptiness; (7) Empty Knowledge; (8) The Turn of the True; and (9) Empty Persons. In the first five Siderits has considered the important objections raised so far against reductionism as developed by Parfit, and also discussed how suitable materials from Buddhist texts can be utilized for meeting such objections. In the last four chapters it has been shown how reductionism can be criticized, following the Buddhists who are Global Antirealists.

The first chapter discusses “just what reductionism amounts to” (p. 5). Chapter 2 discusses several Buddhist arguments against “the view that the continued existence of a person consists in the continued existence of a self” (p. 5). The third chapter discusses how a number of objections raised against the reductionist view of self by Eliminativists and Non-Reductionists can be answered. The fourth chapter expounds the Buddhist view that no composite entity is ultimately real, and also discusses some objections against this view. The fifth chapter deals with the ethical consequences of this reductionist view of self, arguing in favor of the claim that such a thesis results in “a diminished degree of existential dread and greater concern for the welfare of others” (p. 6). The sixth chapter presents the objections against Buddhist reductionism that have been raised by Buddhist Antirealists, who deny the claim that there are things with intrinsic nature. The seventh chapter deals with another claim of the Buddhist Antirealists, that nothing is intrinsically a means of knowledge. The eighth chapter asks whether the charge against Antirealism—that it makes truth dependent on our ability to know—is true of the global anti-realism espoused by the Buddhistic sect that denies the intrinsic nature of things. The ninth chapter discusses the ethical consequences of the claim that persons are devoid of intrinsic nature. [End Page...