Abstract
T.M. Scanlon writes that deontological constraints on taking lives are to be defended “by considering what principles licensing others to take our lives could be reasonably rejected.” I argue that Scanlon can offer no such defence of deontological constraints.
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Shaver, R. Contractualism and Restrictions. Philos Stud 132, 293–299 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2219-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2219-3