Abstract
The moral significance of the human fetus continues to pose difficult ethical questions to the majority of the population. If one abstracts himself or herself from either the pro-life or the prochoice extreme, one finds a difficult range of ethical dilemmas. On the one hand, as a living entity with the human genome, one must affirm value to the embryo; on the other hand, we need to take into account other values external to the fetus. Thus, the difficult ethical questions are how to value the fetus and what status has that value in comparison to other values.
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Notes and References
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I would like to thank my colleagues Mario Moussa and Ruth Smith for their reading of the manuscript and providing very helpful comments.
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Shannon, T.A. (1991). The Moral Significance of Brain Integration in the Fetus. In: Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Bioethics and the Fetus. Biomedical Ethics Reviews. Humana Press, Totowa, NJ. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-445-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-445-0_7
Publisher Name: Humana Press, Totowa, NJ
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