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Notes on Ostrogorski's paradox

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Conclusion

This note has investigated the necessary conditions for the existence of Ostrogorski's Paradox, and it showed that the paradox depends on the sizes of the groups taking each possible set of stands on the salient issues. By revising its positions on relevant issues, the majority party can avert the paradox. With increased emphasis on single-issue voting observed in the United States and other Western democracies, the analysis of the paradox should guide the understanding of parties' responses to coalition formation processes among special interest groups. Indeed, the Apex conditions characterizing the paradox provide clues as to the strategy to be followed by the majority party in selecting its platform: the party should generally follow positions advocated by the largest group while presenting a coalition of all other groups.

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The helpful comments of Howard Tamashiro on an earliar draft of this paper are greatfully acknowledge.

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Shelley, F.M. Notes on Ostrogorski's paradox. Theor Decis 17, 267–273 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132611

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