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On the Normative Authority of Others

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Abstract

Gibbard argues that we have to accord others a certain fundamental epistemic normative authority. To avoid skepticism we must accept some of our normative principles; since the influence of others was a major factor in the process that led us to adopt them, we must accord others fundamental normative authority. The argument ought to be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, since while compatible with expressivism, it does not assume expressivism. It has rarely been discussed. In this essay I analyse the argument, explain why it is not sound and make a suggestion about the real upshot of the rejection of normative skepticism.

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Notes

  1. Gibbard (1990:180).

  2. In the background of D lies Gibbard’s naturalism which restricts the range of possible explanations of the sources of our moral beliefs.

  3. That is, if I think with Korsgaard(2009: 64–80) that consistency suffices as our only fundamental normative principle, or alternatively if I think with Frankfurt (2004: 55–6, 62–3) that aiming at those things I consistently love suffices as our only fundamental normative principle, and that all other norms can be constructed from these foundations. Gibbard himself sometimes seem to suggest that the only fundamental principle we must follow is: guide yourself by the set of consistent plans you cannot bring yourself to reject (2008: 22–3, 30).

  4. Because I think, for example, that this principle is innate.

  5. Gibbard must be assuming that when it comes to fundamental normative principles, that is, principles that cannot be justified by appeal to other normative principles, the only reason we could have for accepting them is the authority we ascribe to their source.

  6. It is the current thought that led me to say previously that assumption A is questionable. If there is anything bleak about scepticism it’s the fact that it leaves one without any practical guidance. It is far from clear that the rejection of scepticism on account of its bleak consequences forces one to accept some of one’s current normative principles as opposed to some arbitrary normative principles.

References

  • Frankfurt, H. (2004). The reasons of love. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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  • Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Gibbard, A. (2008). Reconciling our aims. New York: Oxford University Press.

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  • Korsgaard, C. (2009). Self-constitution. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Rob Hopkins, Chris Bennett, Jimmy Lenman and Michael Bratman for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria St., Sheffield, UK, S3 7QB

    Yonatan Shemmer

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  1. Yonatan Shemmer
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Shemmer, Y. On the Normative Authority of Others. Philosophia 42, 517–521 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9490-x

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