Abstract
Genuine reconciliation between first- and third-person methodologies and knowledge requires respect for both phenomenological and scientific epistemologies. Recent pragmatic, theoretical, and verbal attempts at reconciliation by cognitive scientists compromise phenomenological method and knowledge. The basic question is thus: how do we begin reconciling first- and third-person epistemologies? Because life is the unifying concept across phenomenological and cognitive disciplines, a concept consistently if differentially exemplified in and by the phenomenon of movement, conceptual complementarities anchored in the animate properly provide the foundation for reconciliation. Research by people in neuroscience and in dynamic systems theory substantiate this thesis, providing fundamental examples of conceptual complementarity between phenomenology and science.
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Sheets-Johnstone, M. Preserving integrity against colonization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3, 249–261 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000049304.55836.de
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000049304.55836.de