Franciscan Studies

TIME AND ETERNITY OCKHAM'S LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW Many studies have been devoted already to an analysis of Ockham's logic and philosophical insight into time and modality , which was for him the basis for solving the problems of predestination and God's foreknowledge. In my view, however, some important points still remain unsolved. In the following discussion, I shall (1) analyse Ockham's claims concerning the truth and modality of tensed (i.e., past and future) propositions, and (2) show that his claims consist of two principles: the timeless logical relationship between present-tense propositions and past- or future-tense ones, and the change in the modality of events in process of time. On the basis of this analysis, I shall also (3) examine his concept of God's cognition and predestination of future contingents, which are present to God, though not to us. This examination will (4) lead to a conclusion about the relationship between God's eternity and our human temporal language. 1. THE TRUTH-VALUE AND MODALITY OF TENSED PROPOSITIONS In this section I shall analyse Ockham's claims concerning past- and future-tense propositions, to show that they share a symmetrical structure. I shall distinguish two aspects, one of which is the non-temporal relationship between propositions and the other is the change in the modality of events in process of time. Further, after formalizing Ockham's claims, I shall try to examine and justify them. 1.1 Data and their Primary Analysis In recent discussions, scholars have been in agreement as 284TETSURO SHIMIZU to Ockham's explicit claims on the subject:1 i.e., he not only concedes (1) the necessity of the past, (2) the principle of bivalence2 as applied to future-tense contingent propositions, (3) the immutability of truth, (4) the contingency of the future, but also evades the inconsistency of (l)-(4)3 by (5) restricting necessity to sentences which are really (not merely verbally) about the past or present. Of course I acknowledge (l)-(5) as Ockham's explicit claims. Nevertheless I shall propose in the following discussion some further principles as being more basic to Ockham's theory, from which (5) as well as (l)-(4) will consequently be concluded. That is, speaking from Ockham's standpoint, (5) is not a restriction added afterwards in order to maintain consistency, though historically speaking it might be said to be so. To make my point evident, let us consider and analyse Ockham's assertions again. 1.1.1 Past-tense Propositions Ockham's claim concerning past-tense propositions is as follows: (a) If some proposition, non-modal and about the present, and not equivalent to one about the future, is true now, so that it is true of the present, then it will always be true of the past.4 fb) Every true proposition about the present involves some necessary proposition about the past.5 1 Among others, Calvin G. Normore, "Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An Overview," in T. Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy (1985): 3-22, gives a useful summary of these claims. Cf. Alfred J. Freddoso, "Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism ," The Journal of Philosophy 53 (1983): 257-78. 2 "Bivalence" is understood as the principle that the truth-value of a proposition is determined to be either true or false and there is not any other truth-value. s Normore (9-11) formalizes clearly this inconsistency. 4 Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei respectu Futurorum Contingentium , OP II, 507 1.18-20: "si aliqua propositio mere de inesse et de praesenti et non aequivalens uni de futuro sit vera modo, ita quod sit vera de praesenti, semper erit vera de praeterito." Cf. William Ockham, Predestination, God's Foreknowledge , and Future Contingents, trans, by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann, 2nd ed. 1983: 36. 5 OP II, 515 1.210; "omnis propositio de praesenti vera habet aliquam de praeterito necessariam." Cf. Adams and Kretzmann 46. Time and Eternity in Ockham285 Ockham's intention is apparent: he says that if a proposition , e.g., "some event takes place," is now true, then "some event took place" will be true at all time...