Abstract
Neuropragmatism is a research program taking sciences about cognitive development and learning methods most seriously, in order to reevaluate and reformulate philosophical issues. Knowledge, consciousness, and reason are among the crucial philosophical issues directly affected. Pragmatism in general has allied with the science-affirming philosophy of naturalism. Naturalism is perennially tested by challenges questioning its ability to accommodate and account for knowledge, consciousness, and reason. Neuropragmatism is in a good position to evaluate those challenges. Some ways to defuse them are suggested here, along with recommendations about the specific kind of naturalism, a pluralistic and perspectival naturalism, that neuropragmatism should endorse.
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