Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Personal identity and bioethics: the state of the art

  • Published:
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There may, of course, be other reasons to resist this moral verdict, but for our purposes, we can focus just on the cases in which the only thing preventing moral agreement is metaphysical disagreement.

  2. This is a paraphrase of Eric Olson’s first sentence in his contribution to this issue.

  3. Mark Johnston, in a series of articles, seems to suggest an account like this. See [24].

  4. One might take Eric Olson’s early work [5] to suggest an account like this.

  5. This could flow from a reading of Parfit [6] that interprets him in a descriptive and not revisionary way. The relation grounding (and unifying) our various concerns and commitments is, for him, Relation R, consisting of psychological continuity and/or connectedness.

  6. A position I recently attempted to advance for three specific areas of bioethics, viz., abortion, the definition of death, and advance directives [7].

References

  1. Sider, Theodore. 2001. Four-dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  2. Johnston, Mark. 1987. Human beings. Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Johnston, Mark. 1989. Fission and the facts. Philosophical Perspectives 3: 369–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Johnston, Mark. 1992. Reasons and reductionism. The Philosophical Review 101: 589–618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Olson, Eric. 1997. The human animal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Shoemaker, David. 2009. The insignificance of personal identity for bioethics. Bioethics. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01719.x.

Download references

Acknowledgments

My thanks to the dream team of reviewers—Tim Campbell, David DeGrazia, James Delaney, David Hershenov, Jeff McMahan, Eric Olson, and Marya Schechtman—for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this introduction.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David Shoemaker.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Shoemaker, D. Personal identity and bioethics: the state of the art. Theor Med Bioeth 31, 249–257 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9147-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9147-8

Keywords

Navigation