Abstract
One strategy Mādhyamikas use to support their claim that nothing has intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is to argue that things with intrinsic nature could not enter into causal relations. But it is not clear that there is a good Madhyamaka argument against ultimate causation that understands causation in ‘Humean’ terms and understands dharmas as tropes. After exploring the rationale behind the intrinsic-nature criterion of dharma-hood, I survey the arguments Mādhyamikas actually give for their claim that anything dependently originated must be devoid of intrinsic nature, and suggest that none actually succeeds in ruling out this hypothesis about how ultimate causation might work.
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Abbreviations and References
AKB Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. Prahlad Pradhan, Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna.
LVP Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapdā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.
P Pandeya, Raghunath, ed., The Madhyamakaśāstram of Nāgārjuna, with the Commentaries Akutobhayā by Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakavṛtti by Buddhapālita, Prajñāpradīpavṛtti by Bhāvaviveka, and Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.
English translation: Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Translated, with commentary and introduction, by Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura. Somerville, MA: Wisdom, 2013.
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Siderits, M. Causation, ‘Humean’ Causation and Emptiness. J Indian Philos 42, 433–449 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-013-9206-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-013-9206-3