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Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis

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Notes

  1. Kentridge et al. (2004).

  2. Block (2008).

  3. Ison et al (2011).

  4. Bayne and Spence (2013).

  5. Saxe and Carey (2006).

  6. If we could never tell, for any pair of experiences, whether they differ phenomenally, then the contrast method could not get off the ground. I doubt that Prinz would want to go that far in discrediting introspection, since it would amount to saying that we can never tell the difference by introspection between seeing red and seeing green, or between the sound of C# and the sound of B, and so on.

  7. Otherwise awareness of visible instances would be a form of awareness of an experience, rather than a form of awareness that constitutes an experience.

  8. Why does Travis attribute this overly restrictive characterization of thought to Frege? In the case of quantification, we apply a second-order function—the meaning of the quantifier—to a first-order function, in which case there is functional application without application to an object. I hesitate to think that Travis is mistaking the specific case of applying a function from objects to truth-values with the more general case of applying a function to an argument of whatever type, though someone who made that mistake would characterize thought the way he does.

  9. Anscombe (1965).

  10. Gupta (2006).

  11. If hallucinations are not perceptual experiences, then the only perceptual experiences will be case of perception. Travis wrongly suggests that I use “perceptual experience” to denote only those experiences in which perception is taking place—contrary to my explicit definition on p. 26.

Reference

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  • Block, N. (2008). Consciousness and cognitive access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108(Issue 1 pt 3), 289–317.

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  • Ison, M., et al. (2011). Selectivity of pyramidal cells and interneurons in the human medial temporal lobe. Journal of Neurophysiology, 106, 1713–1721.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Susanna Siegel

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  1. Susanna Siegel
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Siegel, S. Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis. Philos Stud 163, 847–865 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0012-7

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