Abstract
The proponents of embodied cognition often try to present their research program as the next step in the evolution of standard cognitive science. The domain of standard cognitive science is fairly clearly circumscribed (perception, memory, attention, language, problem solving, learning). Its ontological commitments, that is, its commitments to various theoretical entities, are overt: cognition involves algorithmic processes upon symbolic representations. As a research program, embodied cognition exhibits much greater latitude in subject matter, ontological commitment, and methodology than does standard cognitive science. The proponents of embodied cognition to explain the aspects of human cognition are using the importance of embodied interaction with the environment, which is a dynamic relation. The cause of disagreement between these two approaches is regarding the role assumed by the notion of representation. The discussion about the contrast between embodied cognition and standard cognitive science is incomplete without Gibson’s ecological theory of perception and connectionist account of cognition. I will briefly contrast these important theories with computational view of cognition, highlighting the debate over role of representation. Embodied cognition has incorporated rather extensively a variety of insights emerging from research both in ecological psychology and in connectionism. The way I have followed to contrast embodied cognition with standard cognitive science, involves concentration on those several themes that appear to be prominent in the body of work that is often seen as illustrative of embodied cognition. This strategy has the advantage of postponing hard questions about “the” subject matter, ontological commitments, and methods of embodied cognition until more is understood about the particular interests and goals that embodied cognition theorists often pursue. This approach might show embodied cognition to be poorly unified, suggesting that the embodied cognition label should be abandoned in favor of several labels that reflect more accurately the distinct projects that have been clumped together under a single title. Alternatively, it might show that, in fact, there are some overarching commitments that bring tighter unity to the various bodies of work within embodied cognition that seem thematically only loosely related. The contrast between these two approaches is highlighted not only the basis of a priori argument but major experiments have been mentioned, to show the weight of the assumptions of both the contrasting approaches.
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04 September 2020
This article has been retracted. Please see the retraction notice for more detail: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0159-5.
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Singh, P. RETRACTED ARTICLE: Contrasting Embodied Cognition with Standard Cognitive Science: A Perspective on Mental Representation. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 36, 125–149 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0159-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0159-5