Abstract
Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpret Harel as making two central objections to this form of reasoning. First, traditional approaches require comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extreme cases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of rules. I argue that these objections, though prima facie plausible, are on reflection relatively weak, and I offer instead a more moderate argument that vindicates Harel’s general thesis that deliberation is morally relevant. More specifically, I argue that whether one acts on certain conditions affects both the moral permissibility of one’s actions and the duties owed by others.
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Notes
Arguably the rejection of the relevance of intentions is not entailed by the core commitment of consequentialism as intentions may contribute value to states of affairs. Compare two worlds where everyone does the same thing outwardly, but in world 1 they have bad intentions whereas in world 2 they have good intentions. A consequentialist could argue that, given a necessary choice between the two, it would be impermissible to bring about world 1 on the ground that it is less valuable than world 2.
Harel (2014, 199).
Although Harel attributes this claim to consequentialists, not all consequentialists believe this. See Portmore (2011).
For example, Nozick (1974).
Harel (2014, 108).
Ibid. 111.
Ibid. 123.
Ibid.
A positive comparative judgment specifies the way in which two items compare according to some value rather than the way in which they do not compare. For example, the claim that George Eliot is better than Charles Dickens in terms of literary quality is a positive comparison, whilst the claim that Dickens is worse than Eliot in terms of literary value is a negative comparison. See Chang (2002).
Harel (2014, 122).
Ibid. 121.
Ibid. 122.
Ibid.
See Dancy (2004, especially Chapter 5).
Of course, there are those who deny that torture is ever permissible. See, for example, Gaita (2002).
Harel (2014, 118).
Ibid. 118.
Ibid. 122.
For an elaboration of this idea, see Kamm (2007, Chapter 7).
This case is taken from Tadros (2013, 159).
I thank Victor Tadros for discussions about this possibility.
This example is modified from Parr and Slavny, ‘Harmless Discrimination’ (forthcoming in Legal Theory).
See Scheffler (1992).
Rawls (1964).
Nozick (1974, 94).
Casal and Willaims (2004, 159).
See Tadros (2013, 122–127 and 149–155).
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Acknowledgments
I thank Victor Tadros for comments on this paper.
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Slavny, A. Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly. Criminal Law, Philosophy 11, 833–846 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9384-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9384-z