Abstract
Scholars have wrestled with the very troubling but also rather long passage in the Protagoras in which Socrates offers an interpretation of a poem by Simonides (339e-347a). On the one hand, the way in which Socrates develops his interpretation leads to an outcome that makes it look as if Socrates attributes distinctly Socratic views to the poet, which had led a number of scholars to conclude that, albeit in a rather strange way, Socrates is trying to do something philosophically serious in his interpretation. On the other hand, the “philosophically serious” approach must confront several features of the Socratic interpretation that seem anything but serious. Immediately after concluding his interpretation, Socrates contends that the entire enterprise of poetical interpretation is “no different from the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd” (347c3-5) and dismisses such a form of entertainment as “childish frivolities” (347d6). In this paper, I argue that Socrates is presented by Plato as (i) doing something philosophically significant in this passage, and also (ii) providing an interpretation of Simonides that would appear to any intelligent reader as both comical (in places) and far-fetched in its conclusions, and also (iii) believing that the interpretation of poetry is an example of “childish frivolity.” Indeed, I claim that it is the third of these claims—which, after all, is the conclusion Socrates himself reaches by the time he is done—that Plato’s Socrates wants most of all for us to accept.
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Notes
- 1.
When I refer to ‘Socrates’ in this paper, I intend only to refer to the Socrates presented in Plato’s works. The views attributed to this Socrates, then, are the views that Plato has represented to us as belonging to this character. I accept that these may be the same as those of the historical Socrates; I assume, as well, that the views given to this Socrates also represent Plato’s own views when he wrote the dialogue. I acknowledge that both of these opinions are controversial among scholars. Neither, however, is required for my argument herein.
- 2.
Excellent examples of this approach may be found in Beresford (2009), Frede (1986), and McCoy (1999). An even more radical view is proposed by Scodel (1986) and Pappas (1989), who both argue that Socrates’ interpretation of the poem is a sincere attempt to understand its meaning, but governed by what Davidson (1973) recommended as the principle of charity in interpretation. Detailed criticisms of Frede (1986), McCoy (1999), and Pappas (1989) are provided in Trivigno (2013), which I do not intend to repeat herein. As will become obvious, however, contra Trivigno, I do not agree that Plato recognizes any ideal of literary interpretation in the Protagoras. Most of the more recent scholarship on this passage in the Protagoras has urged an abandonment of the view that seems to have been widely accepted throughout most of the twentieth century, which was that the entire episode is an example of Socratic irony or humor. See, for examples, Guthrie (1975), p. 227; Shorey (1933), p.128; A. Taylor (1956), p.251; C. Taylor (1976), p. 145–6; Vlastos (1956), p. xxiv.
- 3.
Beresford (2009), p. 185.
- 4.
Translations of Plato’s text will be those given in Cooper (1997) unless otherwise noted.
- 5.
Trivigno (2013), p. 509.
- 6.
In Scodel (1986), p. 26. As will soon become evident, however, Scodel and I reach opposed conclusions about the evidence provided by Plato’s (other) early dialogues on this question.
- 7.
Beresford, 2009, p. 188.
- 8.
Frede (1986) also thinks that the Protagoras shows signs of Plato’s (later) hand in various views therein endorsed by Socrates. She does not, however, include a change in the earlier characterization of poets as divinely inspired.
- 9.
πάντας δ’ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ μηδὲν αἰσχρόν⋅ ἀνάγκῃ δ’ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται⋅
- 10.
Scodel claims that Socrates “does not even hint at the most obvious reason for dismissal, that the words of the poets are unlikely to provide any truth” (Scodel (1986), p. 26), which would seem to show that she had the Republic’s critique of poets and poetry in mind. As I have argued above, however, serious consideration of the discussions of divine inspiration in the (other) early dialogues would not allow this “most obvious reason” for dismissing the possibility that there might be truth in Simonides’ words. As for this other evidence, Scodel claims that it mandates using the principle of charity when interpreting poetry: “The process Plato depicts is that of the application of a strict Principle of Charity under which the interpretation is guided by the attempt to make as much of the interpreted discourse true as possible. For a poetic text, to be meaningful is not enough. It must be true” (ibid., p. 35). But this would hold only under the assumptions either that the poet is really wise or that the poet was divinely inspired. It seems clear that for Socrates the former is never true, and as I have argued, the Protagoras provides no evidence that the latter is true, either. The upshot is thus not that the interpretation of uninspired poetry requires the principle of charity, but rather that it is simply a waste of intellectual effort and time.
- 11.
Griswold complains that “Socrates’ exegesis is forced—hardly a model of fair literary criticism” (Griswold (1999), p. 284). My point herein (again, contra Trivigno (2013)) is that Plato’s Socrates would not have recognized any model of exegesis of a literary source as having any intellectual worth. I certainly agree with Griswold, however, that Socrates in the Protagoras emphasizes speaking and arguing “in one’s own voice.”
- 12.
I have benefited from comments and suggestions made in response to earlier versions of this paper by David Keyt, and also by others attending the conference in honor of Fred D. Miller, Jr.
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Smith, N.D. (2024). ‘Childish Frivolity’: Plato’s Socrates on the Interpretation of Poetry. In: Keyt, D., Shields, C. (eds) Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 155. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51146-2_3
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