This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Henceforward all references to McKenna (2012) will consist only of page numbers in brackets.
A third type of moral reason is discernible here, although McKenna does not seem to explicitly introduce this as a reason for me not to hit your sore elbow. This is the reason arising from the fact that if I do hit your elbow, then my action is likely to lead to your holding me responsible and engaging in blaming behavior that will expose me to harms. The blaming behavior could include berating me, withholding normal courtesies, reducing your displays of concern about my welfare, or engaging in scolding glances or outright public reprimands. [p. 211] Such activities count as harming me because they set back my welfare interests, even though the setbacks may be minimal. My welfare interests are set back because your blaming behavior typically interferes with my ability to have satisfactory interpersonal relations with others (especially but not exclusively with you), and your behavior makes it likely that my psychic life is burdened by concerns about others’ attitudes towards me. [pp. 134–141, 219] Most of us have reason to avoid these sorts of harms, so we have reason to avoid conducting ourselves in ways that will lead to our being blamed. One might ask whether this is a moral reason to avoid blame, or just a prudential reason. It’s also worth noting that this third type of reason would obtain even if it would be unjust for the blamer to blame one for the allegedly wrongful conduct in question.
One question here is whether HMB2 implies that, when an agent holds another person responsible, there is some moral reason that the agent specifically endorses according to which it is wrong for the person to x—or is it sufficient that the agent believes there is some moral reason or other making x-ing wrong, even though the agent has no particular moral reason in mind?
I’ve added this phrase to maintain the parallel with HMB2.
McKenna’s statements of MB’ and its predecessor MB [15] are statements of sufficient conditions only, since he believes a full statement of necessary and sufficient conditions must accommodate issues of culpable ignorance and derivative responsibility. Since these are not germane to the argument here, I have incorporated an attempt to deal with these issues into a statement of MB’ as a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions.
The actual content of such a special second-personal demand would doubtless be more complex, but for our purposes this statement of it can stand in for the fully stated demand.
References
Darwall, Stephen. (2006). The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, accountability. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McKenna, Michael. (2012). Conversation and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Gary. (1987). Responsibility, the limits of evil: Variations on a Strawsonian theme. In Ferdinand Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character, and the emotions: New essays in moral psychology (pp. 256–286). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Smith, H.M. Does Being Morally Responsible Depend on the Ability to Hold Morally Responsible?. Philos Stud 171, 51–62 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0256-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0256-x