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Notes
In other words, we might sometimes be interested specifically in, say, knowing or understanding, and an inquiry aimed at achieving understanding with respect to the answer to Q would not be settled by believing the answer to Q. See, e.g. (Smith, 2020 183-184).
See, for example, Woodard’s Movies 2 example (3) and the examples on (7).
I’m not trying to give a complete account of replication in the sciences. See (Fiddler and Wilcox 2021) for a more comprehensive philosophical overview of the subject.
On the matter of replication in the sciences: sometimes, we might say that an inquirer X, in replicating inquirer Y’s investigation, is double checking. X might be said to be double checking Y’s work. This is another case of something going by the name “double checking” in ordinary speech that does not fall under the PDDC. It is not double checking because it is not a case of one and the same inquirer returning to one and the same question. This matter may be somewhat complicated in the case of a group inquiry wherein one member of a group inquirer is responsible for confirming the work of another member of the group inquirer. However, determining the nature of group inquiry would take us too far afield here.
I don’t mean this to be an exhaustive list of alternative framings of S’s inquiry.
Indeed, I think this is a very natural understanding of what we mean when we tell people to double check their work. We don’t want them to consider exactly the same question they did the first time around, but some other, related question, perhaps regarding the appropriate use of certain tools or methods.
Of course, S could’ve started their initial inquiry into X with a hunch that Y is the answer, thus making their original question “Is Y the right answer to X?” In this case, though, we can think of the question at stake in S’s double checking as “Did I do X right when I solved it earlier?”
For a fuller account of this idea, see (Smith, 2020 183-184).
In some cases, we may see more clearly the differences between inquiries individuated by their aim if we rephrase the question to reflect this changed aim. For example, if someone inquires into “Why X”, maybe we can’t tell from this question whether they’re interested in believing an answer, or something else. Suppose “Why X” is a question aimed at believing an answer P. We might rephrase questions aimed at further epistemic goods as, for example, “What else counts in favor of P” (an inquiry aimed at additional evidence, perhaps with the goal of moving from believing to knowing), “What is a more systematic account of P” or “How does P relate to other things I believe or know” (inquiries aimed at understanding), etc.
It is important to make the distinction between an inquiry aiming at something and an inquiry having a certain result. I might start an inquiry aiming only to believe an answer, but get so much evidence so quickly, or get evidence of such strength, that I go right to knowing rather than merely believing my answer. While there’s nothing wrong with concluding an inquiry with an even more robust or demanding doxastic state than one aimed at (i.e. gaining knowledge or understanding of an answer would suffice to terminate an inquiry aimed at belief) I believe inquiries should be distinguished by what they aim at, rather than what they in fact achieve. If I inquire with the aim of believing an answer to Q and in fact come to know the answer, I do something different if I then go on to inquire with the goal of knowing an answer. I wouldn’t be double checking in the case of the second inquiry. However, embarking on this second inquiry might be impermissible as discussed below, on the grounds that there is no good reason to inquire for the sake of coming to know something I already know and acknowledge myself to know. We might also imagine an inquirer with a sort of meta-goal in inquiring into a question they’ve settled. S believes answer P to question Q, but knows they’re fallible and so re-inquires into Q. This seems like a case of seeking a further epistemic good in the form of sureness or increased confidence, and we might rephrase S’s question as, for example, “Did I inquire into Q correctly?”
In a sense, I agree with Woodard: people should at least sometimes seek further epistemic goods after they’ve settled a question. What I don’t agree with is that such an inquiry is, at least by the philosopher’s definition, a matter of double checking.
I use an inquiry directed at belief here since this belief is more likely than knowledge or understanding to be compatible with the kind of suspended judgment inquiry requires. If believing an answer P to Q and re-inquiring is plausibly problematic, then surely knowing or understanding an answer P to Q is plausibly even more problematic.
I’m only interested in the epistemic permissibility of S’s action. There might be practical reasons for S to so inquire.
Philosophers, of course, aren’t bound by ordinary speech and everyday practice. It’s possible to build a coherent account of a certain kind of inquiry in line with the PDDC and evaluate the implications of that definition. What this won’t obviously do, however, is explain anything about the actual practices we normally engage in under the umbrella of “double checking”.
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Smith, N. That’s Not Double Checking, or “There’s only a Problem if You Make One”. Philosophia 51, 1923–1931 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00652-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00652-x