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Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants

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Notes

  1. The Tractatus is covered in the first 4 chapters.

  2. ATP pp. 93–94.

  3. Pp. 86–96 of ATP. Beaney asserts that he disagrees with my presentation here, but he doesn’t say why.

  4. Kneale and Kneale (1962) are cited, with Beaney, as providing “informative discussions of the relationship between Frege’s system to syllogistic logic, as well as to the logical contributions of Leibniz, Boole, and De Morgan.” p. 20. Hodes (1990) and Rayo (2002) are cited in chapter 7.

  5. ATP p. 10.

  6. ATP p. 61.

  7. ATP pp. 62–64.

  8. On page 63 I take ‘\(\exists {\text{y x}}\;{ = }\;{\text{y}}\)’ to be what should, from Frege’s point of view, be an acceptable existence predicate. Unfortunately, given (2), it isn’t.

  9. See p. 120 of ATP, where a worry about this idea is also mentioned.

  10. See Halvorson (2012) plus Thomas William Barrett and Hans Halvorson (forthcoming a, b, c).

  11. ATP pp. 252–257.

  12. Page 35, Preface to the first edition, reproduced in the second edition Moore (1903).

  13. Ibid., pp. 56–57.

  14. Ibid., Sections 16 and 17, pp. 73–78.

  15. See my “Is there a science of morality?”, unpublished ms.

  16. Russell (1919, pp. 11–12).

  17. See pp. 492–493 of ATP.

  18. Ibid., pp. 488–491.

  19. Ibid., p. 514.

  20. See chapter 7 of ATP.

  21. Ibid. p. 515.

  22. Ibid., pp. 515–520, 526.

  23. Ibid., p. 519.

  24. Ibid., pp. 516–519.

  25. Klement (2004, pp. 28–29). This is quoted on pp. 519–520 of ATP. See also Klement (2010).

  26. Ibid., pp. 520–531.

  27. ATP p. 521. A footnote to the passage notes (1) that the problem can be mitigated by letting formulas be infinitely long and (2) that Hodes (2012) develops that idea, showing it to be needed by a substitutional interpretation of higher-order quantifiers in Principia Mathematica, leading to a ramified theory of types. As Hodes notes, this approach renders Russell’s logical language incapable of being understood by agents with finite cognitive powers.

  28. Ibid., p. 523.

  29. Ibid., 531.

  30. Abstract presented on October 6, 2012 at the USC Conference on Logic and Philosophy of Science.

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Soames, S. Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants . Philos Stud 172, 1681–1696 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0486-1

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