The Conundrum of Kundakunda’s Status in the Digambara Tradition

Abstract

Kundakunda’s handling of several basic ideas cannot be omitted when one deals with the following concepts in Jaina philosophy: 1. Syāt/siya, syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī. 2. Nayas, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas and nayavāda. 3. Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha and 4. Anekāntavāda. No doubt his dates are a major conundrum; recent research regards him to have lived around the fourth or fifth centuries (Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism, BEJ: Brill’s Encyclopedia of Jainism (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 2 South Asia), edited by Knut Jacobsen, John A. Cort, Paul Dundas and Kristi L. Wiley. Leiden | Boston: Brill, 2020., p. 853). Moreover, it has been said that Kundakunda “thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller”, evident by the fact that hardly, if any, Digambara or even Śvetāmbara scholar elaborates on his ideas, let alone crediting him for significant basic insights into Jaina philosophy. Moreover, it seems to be evident, as will be attempted to show, that some ideas appear to be taken over from Kundakunda. Together with Kundakunda’s ‘legacy’, this article will highlight several conundrums regarding the philosophical impact of several concepts in his works that fortunately have not been relegated to oblivion.

The Digambara tradition took centre-stage early in the Jaina philosophical arena, as is evident from a list of thinkers up to the 10th c.: Kundakunda (4/5th century),¹ Umāsvāti (ca. 5th c.), Siddhasena Divākara (5th c.), Pūjyapāda (6th c.), Samantabhadra (6th c.),² Akalaṅka (8th c.) and Vidyānandin (10th c.).

With the first Sanskrit rendering of basic Jaina thought in the form of other sūtra works in Indian philosophy, Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra (TAS) set the stage to sow a productive and fertile field of ideas that added to the richness of concepts coming from Indian culture, in addition to those of the Brahmanic/Vedic and Buddhist streams. The philosophical thought of all these three indigenous traditions emerged out of the same milieu in the Indian sub-continent after the 4th century BCE, indicating in some cases noteworthy mutual similarities and especially mutual divergencies.

From the list of Jaina thinkers mentioned above, I would like to single out here Kundakunda (kevala Kundakunda) in what I intend to deal with because in several respects he is a puzzle and an enigma in the Digambara tradition.

In order to bring out the conundrums associated with Kundakunda, five topics intrinsic to Jaina thought have been selected, with reference to which his name cannot be ignored:

• 1. Syāt, syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī.³

• 2. Nayas and nayavāda, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas.

• 3. Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha.

• 4. Anekāntavāda.

• 5. Kundakunda’s legacy.

These topics are well-known in Jainism. The list given here looks neat and tidy, but will soon get ruffled up when probing into the details of their use on the basis of selected thinkers. In any case, it allows me a modicum of orientation, so a revisit may be appropriate in recalling them, and also in order to highlight several puzzling problems, even in the rather faint hope of arriving at any new and definite solutions. It is hoped that the references to at least these selected themes scattered in various texts and studies can be selectively compiled here in one place in dealing with the conundrum of Kundakunda’s status in the Digambara tradition.

The main concern here in the use of these terms is about their employment till about the eight century when, by Akalaṅka’s time, there is better textual evidence in helping us to trace a kind of history of their use and relevance, so as to show how they developed later on.

Syāt, Syādvāda and Saptabhan.ṅgī

Early in my concern with Jaina philosophy, since the early 1990s, I have been continually puzzled by a point that I still can not reconcile, namely, about the earliest references to syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī (and the well-known term of anekāntavāda), which has undoubtedly become one of the hallmarks of Jaina philosophy, at least since Śaṅkara’s time in the 8th century.⁴ We know that Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra of the fourth or fifthth century CE is a monumental Sanskrit work that lays down the basic structure of Jaina philosophy in the sūtra-style of all the other known Indian philosophies. What is a continued puzzle is the statement that:

“There is no explicit reference to Syādvāda in [the] Tattvārthasūtras; it is said to be implied by the sūtra: arpitānarpita-siddheḥ (V.32)” [since it (syādvāda) is established on the basis of importance and unimportance].⁵

A.N. Upadhye wrote this in 1935 in his introduction to Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra (Pavayaṇasāra) which we have come across very early in our studies. Apart from the absence of the term syādvāda, the term anekāntavāda is also not used in the TAS, although nayavāda is sufficiently dealt with, as we shall see.

This is the context in which the sūtra mentioned by Upadhye occurs in chapter 5 of the TAS which, as he says, implies the use of syādvāda:

sad dravya-lakṣaṇam ∥ TAS 5.29 ∥

 The characteristic feature of a substance is (what) really is or exists.

utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat ∥ TAS 5.30 ∥

 Existence is furnished or endowed with origination, disappearance or destruction and duration or permanence.

tad-bhāvāvyayaṃ nityam ∥ TAS 5.31 ∥

 Perpetuity is its (the substance’s)indestructible true condition or essential nature,

arpitānarpita-siddheḥ ∥ TAS 5.32 ∥

&160;because (‘contradictory’ views like destruction and duration) are established on the basis of their importance or unimportance [in a specific context].

sigdha-rūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ∥ TAS 5.33 ∥ The binding (of atoms occurs) because of the greasy/sticky and dry/rough (properties/natures of the atoms).

These sūtras are not the problem. Relevant parts of Pūjyapāda’s 6th century Sarvārthasiddhi (SAS) commentary on 5.32 above is what is being highlighted here for a puzzle that occurs regarding the sūtra which Upadhye refers to as implying syādvāda, namely: arpitānarpita-siddheḥ. The terms arpita and anarpita in the sūtra signify making something prominent or important and ignoring what is unimportant. Pūjyapāda comments on this sūtra in two paragraphs, 588–589.

In the first paragraph (§ 588) of his commentary to this, Pūjyapāda indicates that since substances have manifold attributes (anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ), there is a need to give prominence to one or the other attribute, because the remaining ones are not important in a specific context (arpita and anarpita are the words he uses here), without any contradiction.⁶

He then gives the example of Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew and so on, where the context demands the use of one or the other attribute in a specific sense, without the others being needed. This is a simple explanation of arpitānarpita-siddheḥ. There can be no gainsaying that speaking of a father, son, brother, etc. sounds like the known use of syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī, without the explicit use of these words themselves, neither in the sūtra of the TAS nor in its commentary. Syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī are key terms in the anekānta-theory as we know it to be, especially by using the words father, son, etc. What Pūjyapāda wrote seems to be quite understandable as such in mentioning Devadatta being a father, etc., without further details. However, taking into account the context of the sūtra, what Pūjyapāda says sounds a bit far-fetched not only because the use of syāt is explicitly avoided and not even hinted at, but also, because the mention of Devadatta being a father, son, etc., has little to do with the permanence, duration and destruction of a substance or dravya, which is the point here in the sūtra. One conclusion we can tentatively draw is that the use of syāt and/or saptabhaṅgī was not common parlance in his tradition when Pūjyapāda wrote this commentary.

In the second paragraph (§ 589) of his commentary to the same sūtra 5.32, Pūjyapāda goes on to talk about atoms and molecules which combine on the basis of their intrinsic capacity to do so, proceeding to the next sūtra of the TAS about the combination of atoms which which takes place because of their greasy or dry natures.⁷ This part of the commentary is in continuation of the theme concerning substances to explain their origination, destruction and duration, without any contradiction, depending on which aspect one chooses to emphasise in a specific context. In the absence of any reference to syāt (only indirectly through anantaparyāyāṇāṃ, viz., that substances can take on innumerable modes or modifications), Pūjyapāda here seems to be hinting at the use of the terms substance, quality and mode (dravya, guṇa and paryāya) explicitly mentioned a bit later, in TAS 5.38: guṇa-paryaya-vad dravyam, namely, that a substance intrinsically entails its qualities and modes. However he does not directly state it here in his commentary to TAS 5.32. Pūjyapāda justifies the need for these three terms guṇa, paryaya and dravya in a brief way, showing how they are required when talking about objects or persons later on in TAS 5.38.⁸

As we saw, Pūjyapāda does indeed use the word aneka in both the paragraphs in his commentary to TAS 5.32, albeit in a general way. The reference to attributing importance (arpaṇa) to Devadatta being a father, or son, or brother, or nephew, etc.. in § 588, seems to be only incidentally mentioned and out of the context of the sūtra which deals with substances and atoms combining together. Moreover, Devadatta being a father, son, etc., depending on what is important in a specific context, is mentioned without using the word syāt, which we know about from Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divākara. It is noteworthy to mention the use of such technical terms in order to trace their employment: even though Pūjyapāda uses the words anekānta and aneka, they are used in their ‘simple’ sense of substances having manifold attributes, without explicitly using the word syāt.

In a tantalising and even taunting way, we come across a similar Pūjyapāda formulation in Siddhasena Divākara’s Sammaï Suttam (Saṃmati-sūtra, -tarka or prakaraṇa) 3.17–18 who lived apparently before Pūjyapāda of the 6th century, if Siddhasena Divākara’s dating to the 5th century is trustworthy.⁹

What Pūjyapāda says in prose is in content similar to what Siddhasena Divākara says in verse in his Sammaï Suttam 3.17–18 (with the Sanskrit given in Śāstrī’s ed.):

piu-putta-ṇattu-bhavvaya-bhāūṇaṃ ega-purisa-saṃbaṃdho |

ṇa ya so egassa piya tti sesayāṇaṃ piyā hoi ∥ Sammaï Suttam 3.17 ∥

pitṛ-putra-naptṛ-bhāgineya-bhrātṛṇām eka-puruṣa-sambandhaḥ |

na ca sa ekasya piteti śeṣānāṃ pitā bhavati ∥ Sammaï Suttam 3.17 ∥

The relation of one man [can be that] of father, son, grandson, nephew [or of] brother, and not that ‘the father of one’ is the father of all the others.

Compare this with Pūjyapāda’s SAS on TAS 5.32, § 588, about Devadatta being a father, or son, or brother, or nephew, just referred to above: tad yathā—ekasya devadattasya pitā putro bhrātā bhāgineya ity evam ādayaḥ saṃbandhā janakatva-janyatvādi-nimittā na virudhyante; arpaṇābhedāt.

Siddhasena Divākara continues to explain:

jaha saṃbaṃdha-visiṭṭho so puriso purisa-bhāva-ṇiraisao |

taha davvam iṃdiya-gayaṃ rūvāi-visesaṇaṃ lahai ∥ Sammaï Suttam 3.18 ∥

yathā sambandha-viśiṣṭaḥ sa puruṣaḥ puruṣa-bhāva-niratiśayaḥ |

tathā dravyendriya-gataṃ rūpādi-viśeṣaṇaṃ labhate ∥ Sammaï Suttam 3.18 ∥

Just as an individual having a special relation is pre-eminent in the [specific] mode as [this particular] individual [e.g. as a father], so too a substance associated with a sense organ becomes an object [associated with] form, etc.

Further, we shall see in a moment that in his Pañcāstikāyasāra (14) Kundakunda uses the word saptabhaṅga and the word siya/syāt in the explicit sense of ‘is, is not, etc.’, depending on the perspective. Once again, if current dating is reliable, Kundakunda also probably lived in the 4th/5th century, before Pūjyapāda.

When we look at Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra 2.22–23, we see a basic consensus between Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, with regard to a substance. Further, although Kundakunda does not use the word naya, it is clear that this is meant, when we read:

davvaṭṭhieṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhieṇa puṇo |

havadi ya aṇṇamaṇaṇnāṃ tak-kāle tam-mayattādo ∥ Pravacanasāra 2.22 ∥

dravyārthikena sarvaṃ dravyaṃ tat-paryāyārthikena punaḥ |

bhavati cānyad anyat tat-kāle tan-mayavāt ∥ Pravacanasāra 2.22 ∥

“All substances are non-different from the substantial view-point, but again they are different from the modificational view-point, because of the individual modification pervading it for the time being” (tr. Upadhye, PrS p. 394).

atthi tti ya ṇatthi tti ya havadi avvattavvam idi puṇo davvaṃ |

pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubbhayam ādiṭṭham aṇaṃ vā ∥ Pravacanasāra 2.23 ∥

astīti ca nāstīti ca bhavaty avaktavyam iti punar dravyam |

paryāyeṇa tu kenāpi tad ubhayam ādiṣṭam anyad vā ∥ Pravacanasāra 2.23 ∥

“According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise” (tr. Upadhye, PrS p. 394).

Note the use of dravyārthika and paryāyārthika in the first quotation of the Pravacanasāra in the sense of naya, and in the very next gāthā the use of asti ca nāsti ca … avaktavyam, without the use of the word siya/syāt, which Kundakunda explicitly uses in Pañcāstikāyasāra 14, together with the word saptabhaṅga (which is repeated in PS 71–72):

siya atthi ṇatthi uhayaṃ avvattavaṃ puṇo ya tat tidayaṃ |

davvaṃ khu satta-bhaṃgaṃ ādesavaseṇa saṃbhavadi ∥ Pañcāstikāyasāra 14 ∥

syād asti nāsty ubhayam ava[k]tavyaṃ punaś ca tat tritayam |

dravyaṃ khalu sapta-bhaṅgam ādeśavaśena saṃbhavati ∥ Pañcāstikāyasāra 14 ∥

Why Kundakunda uses siya/syāt and saptabhaṅga in his Pañcāstikāyasāra and not in his Pravacanasāra is a matter of debate requiring further detailed research.

What conclusions can be drawn from Divākara’s and Kundakunda’s statements in the fifth century and Pūjyapāda’s in the sixth? Did Pūjyapāda know Divākara’s or Kundakunda’s works? Was there a common source that both drew from separately? Or were these ideas independent traditions without the Digambara-Śvetāmbara divide, in case Divākara also belonged to the Śvetāmbara tradition? These questions stand in a vacuum in the absence of any definite evidence of their relation in the Jaina tradition, adding to the enigma with regard to Kundakunda’s status in the Digambara tradition.

In summarising the main points of what we have just seen in the context of syāt, in this section, the following points seem evident:

• 1. Both Umāsvāti and Kundakunda agree that a substance is intrinsically related to its guṇa and paryāya, however, Kundakunda implicitly mentions the word naya with reference to dravya and paryāya as the standpoints from which an object can be differentiated, whereas Umāsvāti merely states that a substance, dravya, intrinsically entails its guṇa and paryāya.

• 2. Umāsvāti does not use the word naya with regard to a dravya’s guṇa and paryāya—only Pūjyapāda does so in his SAS commentaries to TAS 1.6 (pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ) and to TAS 1.33 where the seven nayas are listed. The next section below will deal with these points again. Moreover, with reference to syāt, with which we are concerned here, Umāsvāti does not use the word syāt as Kundakunda does in its Prakrit form siya, and he is: “One of the first Jain authors to apply it [siya⁄syāt] … around the 4th/5th century CE ”¹⁰

• 3. As we saw in Pūjyapāda’s SAS commentary to the TAS sūtra arpitānarpita-siddheḥ TAS 5.32, he uses the words aneka and anekānta “with a clear hint of the sense in which the term came to be applied as a synonym for the Jaina approach with its epistemological significance.” I had implied in that context in 1996 that he was the first Jaina thinker to use these terms, a point which seems to have been uncontested,¹¹ albeit not in their later technical sense of anekāntavāda.

• 4. In his Āpta-mīmāṃsā stanza 14, Samantabhadra in the 6th century uses the standard formulations kathañcit sad eva, kathamcid asad eva, etc. where he does not use the word syāt, but naya, as we shall see when we deal with this point under anekāntavāda below. In the context here, the conundrum is why does not Pūjyapāda mention Samantabhadra or vice versa, or Siddhasena Divākara. Indeed, the latter two may have been contemporaries and passed on Jaina ideas independently, apparently in the same general sense of anekāntavāda.

In remembering the general consensus that both Pūjyapāda of the 6th century CE and Kundakunda by all accounts belonged to the Digambara tradition, this is my conundrum: Why is Kundakunda’s use and meaning of the Prakrit form of syāt, siya, in his saptabhaṅgī neither listed nor hinted at by Pūjyapāda who only very indirectly refers to father, son, etc., obviously in Kundakunda’s sense of syāt? In the light of recent opinion in 2020 this question can be put even more loudly when it is regarded, as already indicated, that: “One of the first Jain authors to apply it [siya⁄syāt] was Kundakunda around the 4th/5th century CE …”¹²

Kundakunda is conspicuous by being left out in the clear line of the tradition from Umāsvāti (ca. 5th c.) to Pūjyapāda (6th c.), then Samantabhadra (6th c.) to Akalaṅka (8th c.) and to Vidyānandin (10th c.), with many of them respectfully referring to the others chronologically. None of them seems to refer to Kundakunda, directly or indirectly. Once again, it is indeed possible that Kundakunda and Pūjyapāda passed on Jaina ideas independently, apparently in a few cases in similar and general philoso​phical senses. Could we think of the possibility of a common Digambara tradition, although we in retrospect are unable to decipher it?

Naya and Nayavāda, vyavahāra and niścaya nayas

The use of the word naya clearly shows a continuation of its employment from the Jaina canonical texts from which both Kundakunda and Umāsvāti drew in their philosophical literature to couch many traditional ideas contained in the Jaina scriptures. In doing so they indicated their particular standpoints, excerptions and their own selections of themes from which to compile what each thought was specifically relevant.

The term naya was part of the ‘gateways of investigation (anuyogadvāra)’ consisting of a list of factors which were employed when investigating entities. These entities in the canon served as tools in analysing words, especially the titles of works and chapter-titles. In their philosophical implementation, these tools were applied generally to assertions about an object of inquiry from a particular standpoint, and the number seven was considered to be all-encompassing for possible assertions that could be made. In the Jaina canon these gateways to an investigation served to set down or bring forward (nikṣepa) the context when investigating an object of inquiry. Of several lists of tools, containing up to 13 items, the list of four, including the word naya, became popular, namely: the name or word used to designate the entity (nāma); the form or the way in which it can be illustrated (sthāpanā); the substance out of which it is constituted (dravya); and its specific state or condition at the moment of investigation (bhāva or paryāya). We see this clearly as explicitly stated in TAS 1.5 with the words: nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas tan-nyāsaḥ. The term bhāva(tas) is a synonym for paryāya and nyāsaḥ for nikṣepa.

The canonical mention of naya in the sense of a particular standpoint one takes, is the origin of the word naya. The first time we come across the word in the pro-canonical TAS is quite early in the work, namely in the context of epistemology. Naya is used in the context of how we know what we know. TAS 1.6 clearly indicates this in the sūtra: pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ (knowledge is obtained through the pramāṇas and nayas). Here the context is the knowledge of the seven tattvas given in TAS 1.4, jīvājīvāśrava-bandha … etc., in the well-known sūtra that summarises Jaina ontology and metaphysics.

What is conspicuous by its absence in any of the sūtras of the TAS itself, is any reference to the nayas or standpoints pertaining specifically to an object with regard to its being a dravya or paryāya, namely, with regard to it as a substance or its specific mode, as we just saw in Kundakunda (PrS 2.22) above with his reference to the nayas called dravyārthika and paryāyārthika. Only Pūjyapāda’s SAS commentary on TAS 1.6 pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, clearly uses these terms in their known senses: nayo dvividhaḥ dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthikaś ca (§ 24).¹³ Pūjyapāda repeats it in its commentary to TAS 1.33 which lists the nayas, in SAS § 241, where the dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthika nayas are mentioned again.¹⁴ We do not know where Pūjyapāda obtained this mention of the two nayas, although we know from Upadhye (Introduction to PrS, 1984, p. 65) that guṇa in the context of dravya and paryāya occurs in Uttarādhyayanasūtra 28. 5–6, Bhagavatī-sūtra, 18, 6, 631 (ref. from Shaha, 1975, p. 106, fn. 1) and the ṢKhĀ (Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama).

One intriguing point in the context of naya is Samantabhadra’s 6th century use of the word in his Āptamīmāṃsā (ĀM) 14 and 104 that point at the use of the word naya in the sense of syāt, as we know it from the standard seven predications:

kathañcit te sadeveṣṭaṃ kathañcid asad eva tat |

tathobhayam avācyaṃ ca nayayogān na sarvathā ∥ ĀM 14 ∥

 “With the application of naya, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence (is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and non-existence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects.” (tr. Ghosal, ĀM, p. 68.)

The “not in all respects” refers to the view that each predication is not taken in an absolute way, but acknowledges others as well, as expressly stated in ĀM 104:

syād-vādaḥ sarvathaikānta-tyāgāt kiṃ-vṛtta-cid-vidhiḥ |

sapta-bhaṅga-nayāpekṣo heyādeya-viśeṣakaḥ ∥ ĀM 104 ∥

“The word ‘syāt’, leaves out the absolute one-sided view point. (Its interpretations) are words derived from ‘kim’ and (derivations) ‘chit’ [sic] etc. This depends upon the sevenfold Saptabhaṅgī Naya and is distinguished by things to be discarded or acquired.” (tr. Ghosal, ĀM, p. 166.)

These stanzas question the aim to separate the use of the terms naya, syāt and saptabhaṅgī, as we at the outset began with for the sake of endeavouring for some sort of clarity. The 6th century ĀM adds to the conundrum in the use of these terms.

In the case of Kundakunda we come across a unique use of naya in the sense of vyavahāra and niścaya nayas (the mundane and definite or absolute standpoints). What Bansidhar Bhatt pointed in 1974 (p. 280) is still relevant for us:

While analysing the 2000 verses ascribed to Kundakunda [Samayasāra, Anuprekṣā and Niyamasāra] we are able to trace two patterns of this pair [niścaya-naya or its synonyms śuddha- and paramārtha-naya, and vyavhāra-naya]: The Mystic pattern and the Non-mystic pattern, which differ from each other and present contradictory views … As far as these two patterns are concerned, it can easily be ascertained that the works ascribed to Kundakunda are not homogeneous.” Bhatt had already indicated that the pair “has no relation to the ‘standard nayas’”.¹⁵

This is how Kundakunda puts it in his Samayasāra:

vavahāreṇa du ādā karedi ghaḍapaḍarathāṇi davvāni |

karaṇāṇi ya kammāṇi ya ṇokammāṇīha vivihāṇi ∥ SS 98 ∥¹⁶

 vyavahāreṇa tv ātmā karoti ghaṭapaṭarathān dravyāṇi |

 karaṇāni ca karmaṇi ca nokarmāṇīha vividhāni ∥ SS 98 ∥

“It is from the practical standpoint that the soul produces pitcher, cloth, chariot (and other) things, senses, and Karmas and quasi-Karmas of various kinds in this world” (tr. J.L. Jaini in the SBJ ed., p. 65).

uppādedi karedi ya baṃdhadi pariṇāmaedi giṇhadi ya |

 ādāpuggaladavvaṃ vavahāraṇayassa vattavam ∥ SS 107, SBJ ed. 114 ∥

 utpādayati karoti ca badhnāti pariṇāmayati gṛhṇāti |

ātmā pudgaladravyaṃ vavahāranayasya vaktavyam ∥ SS 107, SBJ ed. 114 ∥

“The soul produces, causes, binds, causes to modify and assimilate Karmic Matter. (This) is (so), speaking from the practical standpoint “(tr. J.L. Jaini in the SBJ ed., p. 70).

These gāthās of the Samayasāra have to be regarded as stand-alone stanzas because no one else in the Jaina tradition seems to ascribe to the two levels or so-called truths of niścaya and vyavahāra nayas. Indeed, there has been a doubt about whether in Kunda​kunda’s other work, the Pañcāstikāyasāra, the two levels may be attributed to Kundakunda himself. It is supposed that “it is most probably the commentator Amṛtacandrasūri (10th cent. CE) who introduced them, and perhaps even composed the verse in question himself.” (BEJ 849).¹⁷ Be that as it may, with reference to the Samayasāra, we ascribe to the solid textual study by Bhatt in 1974 who concludes on p. 288: “it is highly probable that the nucleus of the Samayasāra, i.e., the sections treating the mystic pattern, was composed by one individual who was Kundakunda”. Bhatt accepts Upadhye’s dating of Kundakunda as belonging to the beginning of era, and mentions Schubring’s view that Kundakunda lived in the 2nd–3rd century A.D. (Bhatt, 1974, p. 279).

It is a moot question whether the idea of a practical and a definite standpoint may have been prevalent in their nascent form in Kundakunda’s time and reached his ears. If so, it was his genius to see how the idea could be employed in Jainism. It is easy to see how his use of syāt can be integrated to his views of the two levels in keeping with the Jaina syādvāda. In any case, we know that Kānjī Svāmī insisted “on the higher level of truth (niścaya naya) over the lower one ordinary life (vyavahāra naya).”¹⁸

Sapta and Nava tattvas/padārtha

Very early in the text, in TAS 1.4, the following well-known sequence and number of the basic Jaina categories is listed: jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, saṃvara, nirjarā and mokṣa. These seven terms (tattvas) are different from the sequence and number listed by Kundakunda in his Pañcastikāyasāra 108 (quoting the Sanskrit forms for the sake of quick comparison): jīva, ajīva, puṇya, pāpa, āsrava, saṃvara, nirjarā, bandha, and mokṣa.¹⁹ Not only are there nine terms but their sequence is different from that of the TAS with the addition of puṇya and pāpa, and with bandha mentioned before the last term mokṣa (see also Soni, 2001, pp. 135–140).

What is curious and perhaps also a conundrum is that in his SAS commentary to this same TAS 1.4 (§ 19), Pūjyapāda, as we have seen, is aware of and explicitly says that “there are others” who adhere to the view of the nine categories.²⁰ He concludes that the mention of puṇya and pāpa is not necessary, because they are included in the term āsrava, the influx through our actions in thought, word and deed, of fine, invisible and subtle matter into the jīva with effects that can be auspicious or not.²¹ It is puzzling that in his SAS commentary Pūjyapāda (§ 19) does not name Kundakunda but only indirectly hints at his list of nine categories, as just said, and simply sees puṇya and pāpa as being “unnecessary” because these are implied in āsrava and bandha.

In addition to this, we can point out that in his Pañcastikāyasāra 109, immediately following the list of nine categories, Kundakunda says that the jīva is characterised by upayoga (upayoga-lakṣaṇa), which he had dealt with earlier in the work in PS 40–42 (see Soni, 2007b). Pūjyapāda’s commentary intriguingly also mentions upayoga in the same commentary to TAS 1.4 which lists the seven categories, in § 20,²² when in fact the topic of upayoga is specifically mentioned later, in TAS 2.8. The conundrum is this: Kundakunda consistently deals with upayoga in association with the jīva and Pūjyapāda’s commentary on the seven categories, for no apparent reason, simply mentions upayoga, and not under the first category jīva mentioned in the list of seven in TAS 1.4, but in a general way when talking the word tattva in the sūtra. I submit that Pūjyapāda’s brief and tangential hint at upayoga here, seems to suggest that in the context of the seven or nine categories of Jaina metaphysics and ontology, that he (Pūjyapāda) was aware of Kundakunda’s tradition, because he raises the issue of nine categories and apparently mentions upayoga out of context.

A tentative conclusion based on these points above, is that Pūjyapāda was obviously aware of the tradition of nine basic categories to which Kundakunda evidently adhered to, but Pūjyapāda somehow seems to conceal any clear indication of the tradition Kundakunda represented, and there seems to be no reason why he should not refer to Kundakunda’s Prakrit, although he quotes several Prakrit texts from the Digambara canon in his SAS commentary.²³ Pūjyapāda is rather critical of the nine categories.

The mention of the sapta and nava tattvas is here a matter of academic interest because it is necessary to simply remember two different traditions of what constitutes basic Jaina metaphysics and ontology. It is useful to refer to them again because the tattvas are mentioned by Śaṅkara in the eighth century when he criticises the Jainas in his commentary on Bādarāyaṇa’s Vedāntasūtra. Recalling this allows us to see how Jainism was depicted by him in the 8th century, especially for his refutation of the Jaina anekāntavāda.

Anekāntavāda

Apart from the use of word syāt in its concern with syādvāda, the use of the word anekāntavāda itself has been a conundrum, because it is very difficult to obtain a clear picture about its employment before they became established in the way in which we know them since Akalaṅka’s time in the 8th century.

It is noteworthy to point out that in his 8th c. bhāṣya to the Vedāntasūtra²⁴ Śaṅkara seems to present the Jaina worldview in an arbitrary way when he criticises it in four sūtras after attacking the Buddhists. Śaṅkara’s four sūtras against Jainism are from 2.2.33–36: one against anekāntavāda and the other three on the Jaina view of the jīva in terms of its nature, mode or modification, and its size. For our purposes we’ll be concerned with Śaṅkara’s commentary to the first of these sūtras 2.3.33.

In our attempt to try and trace the use of the terms like syādvāda, nayas, etc. listed at the beginning, it is instructive to see how the Jaina worldview was seen by Śaṅkara. He begins by saying “sapta caiṣāṃ padārthāḥ saṃmatā jīvājīvāsrava-saṃvara-nirjara-bandha-mokṣā nāma” (2.2.33).

Not only are there seven categories as in Umāsvāti, but the last two are in Kundakunda’s sequence. Of course, it is impossible to know what was Śaṅkara’s source, as indeed of any of the thinkers and traditions he criticises, but in retrospect it is striking that we see a combination of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda in their lists of categories. Can we say that the two traditions represented by Kundakunda and Umāsvāti were widely prevalent during Śaṅkara’s time and only the Jaina tradition was aware of their specific differences on closer examination?

The curiosity of Śaṅkara’s sources is further intensified by the fact that just before making this point about the seven Jaina categories, Śaṅkara mentions that the Jainas also have a theory about the astikāyas (Prakrit atthiikāya), the “bodies of existence” (BEJ p. 11). This is how he puts it:

tayor imam aparaṃ prapañcam ācakṣate pañcāstikāyā nāma — jīvāstikāyaḥ pudgalāstikāyo dharmāstikāyo ’dharmāstikāya ākāśāstikāyaśceti |

The term kāla is correctly left out here, because for the Jainas it is not an astikāya. Anyone with a modicum of acquaintance of the Jaina principles would obviously think of Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāyasāra, especially because Umāsvāti’s TAS avoids the explicit use of the term in the way Kundakunda uses it. Although the word astikāya appears in TAS 10.8 and in a few places of Pūjyapāda’s SAS commentary (§§ 224, 549 and 559), the five astikāyas are not enumerated but hinted at by merely speaking of “dharmāstikāya etc.” And TAS 10.8 merely says dharmāstikāyābhāvād, “because there is no medium of motion [in āloka, in the non-universe]”.²⁵ We can only hint at this curiosity which is striking, namely that Kundakunda specifically deals with the astikāyas which evidently seem to have been ensconced in Jaina thought by Śaṅkara’s time and credit for it may be attributed to Kundakunda. In his SAS commentary Pūjyapāda, again, omits mentioning Kundakunda.

Śaṅkara’s attack on the non-absolutistic position of the Jainas when they use the several devices like syāt, saptabhaṅgī, naya, aneka, etc., have had a long lasting detrimental influence on the value of Jaina thought and Śaṅkara undoubtedly set a trend of criticism which by and large has been adopted by others without question, especially by the Vedāntins. It has now become clear that Śaṅkara completely misunderstood the use of syāt in its technical sense in which the Jainas use it with logical consistency. This is how Śaṅkara puts it exactly:

sarvatra cemaṃ saptabhaṅgīnayaṃ nāma nyāyam avatārayanti | syād asti, syān nāsti, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād avaktavyaḥ, syād asti cāvaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaś ceti | (2.2.33).

Since Umāsvāti does not use the word syāt, it is plausible that Śaṅkara takes it from Kundakunda’s PS 14, as we saw above, or perhaps also from Siddhasena Divākara.²⁶Whatever be the case, Śaṅkara presents the seven-fold syāt forms faithfully. When he criticises the Jaina position he says that its view of syāt is viruddha or contrary, that it involves saṃśaya-jñāna or a knowledge that is doubtful, that it is viparīta or contrary, that the theory is derived from a madman (mattonmatta).

There have been several doṣas or faults that have been levelled at what we can now call the syādvāda as a part of the anekāntavāda that also included the nayavāda. Jaina thinkers of both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions have valiantly defended their theory and the following names stand out as champions who have defended the Jaina position and proved its faultlessness: Akalaṅka, Haribhadra, Vidyānandin, Prabhācandra, Abhayadeva, Vādidevasūri, Hemacandra, Malliṣeṇa all the way up to the erudite Yaśovijaya of the 17th century. They have argued and shown clearly that the following terms cannot be levelled against syādvāda because they do not apply to it. They say that syādvāda cannot be criticised as being: virodha (a contradiction), saṃśaya (expressing doubt), vyadhikaraṇatā (being incongruous), anavastha (leading to an infinite regress), etc.²⁷ As I said elsewhere, a moot question is about the source these Jaina thinkers drew from in referring to these terms that attack syādvāda or whether they invented them as possible objections for argument’s sake, on the basis of existing ones such as virodha and saṃśaya (Soni, 2007a, pp. 484–486).

Kundakunda’s Legacy and Conclusion

We know that Kundakunda’s commentators Amṛtacandra (10–11th centuries) and Jayasena (12th century) contributed to the fame of Kundakunda, with only the latter explicitly mentioning Kundakunda as the author of the works he comments on.

I pointed out elsewhere (BEJ p. 902): That the philosophical impact of Kundakunda’s works was not relegated to oblivion is due not only to these exceptional commentators but also to a rendering of Kundakunda’s views on the essential nature of the sentient principle (jīva), namely in the popular Apabhramśa work Paramappapayāsu (Skt. Paramātmaprakāśa ) by Joindu (or Yogindu, Yogīndu), perhaps 6th century CE. (see Dundas BEJ 107–108, who accepts A.N. Upadhye’s dating).

We quoted Bhatt (1974, p. 279) above that “the sections treating the mystic pattern, was composed by one individual who was Kundakunda”.²⁸ Jérôme Petit (2014) has traced the transmission chain of the “mystical” trend based on Kundakunda’s work, particularly his “Samayasāra mysticism,” from Yogīndu, perhaps 6th century, to the poet and merchant Banārsīdās (1586–1643). Banārsidās was responsible for the religious movement emphasizing Kundakunda’s “mysticism” known as the Adhyātma movement. The chain of transmission based on Kundakunda proceeds further to the poet Dyānatrāy (1676–1726), Paṇḍit Ṭoḍarmal (1720–1767), Paṇḍit Daulatrām (1798–1866), and, finally, Śrīmad Rājacandra (1867–1901), even if he does not directly quote Kundakunda. In the 20th century, as already pointed out, the Kānjī Svāmī Panth revived and further emphasised Kundakunda’s significance.

We began with the conundrum of why was Kundakunda’s use and meaning of the Prakrit form of syāt, siya, in his saptabhaṅgī neither listed nor hinted at by Pūjyapāda who only very indirectly refers to father, son, etc., obviously in Kundakunda’s sense of siya? We then traced several other puzzles in the different sections of this study, some of which are of a technical nature, but highlighting the problem about Kundakunda’s status in the Digambara tradition. At the present stage of Jaina studies and research no definite answer can be provided. Nonetheless, an awareness of these problems might later lead to reliable suggestions.

In addition to these selected puzzles, it is further revealing that there is no preeminent Śvetāmbara intellectual who evinces any sympathy for Kundakunda’s contributions and who would be sympathetic to his two-truths schema and its implications for Jaina philosophy. Indeed the two-truths schema was vigorously criticised, for example by the 17th century polymath Yaśovijaya. Nonetheless, it is stroke of providential fortune that Kundakunda’s name and fame have remained indelible in the history of Jaina philosophy throughout the medieval and modern periods (see also BEJ p. 902).

It is telling to note what K.K. Dixit said in 1971 because he captures Kundakunda’s status in the Digambara tradition precisely and what he says may in many ways resolve the conundrum of his status. He says:

In the case of Kundakunda it will be advisable to dispose of his treatment of the traditional Jaina philosophical views — not only because such a treatment is not a characteristic activity of the age of Logic²⁹ but also because it is not a characteristic activity of Kundakunda himself. For Kundakunda deserves attention chiefly because of the special trend of thought he developed in his Samayasāra, a text which markedly deviates from the usual manner of Jaina’s presentation of his philosophical views. But before writing writing the Samayasāra Kundakunda wrote Pañcāstikāyasāra and Pravacanasāra and in these texts he stands much close to the orthodox positions (Dixit, 1971, p. 132, emphases mine).

Then adds this a bit later:

Kundakunda was well acquainted with the traditional Jaina philosophical views and also with the tendency towards Anekāntavāda that had lately emerged. And yet he also thought it proper to thread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller (Dixit, 1971, p. 133, emphases mine).

What “had lately emerged” is the crucial point in Dixitt’s statement, with a significant impact of Kundakunda’s date that we are unable to reconcile.³⁰

In conclusion it may be said that it is indeed fortunate that Kundakunda’s works have been preserved for posterity, a fact of historical providence that cannot be taken for granted. We have tried to show that despite all the conundrums and enigmas Kundakunda’s works present him as a thinker who has contributed tremendously towards an understanding of basic Jaina thought and, in many respects, gave us specific insights into Jaina philosophy in ‘early’ times.