This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, 23:121–23 (1963). For discussion of the issues raised by Gettier, see Michael Clark, “Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper,”Analysis, 24:46–47 (1969) ; Ernest Sosa, “The Analysis of ‘Knowledge That P,’”Analysis, 25:1–8 (1965); John Turk Saunders and Narayan Champawat, “Mr. Clark's Definition of ‘Knowledge,’”Analysis, 25:8–9 (1965); Keith Lehrer, “Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence,”Analysis, 25:168-75 (1965) Gilbert Harman, “Lehrer on Knowledge,”Journal of Philosophy, 63:241-47 (1966); Israel Scheffler,Conditions of Knowledge (Chicago: Scott, Forsman, 1965); Roderick M. Chisholm,Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 23; Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,”Journal of Philosophy, 64:357-72 (1967) ; Brian Skyrms, “The Explication of ‘X Knows That P,’”Journal of Philosophy, 64:373-89 (1967).
Bertrand Russell,Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), p. 154.
Scheffler,Conditions of Knowledge, p. 112.
Compare Lehrer, “Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence,” p. 174.
See Harman, “Lehrer on Knowledge.” See also Nicholas Rescher,Hypothetical Reasoning (Amsterdam: North-Holland, New York: Humanities, 1964). And compare my review article “Hypothetical Reasoning,”Journal of Philosophy, 64:293–305 (1967).
See Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, Chapter I. Compare Roderick Firth, “Ultimate Evidence,”Journal of Philosophy, 53:732–39 (1956), and “Chisholm and the Ethics of Belief,”Philosophical Review, 68:493–506 (1959); also Herbert Heidelberger, “On Defining Epistemic Expressions,” Journal of Philosophy, 60:344-48 (1963).
In contradistinction to my own earlier effort (Analysis, 25:1–8 (1965) ), the present analysis is not recursive. Furthermore, it does not suffer from essential dependence upon an obscureceteris paribus clause. It should be noted, also, that the definition of a set fully rendering evident a proposition to a subject does not exclude the possibility that such a set be infinite, and hence does not commit us to the view that all knowledge must have a foundation.
I have in mind particularly the definitions previously offered by Clark, Lehrer, Chisholm, and myself. See note 1 for the references.
The reader should be warned that my talk of chains of justification and of defective links is only shorthand for the earlier, more careful formulations. I do hope, however, that it gives a not-too-misleading overview of what I have tried to do.
Compare Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” pp. 368-70.
Compare Skyrms, “The Explication of ‘X Knows That p,’” pp. 381 and 387.
I am indebted to Robert Binkley, Joseph Camp, Herbert Heidelberger, and, especially, Roderick M. Chisholm, for illuminating discussion of the problems I have treated. I wish also to thank Howard Smokler, my commentator when I read an earlier version of this paper at the 1966 annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the A.P.A.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sosa, E. Propositional knowledge. Philos Stud 20, 33–43 (1969). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02224943
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02224943