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And I grant that this is a stretched sense of ‘awake’. For example, the more natural thing to say about lucid dreaming is that the dreamer is still asleep and hence not awake in forming beliefs and intentions about his dream. I prefer to say rather that he is ‘awake’ in respect of his beliefs that correctly track the dream, though he is also dreaming nonetheless (and hence asleep in that respect). But I am not wedded to this terminology and it would be easy enough to accommodate my substantive points with less stretched English. The relevant cogito-like anti-skeptical proposition would then be, not <I am hereby awake> but rather <I am not hereby dreaming>.
The implications of persistent philosophical disagreement among apparent peers is a subject of intense current debate, to which Conee and I both contribute in forthcoming work.
Conee misquotes this principle by replacing ‘justified’ in the consequent with ‘fully justified’. It remains to be seen how consequential this error turns out to be.
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Sosa, E. Replies to Brown, Pritchard and Conee. Philos Stud 143, 427–440 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9339-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9339-0