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‘Love’ as a Practice: Looking at Real People

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New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving

Abstract

This ameliorative project of love investigates how we can improve how we use the concept ‘love’, formulating better and worse forms of loving. It compares two contemporary analytic philosophers who have argued for different but related accounts of love as looking. By comparing David Velleman’s and Iris Murdoch’s account of love, I argue that Velleman’s account is not suitable for this ameliorative project, while Murdoch’s account enables us to be better lovers. We would all love better if we think of love as a practice of attending to one another—a process that requires continuous work. Murdoch is able to talk about love as an activity, instead of the passive evaluation that Velleman describes. ‘Love’ as a practice is able to look at the reality of people as opposed to the self-serving fantasies we might have. Such a practice will not only make us better lovers, it could also be used politically: a moral practice of ‘loving attention’ could actively combat privileged blindness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Although Murdoch regarded herself a Platonist, many philosophers have argued that her ideas are compatible with Kantian ideas or have used her ideas within Kantian perspectives (cf. Bagnoli 2003; Grenberg 2014; Merritt 2017; and Milligan 2013).

  2. 2.

    Possibly Kant’s account of love is also not as detached as Velleman’s ( Milligan 2013).

  3. 3.

    Which is considered a different problem with Velleman’s account, pointed out by Edward Harcourt (2009).

  4. 4.

    Referring to the chemically straightening of tight curly (e.g. Afro-textured) hair, not to relaxing as calming or unwinding activity.

  5. 5.

    Although Heather Widdows makes a compelling case for beauty being considered an ethical ideal in her book Perfect me (2018).

  6. 6.

    This is a question Eileen John asks in her paper “Love and the Need for Comprehension” (2013).

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Correspondence to Lotte Spreeuwenberg .

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Spreeuwenberg, L. (2021). ‘Love’ as a Practice: Looking at Real People. In: Cushing, S. (eds) New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72324-8_4

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