Skip to main content
Log in

An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Standard arguments for Bayesian conditionalizing rely on assumptions that many epistemologists have criticized as being too strong: (i) that conditionalizers must be logically infallible, which rules out the possibility of rational logical learning, and (ii) that what is learned with certainty must be true (factivity). In this paper, we give a new factivity-free argument for the superconditionalization norm in a personal possibility framework that allows agents to learn empirical and logical falsehoods. We then discuss how the resulting framework should be interpreted. Does it still model norms of rationality, or something else, or nothing useful at all? We discuss five ways of interpreting our results, three that embrace them and two that reject them. We find one of each kind wanting, and leave readers to choose among the remaining three.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Henceforth, we will use “learn” and “become certain of” interchangeably. Hence, when we say that an agent learns something, what they learn can be true or false.

  2. One objection is worth mentioning here, although we won’t discuss it in detail, as it would lead us away from our main train of thought. It says that becoming certain of empirical evidence is always irrational. Proponents of the regularity principle argue that we should at most invest high credence in any empirical propositions, but not credence 1. This makes Jeffrey conditionalization the only relevant update rule, thus omitting the need for a factivity-free version of conditioning. We think that the case for regularity is unconvincing. For discussion, see Rescorla (2020) and especially Hájek (2012). Also, proponents of contextualist versions of Bayesianism give good reasons to avoid regularity as a requirement (Greco, 2017; Salow, 2019).

  3. A similar problem would occur if E was true but the agent became certain of \(E'\ne E\). In that case, the bet at \(t_2\) would not occur, for the bookie would also be certain of \(E'\), but the standard Dutch book relies on it, for E is true.

  4. Abusing the notation, we use w for both a possible world and the proposition that is true only there.

  5. s is strictly proper if only \(x=p\) minimizes \(ps(1,x)+(1-p)s(0,x)\) for any \(p\in [0,1]\).

  6. We assume in our argument below that W is kept fixed after learning, to avoid pseudo-factivity, while in Pettigrew’s argument this set is narrowed to the learned \(E_i\), which makes his arguments pseudo-factive.

  7. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.

  8. Pseudo-factivity would do the job, but we are trying to avoid it.

  9. Note this property is, given (Personal) Probabilism, implied by but weaker than restricting the set of worlds W to those compatible with the learned \(E_j\).

  10. Also Rescorla (2020) assumes a similar assumption, for an agent that became certain of an \(E_i\) to accept any bet conditional on a \(E_j\ne E_i\).

  11. If \(E_i\not \in {\mathcal {F}}\), \(c'_i\) implies \(c'_i(E_i)=1\) if it is the only credence that personally probabilistically extends \(c'_i\) to \(E_i\).

  12. Thanks to Kenny Easwaran for suggesting that we discuss this option.

  13. Except perhaps in cases in which it is beyond an agent’s cognitive capacities to assign the correct credences.

  14. This strategy is defended by Williamson (forthcoming). For a critical discussion, see Greco (2021).

  15. Notice that moving to the standard arguments for conditioning would not help much here. In the standard framework, it’s irrational for the agent to become certain of a logical falsehood. But when an agent becomes certain of an empirical falsehood, the arguments give the same verdict as Pettigrew’s version from Sect. 3: conditionalizing on the falsehood avoids Dutch-bookability and accuracy dominance, but it’s not shown that it’s the unique strategy with these properties.

References

  • Briggs, R. A., & Pettigrew, R. (2020). An accuracy-dominance argument for conditionalization. Noûs, 54(1), 162–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Comesaña, J. (2020). Being rational and being right. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • de Finetti, B. (1974). Theory of probability. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dogramaci, S. (2018a). Rational credence through reasoning. Philosophers’ Imprint, 18(11), 1–25.

  • Dogramaci, S. (2018). Solving the problem of logical omniscience. Philosophical Issues, 28(1), 107–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greco, D. (2017). Cognitive mobile homes. Mind, 126(501), 93–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greco, D. (2021). Justifications and excuses in epistemology. Noûs, 55(3), 517–537.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. (1967). Slightly more realistic personal probability. Philosophy of Science, 4, 311–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hájek, A. (2012). Is strict coherence coherent? Dialectica, 66(3), 411–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lord, E. (2018). The importance of being rational. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McHugh, C., & Way, J. (2018). What is good reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(1), 153–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pettigrew, R. (2021). Logical ignorance and logical learning. Synthese, 198(10), 9991–10020.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pettigrew, R. (2023). Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false. Erkenntnis, 88, 309–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rescorla, M. (2020). An improved Dutch book theorem for conditionalization. Erkenntnis, 87(3), 1013–1041.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salow, B. (2019). Elusive externalism. Mind, 128(510), 397–427.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smithies, D. (2015). Ideal rationality and logical omniscience. Synthese, 192(9), 2769–2793.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Staffel, J. (2019). Unsettled thoughts: A theory of degrees of rationality. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Titelbaum, M. (2019). Return to reason. In A.S.-P.M. Skipper (Ed.), Higher-order evidence: New essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2010). On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2), 312–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wedgwood, R. (2017). The value of rationality. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (forthcoming). Justifications, excuses, and sceptical scenarios. In: F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (Eds.), The new evil demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julia Staffel.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix

Appendix

Lemma 1

Let \({\mathcal {F}}=\{X_1,\dots , X_m\}\) be a set of credal objects over a set of worlds W. Given real numbers \(a_1,\dots , a_m \in {\mathbb {R}}\), let \(A:W \rightarrow [0,1]\) be an act defined as \(A(w)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^m a_iv_w(X_i)\) for all \(w\in W\). If \(p:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) coherently extends a personally probabilistic credence function \(c:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\), then:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)A(w)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^mc(X_i)a_i \end{aligned}$$

Proof

Consider a \(p:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) that coherently extends a personally probabilistic credence function \(c:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\). For each \(1\le i\le m\), define an act \(A_i:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) such that \(A_i(w)=a_iv_w(X_i)\) for all \(w \in W\). So we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)A(w)=\sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)\sum \limits _{i=1}^mA_i(w) \\ =\sum \limits _{i=1}^m\sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)A_i(w) \end{aligned}$$

Splitting the inner sum according to the truth value of \(X_i\), for \(1\le i\le m\), it holds that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)A_i(w)= & {} \sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=1}p(w)A_i(w)+\sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=0}p(w)A_i(w)\\= & {} \sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=1}p(w)a_i+\sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=0}p(w)0\\= & {} a_i\sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=1}p(w) \end{aligned}$$

As p coherently extends c, \(\sum \limits _{w,v_w(X_i)=1}p(w)=c(X_i)\). Finally, we can conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{w\in W}p(w)A(w)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^mc(X_i)a_i \end{aligned}$$

\(\square\)

Theorem 3

Let \(c:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\) be a personally probabilistic credence function and \(c'=\langle {c'_1,\dots ,c'_n}\rangle\) be the set of possible future personally probabilistic credence functions defined over \({\mathcal {F}}\).

  1. (a)

    If \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) violates wGRP, then it is vulnerable to a Strong Dutch Strategy.

  2. (b)

    If \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) satisfies wGRP, then it is not vulnerable to a Strong Dutch Strategy.

Proof

  1. (a)

    Supposing \({\mathcal {F}}=\{X_1,\dots , X_m\}\), any credence function \({\hat{c}}:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\) can be viewed as a vector \(\langle {{\hat{c}}(X_1),\dots ,{\hat{c}}(X_m)}\rangle \in {\mathbb {R}}^m\). If \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) violates wGRP, then c is not in the convex hull of the vectors \(c'_1,\dots ,c'_n\). Thus, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there are numbers \(a,a' \in {\mathbb {R}}\) and a vector \(b\in {\mathbb {R}}^m\) such that, for each \(c'_j\in c'\):

    $$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{i=1}^m c(X_i)b_i< a<a'<\sum \limits _{i=1}^m c'_j(X_i)b_i \end{aligned}$$

    Now consider the constant acts \(A:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) and \(A':W\rightarrow [0,1]\) such that \(A(w)=a\) and \(A'(w)=-a'\) for all \(w \in W\). Furthermore, consider the act \(B: W \rightarrow [0,1]\) defined in the following way: \(B(w)= \sum \limits _{i=1}^m b_iv_w(X_i)\). That is, for each world \(w\in W\), determine those \(X_i\) that are true and sum the corresponding \(b_i\) to obtain B(w). If all \(X_i \in {\mathcal {F}}\) are false in w, then \(B(w)=0\). Now, define the act \(B':W \rightarrow [0,1]\) via \(B'(w)=-B(w)\) for all \(w\in W\). By Lemma 1, for any \(p:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) that coherently extends c we have that \(\sum _w p(w)B(w)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^mc(X_i)b_i\). As \(\sum _wp(w)A(w)=a\), c prefers A to B. Analogously, by Lemma 1, each \(c'_j\) prefers \(A'\) to \(B'\). Finally, note that \(B(w)+B'(w)=0>a-a'=A(w)+A'(w)\) for any \(w\in W\), therefore \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) is vulnerable to a Strong Dutch Strategy.

  2. (b)

    Assume there are weights \(\lambda _j\in [0,1]\), summing up to one, such that \(c(X)=\sum _j\lambda _jc'_j(X)\) for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\). To prove by contradiction, suppose there are acts \(A,A',B,B'\) such that c prefers A to B, each \(c_j\) prefers \(A'\) to \(B'\), but \(A(w)+A'(w)<B(w)+B'(w)\) at any \(w \in W\). For each \(c'_j\), consider a credence function \(p'_j:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) that coherently extends it, thus preferring \(A'\) to \(B'\). Defining \(p:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) via \(p(w)=\sum _j\lambda _jp'_j(w)\) for all \(w\in W\), we have that \(\langle {p,p'}\rangle\) satisfies wGRP. Note that p coherently extends c, hence preferring A to B. Consequently, \(\langle {p,p'}\rangle\) is vulnerable to a Strong Dutch Strategy, which contradicts Theorem 1(b).

\(\square\)

Theorem 4

Let \(c:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\) be a personally probabilistic credence function and \(c'=\langle {c'_1,\dots ,c'_n}\rangle\) be the set of possible future personally probabilistic credence functions defined over \({\mathcal {F}}\).

  1. (a)

    If \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) violates wGRP, then it is accuracy dominated.

  2. (b)

    If \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) satisfies wGRP, then it is not accuracy dominated.

Proof

(a) See the (\(\rightarrow\))-part of the proof of Theorem 2 (Pettigrew, 2023), just interpreting W as a set of personally possible worlds.

(b) Suppose \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) satisfies wGRP, so that there are \(\lambda _1,\dots ,\lambda _n\in [0,1]\) such that \(\sum \limits _j\lambda _j=1\) and \(c(X)=\sum \limits _{j=1}^n\lambda _jc_j(X)\) for any \(X\in {\mathcal {F}}\). To prove by contradiction, assume \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) is accuracy dominated: there are credence functions \(c^*,c^*_1,\dots ,c^*_n\), defined on \({\mathcal {F}}\), such that \({\mathfrak {I}}(c,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c'_j,w)>{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*_j,w)\) for all \(w\in W\) and \(1\le j\le n\). Since accuracy is measured with an additive strictly proper \({\mathfrak {I}}\), there is a strictly proper scoring rule s such that, for any credence function \({\hat{c}}\), \({\mathfrak {I}}({\hat{c}},w)=\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}s(v_w(X),{\hat{c}}(X))\). For s is strictly proper, we have that, for any \(X\in {\mathcal {F}}\) and any \(1\le j\le n\):

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} c(X)s(1,c(X))+(1-c(X))s(0,c(X))\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \le c(X)s(1,c^*(X))+(1-c(X))s(0,c^*(X)) \end{aligned}$$
(1)
$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} c'_j(X)s(1,c'_j(X))+(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c'_j(X))\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \le c'_j(X)s(1,c^*_j(X))+(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c^*_j(X)) \end{aligned}$$
(2)

If we replace those c(X) out of the scope of s(.) by \(\sum _j\lambda _jc_j(X)\) in Expression (1) (note also that \(\sum _j\lambda _j=1\)) and, in Expression (2), multiply both sides by \(\lambda _j\) before summing for all j, we obtain, respectively:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \sum \limits _j\lambda _jc'_j(X)s(1,c(X))+\sum \limits _j\lambda _j(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c(X))\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \le \sum \limits _j\lambda _jc'_j(X)s(1,c^*(X))+\sum \limits _j\lambda _j(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c^*(X)) \end{aligned}$$
(3)
$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\big [c'_j(X)s(1,c'_j(X))+(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c'_j(X))\big ]\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \le \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\big [ c'_j(X)s(1,c^*_j(X))+(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c^*_j(X))\big ] \end{aligned}$$
(4)

Grouping the summations in j in each side of Expression (3), it can be added to Expression (4) to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\big [c'_j(X)(s(1,c(X))+s(1,c'_j(X)))+(1-c'_j(X))(s(0,c(X))+s(0,c'_j(X)))\big ]\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad \le \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\big [c'_j(X)(s(1,c^*(X))+s(1,c^*_j(X)))\nonumber \\{} & {} \qquad +(1-c'_j(X))(s(0,c^*(X))+s(0,c^*_j(X)))\big ] \end{aligned}$$
(5)

Since \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) is accuracy dominated by \(c^*\) and \(\langle {c^*_1,\dots ,c^*_n}\rangle\), \({\mathfrak {I}}(c,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c'_j,w)>{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*_j,w)\) for all \(w\in W\) and \(1\le j\le n\). Multiplying each side of this inequality by \(\lambda _jp_j(w)\), for a \(p_j\) that coherently extends \(c'_j\), and summing for all \(w \in W\) and all \(1\le j \le n\), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\sum \limits _w p_j(w)\big [{\mathfrak {I}}(c,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c'_j,w)\big ]> \sum \limits _j\lambda _j\sum \limits _w p_j(w)\big [{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*,w)+{\mathfrak {I}}(c^*_j,w)\big ] \end{aligned}$$
(6)

Recall that, for any \({\hat{c}}:{\mathcal {F}}\rightarrow [0,1]\), \({\mathfrak {I}}({\hat{c}},w)=\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}s(v_w(X),{\hat{c}}(X))\). Thus, for any \({\hat{c}}\), \({\mathfrak {I}}({\hat{c}},w)\) can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} {\mathfrak {I}}({\hat{c}},w) = \sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}v_w(X)s(1,{\hat{c}}(X))+\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}(1-v_w(X))s(0,{\hat{c}}(X))\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad = \sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}v_w(X)s(1,{\hat{c}}(X)) -\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}v_w(X)s(0,{\hat{c}}(X))+\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}s(0,{\hat{c}}(X)) \end{aligned}$$
(7)

If \({\hat{c}}\) is fixed, the first two summations in Expression (7) can be viewed as acts in the format \(\sum _ia_iv_w(X_i)\). Hence, applying Lemma 1 to \(\sum _w p_j(w){\mathfrak {I}}(c,w)\) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}c'_j(X)s(1,c(X))-\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}c'_j(X)s(0,c(X))+\sum \limits _w p_j(w)\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}s(0,c(X)) \end{aligned}$$

As \(\sum \limits _w p_j(w)=1\), a bit of algebraic manipulation results in:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}\big [c'_j(X)s(1,c(X))+(1-c'_j(X))s(0,c(X))\big ] \end{aligned}$$

Analogously, we can apply Lemma 1 to each \(\sum _w p_j(w){\mathfrak {I}}(\cdot ,w)\) resulting from Expression (6), obtaining:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} \sum \limits _j\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}\lambda _j\big [c'_j(X)(s(1,c(X))+s(1,c'_j(X)))\nonumber \\{} & {} \qquad +(1-c'_j(X))(s(0,c(X))+s(0,c'_j(X)))\big ]\nonumber \\{} & {} \quad >\sum \limits _j\sum \limits _{X\in {\mathcal {F}}}\lambda _j\big [c'_j(X)(s(1,c^*(X))+s(1,c^*_j(X)))\nonumber \\{} & {} \qquad +(1-c'_j(X))(s(0,c^*(X))+s(0,c^*_j(X)))\big ] \end{aligned}$$
(8)

But note that this is just the negation of Expression (5) summed for all \(X\in {\mathcal {F}}\), which is a contradiction, completing the proof. \(\square\)

Theorem 5

Let c be a credence function. Let \(c'=\langle {c'_1,\dots ,c'_n}\rangle\) be an updating rule for a partition \(\{E_1,\dots ,E_n\}\) of W, respecting it. If the pair \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) satisfies the Weak General Reflection Principle, then \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) is superconditioning.

Proof

As \(c'\) respects the partition \(\{E_1,\dots , E_n\}\), for each \(1\le i\le n\) there is a function \(p_i:W\rightarrow [0,1]\), with \(\sum \limits _{w\in W}p_i(w)=1\), such that \(c'_i(X)=\sum \limits _{w \in W}p_i(w)v_w(X)\) for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\) and \(\sum \limits _{w \in E_i}p_i(w)=1\). wGRP implies that, for some \(\lambda _1,\dots ,\lambda _n\in [0,1]\) with \(\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _i=1\), we have that \(c(X)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^n \lambda _ic'_i(X)\) for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\). Thus, \(c(X)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^n \lambda _i\sum \limits _{w \in W}p_i(w)v_w(X)=\sum \limits _{w\in W}\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _ip_i(w)v_w(X)\) for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\). Let the function \(p:W\rightarrow [0,1]\) be such that \(p(w)=\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _ip_i(w)\) for all \(w \in W\). Note that \(\sum \limits _{w \in W}p(w)=1\).

Now consider an element \(E_j\) of the partition. We have, for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\), that \(\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}p(w)v_w(X)=\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}v_w(X)\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _ip_i(w)\). Given that, for any \(w\in E_j\), \(p_i(w)=0\) whenever \(i\ne j\), as the partition is respected, it follows that \(\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}v_w(X)\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _ip_i(w)=\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}v_w(X)\lambda _jp_j(w)=\lambda _j\sum \limits _{w\in W}v_w(X)p_j(w)\). For all \(E_j\), we also have that \(\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}p(w)=\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}\sum \limits _{i=1}^n\lambda _ip_i(w)=\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}\lambda _jp_j(w)\), thus \(\sum \limits _{w \in E_j}p(w)=\lambda _j\sum \limits _{w \in E_j}p_j(w)=\lambda _j\). Finally, for each \(1\le j \le n\) with \(\sum \limits _{w \in E_j}p(w)=\lambda _j>0\), we obtain, for all \(X \in {\mathcal {F}}\):

$$\begin{aligned} c_j'(X)=\sum _{w \in W}p_j(w)v_w(X)= \frac{\lambda _j\sum \limits _{w \in W}p_j(w)v_w(X)}{\lambda _j} =\frac{\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}p(w)v_w(X)}{\sum \limits _{w\in E_j}p(w)} \end{aligned}$$

Consequently, \(\langle {c,c'}\rangle\) is superconditioning. \(\square\)

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Staffel, J., De Bona, G. An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization. Erkenn (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00676-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00676-5

Navigation