Résumé
L'article fait le point sur les thèses néo-institutionnalistes et sur la théorie des jeux telles qu'elles ont été «appliquées», à l'histoire. L'analyse des marchés principaux (travail, terre, crédit) et leur impact sur la théorie du développement sont également présentés. L'auteur prend ensuite en considération la théorie des jeux, il en discute les hypothèses et les présupposés de manière à rendre explicites les usages qui en ont été faits en histoire. La dernière partie introduit des notions plus complexes de rationalité économique, distingue entre information et connaissance et propose un schéma heuristique permettant d'intégrer certains éléments de l'économie de l'information et des jeux dans des démarches qui tiennent compte des notions temporelles propres à l'historiographie.
Abstract
The paper reviews the main «applications» to economic history of neo-institutionalist and game theories. The analysis of labor, land and credit markets as well as their implications for the theory of development are equally discussed. The author then discusses the main game theories, their hypotheses and assertions in order to elucidate their historiographical uses. The last part of the paper introduces more complex notions of rationality, while distinguishing between information and learning; it finally suggests an heuristic scheme able to integrate certain elements of the economy of information and games into historical notions of time.
Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel behandelt die wichtigsten Anwendungen der neoinstitutionalistischen Theorien und der Spieltheorie auf die Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Ferner geht es um die Analyse der wichtigsten Märkte (Arbeit, Grund und Boden, Finanzen). Danach wird die Spieltheorie untersucht, wobei der Verfasser deren Annahmen und Voraussetzungen diskutiert, um ihre Anwendung in der Geschichtswissenschaft zu verdeutlichen. Im letzten Teil des Artikels werden komplexere Begriffe der wirtschaftlichen Rationalität eingeführt, wobei zwischen Information und Wissen unterschieden wird. Das dabei eingeführte heuristische Schema ermöglicht die Einbeziehung bestimmter Elemente der Informationsökonomie und der Spieltheorie bei der Untersuchung der in der Geschichtsschreibung verwendeten Zeitbegriffe.
Resumen
El articulo estudia la «aplicación» de las tesis neoinstitucionalistas y de la teoría de juegos a la historia. Se discute inicialmente el análisis de algunos mercados importantes (trabajo, tierra, crédito), y su impacto sobre la teoría del desarrollo. A continuación, se tratan las hipótesis y presupuestos de la teoría de juegos con objeto de mostrar el uso que se hace de ellos en historiografía. La parte final introduce concepciones más complejas de la racionalidad económica. Se distingue entre información y conocimiento, y se propone un esquema heurístico que permite integrar ciertos elementos de la economía de la información y de la teoría de juegos en enfoques teóricos que tengan en cuenta los conceptos temporales característicos de la historia.
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AlessandroStanziani, né en 1961, est chargé de recherche au Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Ses travaux portent, d'une part, sur l'histoire de l'économie, de la pensée économique et statistique en Russie entre 1861 et 1930, et, d'autre part, sur le thème «histoire économique, information et institutions: les marchés du vin français et internationaux entre 1870 et 1914».
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Stanziani, A. Information, institutions et temporalité quelques remarques critiques sur l'usage de la nouvelle économie de l'information en histoire. Rev synth 121, 117–155 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02962738
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02962738