Abstract
Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social phenomenon. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, Gilbert’s thesis that certain kinds of collective intentionality presuppose joint normative commitments is introduced. Second, it is argued that, on this view, individual commitments can only constitute the relevant kinds of collective intentional states if there are socially shared “principles of membership” that connect the force of individual commitments to a shared content. Third, it is shown that strong collective intentionality depends on the practical acceptance of shared norms and on the establishment of authority relations through mutual recognition.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
It is implausible to claim that the content of the derived individual commitment can always be straightforwardly derived from the content of the joint commitment without further information about the social context (Gilbert 2006, p. 136). Firstly, there are types of collective commitments that do not have the promotion of a goal as their content, and secondly, the individual commitments flowing from the joint commitment to a goal need not be commitments to promote that goal, although functional constraints usually guarantee that they do not diverge too far.
- 3.
In the case of an individual intention, fully understanding a person’s intention entails understanding what this intention commits her to. In the collective case, however, even a full understanding of the collective intention leaves open the further question of what individual commitments one has to accept to count as a member of the relevant group.
- 4.
As Philip Pettit (2003) notes, we can attribute to groups minds of their own if they collectivise reason in an appropriate way. Thus, the individual commitments necessary for plural subjecthood could be understood as commitments to collectivise reason without it being necessary for the participants to be personally committed to the result of this process.
- 5.
Of course, nothing keeps us from only talking about the individual membership commitments (as part of an explanatory story, for example). But we will miss the point of these commitments if we do not see that they socially institute the group as a plural subject.
- 6.
This argument connects to a point frequently made by Tuomela: collective action types have to be available for members of a community in order for concrete collective actions to be possible. This issue is also discussed in Stekeler-Weithofer (2002).
- 7.
This approach is very similar to Tollefsen’s (2002) analysis, which describes the ascription of collective intentional states from the perspective of Dennett’s and Davidson’s “interpretationism”.
References
Brandom, R. 1994. Making it explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R. 2009. Reason in philosophy. Animating ideas. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. 1999. Shared intention. In Faces of intention, 109–129. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilbert, M. 1987. Modelling collective belief. Synthese 73(1): 185–204.
Gilbert, M. 1989. On social facts. London: Routledge.
Gilbert, M. 1990. Walking together: A paradigmatic social phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: 1–14.
Gilbert, M. 1996. Living together. Rationality, sociality and obligation. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gilbert, M. 1999. Obligation and joint commitment. Utilitas 11(2): 143–163.
Gilbert, M. 2002a. Acting together. In Social facts and collective intentionality, ed. G. Meggle, 53–72. Frankfurt a. M: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG.
Gilbert, M. 2002b. Considerations on joint commitment: Responses to various comments. In Social facts and collective intentionality, ed. G. Meggle, 73–10. Frankfurt a. M: Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG.
Gilbert, M. 2006. A theory of political obligation: Membership, commitment, and the bonds of society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Meijers, A. 2003. Can collective intentionality be individualized? The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62(1): 167–183.
Pettit, P. 2003. Groups with minds of their own. In Socializing metaphysics, ed. F. Schmitt, 172–175. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Searle, J. 1995. The construction of social reality. London: The Penguin Press.
Shockley, K. 2004. The conundrum of joint commitment. Social Theory and Practice 30(4): 535–557.
Stekeler-Weithofer, P. 2002. Zur Logik des ‘Wir’. Formen und Darstellungen gemeinsamer Praxis. In Kultur – Handlung – Wissenschaft, ed. M. Gutmann, D. Hartmann, and W. Zitterbarth. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.
Tollefsen, D. 2002. Organizations as true believers. Journal of Social Philosophy 33(3): 395–410.
Tollefsen, D. 2004. Collective intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/coll-int/. Accessed 19 Sept 2011.
Tuomela, R. 2007. The philosophy of sociality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stahl, T. (2014). The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership. In: Konzelmann Ziv, A., Schmid, H. (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6933-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6934-2
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)