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Harsanyi’s critical rule utilitarianism

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Abstract

In his recent book,Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium In Games and Social Situations, John C. Harsanyi devotes a chapter to his new theory of morality, which he calls ‘Critical Rule Utilitarianism’, and which contains his solution to the problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility. After a detailed exposition of his theory, arguments will be presented to show that:

  1. (i)

    there are certain formal difficulties in the solution that he offers which leads to a rejection of the axiom that there is to be agreement between an individualj’s personal preferences and individuali’s (ij) extended utility function out of which the social welfare function is to be constructed; and

  2. (ii)

    Harsanyi’s theory of critical rule utilitarianism cannot be accepted as a theory of morality because it presupposes a more fundamental theory in its actual construction.

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Stefanik, R.J. Harsanyi’s critical rule utilitarianism. Theor Decis 13, 71–80 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342604

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342604

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