Abstract
In his recent book,Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium In Games and Social Situations, John C. Harsanyi devotes a chapter to his new theory of morality, which he calls ‘Critical Rule Utilitarianism’, and which contains his solution to the problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility. After a detailed exposition of his theory, arguments will be presented to show that:
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(i)
there are certain formal difficulties in the solution that he offers which leads to a rejection of the axiom that there is to be agreement between an individualj’s personal preferences and individuali’s (i ≠j) extended utility function out of which the social welfare function is to be constructed; and
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(ii)
Harsanyi’s theory of critical rule utilitarianism cannot be accepted as a theory of morality because it presupposes a more fundamental theory in its actual construction.
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Stefanik, R.J. Harsanyi’s critical rule utilitarianism. Theor Decis 13, 71–80 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342604
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02342604