Lehrer on Knowledge and Causation

Abstract

Keith Lehrer has argued that it is possible to have knowledge of a proposition despite the fact that one’s belief in that proposition is causally unrelated to one’s epistemic reasons. This is an interesting and contentious claim, but an assessment of it is not the task of this paper. Instead, I will argue that Lehrer, and perhaps one critic as well, both take Lehrer’s theory to entail that knowledge is possible without causation by reasons, but that this is mistaken. Lehrer’s theory as it stands actually delivers no verdict on the issue of whether proper causation is necessary for knowledge or a belief’s being justified. While this means that the coherence of Lehrer’s theory can be saved should his treatment of these issues yield counterintuitive results, it also means that the theory as it currently stands is incomplete. The theory simply does not make any predictions about certain kinds of examples, and this reveals that Lehrer’s theory is unfinished in an important respect.