Abstract
Peter van Inwagen’s short piece on the possibility of resurrection via simulacrum from 1978 has been regularly condemned for its overall implausibility. However, this paper argues that van Inwagen’s thesis has been unfairly criticized and remains a live and salutary option. It begins by summarizing the metaphysics of the simulacrum theory of the resurrection alongside the motivation for such a theory. Next, it challenges the four main criticisms against the van Inwagen styled simulacrum model. First, it argues that while van Inwagen’s model may appear unnecessary or irrelevant for those that reject his metaphysics of human persons, an account like his is necessary for those that desire to maintain the traditional metaphysics of resurrection (e.g., the resurrection of the “self-same” body). Second, it argues that his model does not implicate God in mass deception or irreverence for the dead. Third, it rejects the idea that van Inwagen’s model is analogous to the implausibility of young earth creationism and its required claims like dinosaur bones being given the appearance of age. Fourth, it argues that his model is not metaphysically impossible for scenarios where someone is simultaneously killed and destroyed, such as in nuclear blasts.
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Notes
See the confessional consensus on such a view of the resurrection in numerous Protestant confessions such as the Westminster Confession of Faith 32.2, The Second London Confession of Faith 31.2, and The Savoy Declaration 31.2.
See for example: (Strickland 2010).
I would like to thank Nikk Effingham, Martin Pickup, Matt Ntiros, and Yujin Nagasawa for comments on earlier versions of this essay.
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Steffaniak, J.L. Resurrecting van Inwagen’s simulacrum: a defense. Int J Philos Relig 93, 211–225 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09861-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09861-6