Summary
With the help of psychological and biological concepts it is possible todescribe adequately a fundamental class of inductive inferences that are intuitively correct. Moreover, by relying on evolutionary theories it is possible tojustify them, because they reflect innate, hence useful, capacities. These inferences, however, refer to the past, i.e. the inferred generalization is of the form “All Awere B”. The reason is that evolutionary theories only claim that innate capacitieshad survival value. With respect to inductive inferences about the future the situation is different. In particular, they are affected by the Goodman paradox. In the article, a method is proposed which enables us to describe adequately a basic class of inductive inferences about the future which are intuitively correct. These inferences can also be justified, but their justification requires a very specific assumption. The conclusions arrived at in the article can be viewed as a satisfactory solution to the Goodman paradox.
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References
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I am indebted to Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Allan Berger, David Hull, and Joseph S. Ullian for valuable criticism.
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Stemmer, N. The goodman paradox. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 6, 340–354 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800794
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800794