Abstract
In “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Derrida maintains that crisis is endemic to philosophy rather than being, as Husserl forcefully argued, a temporary condition that can and must be overcome through the resources of reason. A reflection on the place of madness in Descartes's Meditations serves as the point of departure for demonstrating that Derrida has done an injustice to philosophy; and a comparison of Derrida's views with the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche reveals that Derrida's position in “Cogito and the History of Madness” entails a sacrifice of the notion of responsibility that lies at the center of meaningful historical action.
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Steiner, G. “This project is mad”: Descartes, Derrida, and the notion of philosophical crisis. Continental Philosophy Review 30, 179–198 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004239223745
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004239223745