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Why Should Remorse be a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing?

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Abstract

This article critically examines the rationales for the well-settled principle in sentencing law that an offender’s remorse is to be treated as a mitigating factor. Four basic types of rationale are examined: remorse makes punishment redundant; offering mitigation can induce remorse; remorse should be rewarded with mitigation; and remorse should be recognised by mitigation. The first three rationales each suffer from certain weaknesses or limitations, and are argued to be not as persuasive as the fourth. The article then considers, and rejects, two arguments against remorse as a mitigating factor in sentencing: that the crime, not the offender, is the focus of punishment; and that the truly remorseful offender would not ask for mitigation. The article concludes with a brief consideration of whether a lack of remorse should be an aggravating factor.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, the following legal authorities in some of the main Anglophone jurisdictions: United Kingdom: R v Cooksey [2005] EWCA Crim 3395; R v Cooksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996, [2003] 3 All ER 40; R v Archer [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 76; R v Fraser (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 254; R v Harper; R v De Haan [1968] 2 QB 108; Amendment No 8 to the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction (IV.49 sections 18 and 31) [2004] All ER(D) 552; Sentencing Guidelines Council, Overarching Principles: Seriousness (Guideline) (December 2004) para 1.27; United States: United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §3E1.1 and §5K2.16 (Nov. 2006); and the various state statutes and cases cited in Ward (2003: n 43); Canada: R v Zeek (2004) 193 BCAC 104; R v Anderson (1992) 16 BCAC 14; R v Sawchyn (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 600; Australia: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s. 16A(2)(f); Neal v R (1982) 149 CLR 305; R v Thomson (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; R v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442.

  2. The characterisation of remorse used here draws upon Tudor (2001). See also Gaita (2004, chap. 4) and Taylor (1996).

  3. Cf. Habermas’s conception of communicative action as action that is ‘oriented to reaching understanding’ (1984, pp. 285ff).

  4. I draw here upon Tasioulas (2006). Tasioulas maintains that ‘antecedent repentance’ (equivalent here to remorse prior to sentencing) can justify tempering punishment on the basis that such repentance is appropriately connected to the censuring punishment by sharing a focus on the original wrongdoing (pp. 316–319). However, I would not, as does Tasioulas, describe that tempering as involving ‘mercy’. He does so because he maintains that the offender’s deserved or just punishment is determined by the gravity of the original offence and a downward departure from desert or justice is a matter of mercy. In contrast, I maintain that post-offence, pre-sentence remorse helps to determine the just censuring sentence of this offender here and now. (Cf. Duff 2007, pp. 384f, on Tasioulas.)

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Acknowledgements

Thanks are owed to Professor R. A. Duff, Dr Michael Proeve, Mr Dennis Warren, Ms Marilyn McMahon, and an anonymous referee for their assistance in the preparation of this article.

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  1. School of Law, La Trobe University, Kingsbury Drive, Bundoora, Melbourne, VIC, 3086, Australia

    Steven Keith Tudor

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  1. Steven Keith Tudor
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Correspondence to Steven Keith Tudor.

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Tudor, S.K. Why Should Remorse be a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing?. Criminal Law, Philosophy 2, 241–257 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-007-9044-z

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